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ABSTRACT
THEODOR ADORNO'S 'POLITICAL DEFICIT'
FEBRUARY 1995
MICHAEL D. PARKHURST, B.A., REED COLLEGE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Nicholas Xenos
This dissertation explores what some critics have
called the 'political deficit' in the work of Theodor
Adorno; his harsh criticism of late capitalist society seems
to demand some explicit discussion of oppositional or
revolutionary politics, but Adorno refuses any consideration
of political strategy or tactics.
I trace Adorno' s 'deficit' through his analyses of the
economic, psychoanalytic, and cultural dimensions of
contemporary society, to show that much of his work can be
taken as an implicit argument for the irrelevance of any
imaginable form of 'politics, ' and for the practical
impossibility (in the present) of revolutionary politics in
any meaningful sense.
In the middle chapters of the dissertation, I discuss
what Adorno sees as the still potentially liberatory moments
of art and theory, given that praxis has fallen into an
indefinite period of hibernation.
The final chapter attempts an immanent critique of
Adorno' s foreclosure of meaningful politics, arguing that a
v
renewal of critical theory will depend upon a more thorough
commitment to the interdisciplinary program Adorno and his
Frankfurt School colleagues attempted. Specifically, social
theory needs to connect the insights of political economy to
cultural analysis and attention to the constitution of
subjectivity
.
Finally, I suggest some non-Adornian avenues for a
renewal of critical theory, emphasizing two moments whose
political significance has been neglected by both first- and
second-generation critical theory. First, I argue we need
to rescue the dialectic of desire and recognition from
premature Hegelian harmony, to understand the importance of
intersubjectivity for any 'progressive' political project.
Lastly, I argue that critical theory would do well to
incorporate some sustained attention to the meaning and
practice of solidarity, as the positive cohesion necessary
to sustain a political movement.
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INTRODUCTION
In the twenty-three volumes of Theodor Adorno's Gesam-
melte Schriften, there is none titled "Politische Schrift-
en M
; politics seems not to figure very prominently in his
work. At the same time, virtually every paragraph he had a
hand in is informed by a sophisticated and critical parti-
sanship—in the very best sense: Adorno never allows the
reader to forget that even the most recondite topics are
bound up in a "damaged" state-of-affairs which must be
understood as historical and therefore (potentially) corri-
gible .
This infamous pessimist asserts over and over again
that a post-scarcity Utopia is a technical possibility. The
industrial revolution and the advent of a truly global
economy have made it possible to dispense with the stick
with which humanity has threatened itself from time immemo
rial
:
It cannot be denied ... that in the increasing degree of
satisfaction of material needs, in spite of their deforma-
tion by the social apparatus, the possibility of a life
without indigence is incomparably more concretely possible
than before. Even in the poorest lands, no one would need
to go hungry anymore. 1
That people starve under capitalism is for Adorno a fully
sufficient (if hardly exhaustive) indictment of the irrati
nality of the disenchanted economy. While he was no enthu
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siast of technical "Progress," he argues (as Marcuse and
Murray Bookchin would after him) that exchange relations
under mature capitalism bar the way to a qualitative break
with the history of material scarcity.
In other words, however much some readers would like to
rescue Adorno from what they see as an unfortunate Marxist
residue, 2 the Utopian ostinato in all his work can not be
ignored; the demand for a radical reconfiguration of social
relations can not be discreetly excised without doing vio-
lence to Adorno. Any such attempt to make Adorno 'respect-
able' not only does a disservice to the diversity and vital-
ity of Marxist intellectual traditions, but makes it impos-
sible to make sense of Adorno ' s work.
On the other side of this divide are the leftists who
would like to revoke Adorno 's socialist credentials. Adorno
has been chastised by even his most sympathetic critics for
his "political deficit." Fredric Jameson may be the only
major commentator who doesn't at some point reach for the
Theses on Feuerbach to cudgel Adorno. Whether it is put
down to pessimism, "mandarinism, " obstinance, or simple
forgetfulness, Buck-Morss, Jay, and Rose—to say nothing of
Habermas and various Marxists and post-marxists—have all
found themselves confessing that there is something missing
from Adorno: a theory of power, of revolution or resis-
tance :
Although Adorno staunchly rejected the accusation
that he was really an apolitical aesthete, it is
2
hard to avoid the conclusion that there was what
many of his German critics liked to call a 'poli-
tical deficit' in his theory. For when Adorno
spoke of power, it was always in terms of a perva-
sive and diffuse domination that transcended any
identifiable political realm. 3
While the substance of this criticism is an important
part of a fair assessment of his legacy, this chorus of
rebuke—that Adorno is not Lenin, nor even Marcuse—has shed
little light on the theoretical basis for Adorno 's "lack,"
and less on how one might take up the question of "politics"
or resistance, knowing what Adorno knows.
It is unlikely that Adorno simply forgot to address
politics in his work. If we can also discount the possibil-
ity that Adorno felt he had nothing interesting or important
to say about political matters, then we are left to consider
why he would refrain from any significant work on the state,
revolution, organization, etc.
The main thread of this dissertation is an exploration
of this 'political deficit' in Adorno 's work. I am critical
of attempts to dismiss Adorno for this 'failure,' and I make
the strongest case I can for a reading that shows the 'poli-
tical deficit' to be an attribute of contemporary society as
much as of Adorno 's theoretical standpoint.
At the same time, I argue that there is a kind of
'deficit,' or gap, between his theoretical aspirations and
his political conclusions, and I point out the moments where
the dialectic stalls in Adorno 's work.
3
In a nutshell, I want to show that there is a logic
behind Adorno's refusal to speculate upon political prac-
tice, that this logic is flawed, and finally that it is
possible to retrace Adorno's analysis in a way that lives up
to its highest theoretical intentions without being led into
the same political dead-end.
Chapter one explores the dimensions of the various
'political deficits' that have been attributed to Adorno.
This chapter begins to reconstruct the hole where politics
'ought' to be, with a recapitulation of his critique of late
capitalism, structured around his deployment of economic,
psychoanalytic, and philosophical analyses.
Chapter two discusses the powerfully depoliticizing
operation of the culture industry, as well as the 'withdraw-
al' of politics into autonomous art. This completes the
description of a 'totally administered' society in which
politics has no bearing whatsoever on the basic processes of
domination
.
Taken together, these first two chapters establish
Adorno's own implicit response to the objection he has
neglected politics: to put it as starkly as possible, there
is nothing left to neglect. Adorno's work deeply problema-
tizes the basic assumptions of both liberal and Marxist
political theory.
More than anything else, this is because the subject is
dead. Adorno and his colleagues in the Frankfurt school
4
attempt to weave together an analysis of the trajectory of
twentieth-century capitalism with a psychoanalytic account
of the formation of subjectivity. Adorno becomes convinced
early on in his career that the qualities of autonomy and
reflection, which any hope for a rational, meaningful poli-
tics takes for granted, are being systematically undermined
by late capitalism. Industrial modernity kills off both the
citizen and the proletariat.
The failure of Marxism's practical challenge to capi-
talism, symbolized in the most unmistakeable terms by the
success of Nazism (as well as the perversion of the Soviet
experiment), leaves a profound political vacuum in the
world. Adorno can take no comfort in the defeat of Fascism
(nor would the collapse of official Communism cheer him),
because the victorious society has become a mockery of its
ideals of freedom and justice.
What remains of the political impulse to praxis, in a
world seen as utterly hostile to it, is the focus of chapter
three. In this chapter, I elaborate on Adorno 's conception
of the practical dimension of critical theory. This chapter
argues that Adorno' s work is best understood in the context
of the highest ambitions of the Enlightenment, read through
the lens of Marx's critique of capitalism.
It is here, in the gap between the political situation
that Adorno describes, and the only practical avenues for
5
resistance that he is able to endorse, that the 'political
deficit' of his analysis is most poignant.
I point out in the first three chapters moments where
Adorno's analysis fails to live up to its own standards. In
chapter four, I attempt to outline some possible Adornian
ways out of Adorno's political dead-end. Ultimately, I want
to challenge his narrative of a dramatic, irreversible Fall
from (merely really bad) liberal capitalism which he uses to
bolster his critigue of (catastrophically bad) contemporary
capitalism
.
Crucial to this project is a re-examination of politi-
cal economy and psychoanalytic theory. In addition I turn
to moments in Hegel (whose work was a major source of inspi-
ration and provocation for Adorno) which point beyond the
solipsistic trap Adorno falls into. The role of desire in
the Hegelian narrative, I argue, points the way to a theory
of solidarity which would move Adorno's analysis beyond its
allergic recoil from collective action.
My own critigue of Adorno's 'deficit' also includes his
failure to take mediating institutions of late capitalist
society (everything between the crippled particular and the
mad universal) seriously enough. His very sophisticated
work on aesthetics allows culture (broadly speaking) to
straddle the Marxist divide of base/superstructure. But
political action is granted much less leeway in Adorno, and
is implicitly assigned a purely epiphenomenal status. I
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argue, again turning to Hegel for support, that Adorno fails
to recognize (or theorize) the powerful constitutive element
of political involvement.
Any attempt to give an account of "Adorno 1 s thought" or
"major themes in Adorno" has to contend with the systematiz-
ing impulse he criticized relentlessly; like Nietzsche,
Adorno makes one aware that the will-to-summarize is a will-
to-power .
It is not my intention to offer a compact Michelin
guidebook to 'The Philosophy of T. w. Adorno,' nor to pro-
duce a "more accessible" digest which would displace the
original texts. (Nothing would measure the success of this
project better than the degree to which it sharpens the
reader's thirst for Adorno 's own work).
If we are to take Adorno 's invocations of the fragment
and the anti-systemic seriously, we must be extremely wary
of "reconstructing" Adorno 's philosophy. What Max Pensky
says of Aesthetic Theory applies to any attempt to grapple
with Adorno:
A reconstructive approach ... risks inflicting on
the text precisely the violence that Adorno him-
self so skilfully deploys against itself: it would
reinscribe a will to completeness within the de-
liberately fragmentary, hence in effect ruining
the ruin by rebuilding it, and violently returning
Aesthetic Theory to the family of idealistic stun-
measure-tag-and-release theoretical projects it
disowns
.
4
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While the discussion of this dissertation does wind
through what I take to be the major themes in his work (even
"ordering" these themes under three headings), it does so
not in a cartographic spirit that registers the lay of the
land from on high, but rather in the pursuit of one (rather
big) question: what happened to politics? Still, I may
arguably be even more tempted than the cartographer to
smooth over tensions and contradictions on behalf of narra-
tive momentum.
Alternatively, one could latch onto the seductive
metaphor of the constellation, and situate Adorno's various
themes and polemics relative to the gravitational fields of
"identity," "mimesis," etc. One might in this fashion
succeed in maintaining tensions and aporias that would be
forcibly reconciled by a "reconstructive" approach.
I have avoided this, perhaps only because the metaphor
comes a little too easily to mind, and can only be realized
without trying to force the discussion into a constellation.
What I have tried to do instead is read and re-read Adorno's
text with an ear out for what is said—and much more often
not said—about "the political" without any geometrical or
astrological template in mind.
The orderliness of my presentation reflects, not so
much a systematizing impulse on Adorno's part (nor on mine),
but rather the systematic character of the totality he
criticized. At the same time, one of the central claims I
8
make in the first chapter is that one cannot pry Adorno's
philosophical insights (which are in some sense certainly
the most impressive side of his work) away from his econom-
ic, psychological, and cultural analyses (which are not
uniformly successful).
Like any project which sports a first and last page,
this one would masguerade as an organic, complete project;
certainly it is far from that. There are two obvious ave-
nues for extending the reach and significance of the work I
have done here.
The first suggests itself in recent readings of Adorno
as a kind of proto-postmodernist
. Adorno's relation to
theorists like Derrida, Foucault, and Baudrillard, will be
one of the major concerns of the next stage of this project.
I am particularly wary of is the tendency to show that
Adorno is a precursor of, say, Derrida, in a way that sug-
gests that postmodern theory supersedes Adorno. At least as
important as his consonance with some 'postmodern' themes,
is Adorno's non-identity with postmodernism.
The other project which will play a prominent part in
later work is a thorough encounter with Jiirgen Habermas.
The weight of Habermas' writing hovered over my dissertation
from the very outset; in large part, I began this as a
contribution to the attempt to remind contemporary theory
that Habermas and discourse ethics are not the alpha and
9
omega of "Critical Theory." Without perhaps intending it,
Habermas has (at least in the United States) eclipsed the
first generation of critical theorists to the point that it
is not uncommon at all to find books published of the vari-
ety Critical Theory and Such-and-Such which utterly lack any
substantive mention of Horkheimer or Marcuse or Adorno.
This is not a brilliant excuse for ignoring Habermas,
who is after all one of the major commentators on the work
of his former mentors, and I have tried to include him on
precisely those terms. There is still a palpable necessity
for someone to directly address the continuities and discon-
tinuities between the critical theory pursued by Adorno et
al . and the project of Habermas. In this context, it made
theoretical and practical sense to keep the focus on Ador-
no 1 s work
.
This is why Adorno 1 s colleagues in the Frankfurt School
get rather short shrift as well. Horkheimer 1 s name recurs
mostly in discussion of collaborative works with Adorno like
Dialectic of Enlightenment (and I take their claim to have
fully collaborated at face value— I make no attempt to sort
out which sentences 'belong' to which thinker). Marcuse and
others appear in passing. In truth, the delineation of the
differences in emphasis within the Frankfurt School is
fairly adequately accomplished in the most notable overviews
5
of critical theory.
10
This is an opportune moment to mention the extraordi-
narily fine level of the secondary literature on Adorno, to
which I am afraid I have hardly done justice. My work would
not have been possible without the trail-blazing scholarship
of Gillian Rose, Susan Buck-Morss , Martin Jay, and Fredric
Jameson. They hardly exhaust the list of writers whose work
was useful to me, and the traces of many others can be found
in my footnotes. As solitary as this project has felt
sometimes, I would like to think it is really a kind of
indirect and obscure collaboration with the discontinuous
community of readers who have found it hard to dispense with
Adorno
.
11
1. "Is Marx Obsolete?" trans, by Nicolas Slater, Diogenes,
64, Winter 1968, p. 8.
2. This trend is most visible among those that want to
claim Adorno's critique of identity as a kind of postmodern-
ism avant la lettre. See e.g., Drucilla Cornell, The Phi-
losophy of the Limit (New York: Routledge, 1992), chs . 1-2.
3. Martin Jay, Adorno, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1984), p. 86.
4. Max Pensky, "on Zuidervaart 1 s Adorno's Aesthetic Theo-
ry," presented at the Society for Phenomenology and Existen-
tial Psychology, Boston, 1992.
5. See Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History
of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Re-
search, 7 923-1 950, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1973), and David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
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CHAPTER I
VALUE
,
DESIRE, AND REASON: THE EROSION OF SUBJECTIVITY
Adorno's 'political deficit' is no simple thing. His
work has been criticized from different quarters for embody-
ing a whole series of distinct political failures, among
which we can distinguish two broad strands: a critique of
his engagement with politics, and a disappointment with the
level of political analysis one can extract from his work.
Marxists and other radicals have always been disappointed
with Adorno. His focus on abstract philosophical issues,
his pessimism, and his lack of interest in concrete politi-
cal struggles add up, in the minds of more than one critic,
to a utopian rhetoric which hardly masks Adorno's fundamen-
tal departure from the Marxist project. 1 Adorno's refusal
to endorse or encourage the student movement of the 1960s
only cemented his reputation in this respect.
Even critics who do not expect Adorno to take up a place on
the barricades have found his analysis of society and poli-
tics lacking; Gillian Rose is perhaps the most eloquent and
trenchant critic to argue that Adorno fails to give us an
adequate "theory of socio-political action."
This chapter and the next will demonstrate that Adorno was
not ignoring politics, and did not forget 'the Revolution'
—
his 'pessimism' is not an idiosyncrasy, but the reasoned
1 3
conclusion of his analysis of the impact of late capitalism
on the psychological roots of resistance to domination. We
need to recognize in Adorno a subtle (if not completely
satisfying) negative political theory; not 'a theory of
socio-political action, 1 but a theory of socio-political
inaction
.
We assume for the moment then, that the 'political
deficit' might lie in the world at least as much as in
Adorno. Our task then, is to follow the lines of Adorno'
s
critique of late capitalist modernity, and to retrace the
logic that carried him into a blind alley from which revolu-
tion became too problematic to speculate upon. I begin with
the working hypothesis that Adorno had compelling reasons to
decline any discussion of "strategy and tactics" of resis-
tance, even where his own argument most calls out for it.
In later chapters I will argue that the momentum of his
analysis need not carry us into the same blind alley. For
now, we need to know how Adorno got there.
To learn anything from Adorno' s 'deficit' we must be
able to trace its provenance through the three dimensions of
Adorno' s radical critique of capitalist modernity: politi-
cal economy, psychoanalysis, and ideology. Careful atten-
tion will show that in each of these spheres Adorno' s work
is centrally concerned with the erosion of the bases of
resistance: civil society, the individual ego, and critical
thought all appear as endangered (if not extinct) prerequi-
1 4
sites of a just and free society. Taken together, the
critique of value, desire, and reason announce the end of
both liberal and revolutionary politics, and the obsoles-
cence of political theory attached to a rational, autonomous
subject
.
A. Value: State Capitalism & the End of Liberalism
Marx's critique of capitalism is evoked— if not elabo-
rated—at important junctures in nearly every text Adorno
wrote. Adorno clearly held onto several Marxist tenets as
indispensable analytic principles: capitalism as a totality
of (unequal) exchange; exploitation and class; commodifica-
tion and commodity fetishism; the tendency toward central-
ization and monopoly; the pernicious consequences of the
division of mental from manual labor; and the notion that
relations fetter forces of production. While these concepts
are more often cited than developed and critiqued, it would
be a mistake to assume that political economy was peripheral
to Adorno ' s project.
As with other traditions that he draws or comments
upon, Adorno nearly always presumes a familiarity with the
basic arguments of Marxism, and is more interested to "ap-
ply" these arguments in his enquiries into philosophy and
music than to delve very deeply into economic categories
themselves. While Adorno is willing to critique and re-work
1 5
certain philosophical categories from Marx (most notably
dialectics and materialism), the workings of political
economy are more or less taken for granted.
The economic dimension of Adorno
' s thought is fairly
unexplored territory. The few pages that Gillian Rose 3
devotes to Adorno
' s appropriation of Marxian political
economy are unfortunately unusual in their depth; more
typically, Adorno
' s frequent references to exchange are only
discussed in reference to the critique of identity theory,
and nothing much is made of his scattered, shorthand cita-
tions of the market, unequal exchange and the division of
labor
.
This lack of interest in political economy is no small
matter; economic assumptions are not only critical to Ador-
no ' s discussions of art and culture (as I'll demonstrate
next chapter), but essential to understanding anything of
his neglect of politics.
I will discuss Adorno ' s appropriation of Marxian no-
tions of commodif ication, exchange, and the division of
labor in appropriate contexts below (in relation to the
culture industry, the critique of identity, and the status
of theory, respectively). At this juncture, I want to delve
into Adorno' s "political deficit" through a consideration of
class and crisis theory in Adorno ' s political economy.
The capitalist economy figures in Adorno first and
foremost as a total system of exchange based on the univer-
16
sal fungibility of goods. As we will see in a moment, the
Marxian analysis of exchange value as the commensurabili ty
foisted upon everything in a capitalist economy prefigures
Adorno's critique of identity-thinking.
One of the most momentous implications of exchange is
the social reduction of human activity to labor power.
Adorno indicates that he follows Marx's analysis of unequal
exchange and exploitation:
it is through exchange [Tausch] that non-identical
individuals and performances become commensurable
and identical .... From olden times, the main char-
acteristic of the exchange of equivalents has been
that unequal things have been exchanged in its
name, that the surplus value of labor would be
appropriated
.
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Nor could he ignore that generalized exploitation entails
the division of society into classes.
Adorno is certainly "unorthodox" in his treatment of
class. If the theme of class struggle is relatively subdued
in Adorno it is not because the objective contradictions
analyzed by Marx have melted away; on the contrary:
The process of increasing social rationalization,
of universal extension of the market system, is
not something that takes place beyond the specific
social conflicts and antagonisms, or in spite of
them .... Society remains class struggle, today just
as in the period when that concept originat-
ed .... Screened from subjectivity, the difference
between the classes grows objectively with the
increasing concentration of capital.
What makes Adorno hopelessly revisionist with respect
to class is not that he challenges the bifurcation of soci-
1 7
ety into owners and producers— indeed Adorno at times offers
extremely subtle and nuanced "class analysis"—but that he
refuses to automatically accord to the proletariat the pre-
ordained role of savior of humanity. Nor does Adorno follow
Marcuse's lead in looking for a new revolutionary agent in
the women's movement, the third world, or the ghetto. Here
we have the first indications of Adorno
' s "political defi-
cit."
The most obvious and doubtless most substantial obsta-
cle to championing the working class as the agent of revolu-
tionary change was its capitulation to—or support for
—
fascism. Still, no doubt there were Marxists who made the
arduous dialectical effort to maintain their faith in the
proletariat; and even before 1933 Adorno seemed not to have
shared the enthusiasm of some of his colleagues. The easi-
est (and thus most suspicious) way to account for this would
be to put it all down to congenital "Mandarinism" (a diagno-
sis that is equally applicable to some privileged Marxists
who cultivated a romance-from-a-distance with the proletari-
at) .
I am not inclined to reduce Adorno 's skepticism toward
the identical subject-object of history to autobiography
—
for one thing, this dissertation would be superfluous if we
could be satisfied with a determination that Adorno was
simply an elitist who refused to dirty his hands in practi-
cal politics. It would be far more interesting and useful
18
to trace the correspondences between Adorno
' s refusal to
privilege self-conscious class struggle and his diagnosis of
the conditions begging for Revolution. Only then would we
have an adequate sense of Adorno
' s attempt to pursue revolu-
tionary theory without a revolutionary subject.
If it is possible to read out of his discussions of
ideology in the "totally administered" society a kind of
'declining significance of class' thesis, it is not because
there is no proletariat, but that class-consciousness is
somehow short-circuited. Clearly Adorno balks at the link
Marx supposes between the objective conditions of workers
and their consciousness. While Adorno accepted the notion
that the proletariat embodies in some sense the universal
interest in liberation, he could not share Marx's (or Lu-
kacs
'
) confidence that recognition of this interest followed
logically from experiential political economy. For these
reasons, Adorno argues in the important essay "Reflexionen
zur Klassentheorie , " that the concept of class must be re-
tained but re-thought:
Retained: since its ground, the division of soci-
ety into exploiters and exploited, not only sur-
vives undiminished but increases in force and
solidity. Altered: because the oppressed ... cannot
experience themselves as a class.
The exact nature of this obstacle to class consciousness is
one of our central concerns here, and a thorough account
necessarily has to wait on explorations of Adorno' s work on
psychoanalysis, ideology, and the culture industry.
19
A close reading of these themes in Adorno will show
that he believed that Marx's assumptions about class con-
sciousness have been made obsolete by decisive changes in
the economic and the libidinal regimes of late capitalism.
The opaqueness of the proletariat to itself kicks one
leg out from under the conceit that revolution is a histori-
cal necessity; the other leg is crisis theory: the notion
that capitalism will be undone by its own contradictions.
Here again Adorno is a peculiar Marxist, not on account of
his "Mandarin" love of art and philosophy, but because, in
this case, of the analysis of political economy which he
takes up from Friedrich Pollock: capitalism has learned to
forestall indefinitely the collapse Marxists expected it
would be brought to.
Pollock's work usually figures in Adorno ' s writings as
the passing of "competitive" or liberal capitalism. The end
of the liberal era is an understated theme throughout Ador-
no 1 s work; in typically Adornian fashion, it is casually
cited in various contexts as if its meaning and significance
were too obvious to belabor.
Adorno 's comments on liberalism have received astonish-
ingly little attention, which helps to explain why discus-
sions of his politics have often been superficial or nonex-
istent .
20
Adorno's passing references define liberalism in terms
we can relate to value, reason, and desire: the market, the
Enlightenment, and individuality. The advent of the "admin-
istered world" signals a change in regime in each sphere; as
competitive capitalism gives way to monopoly, critical
thought loses ground to instrumental reason and positivism,
and individuality is eroded at its libidinal roots. The
supercession of the liberal "free market" threatens the
historical viability of both Reason and the Subject:
The individual has become an obstacle to produc-
tion.... Economic rationali ty . . . is incessantly
converting the last units of the economy: firms
and men alike.... The risks of competition led to
the more productive centralized form of retail
trade represented by the department stores. The
individual—the psychological corner shop—suffers
the same fate. 7
Reading Adorno's terse elegies for the liberal economy
in light of Friedrich Pollock's attempt to define a new
stage of "state capitalism" goes far to explain his inabili-
ty to situate a meaningful approach to politics in the
administered world.
Pollock's work is usually cited as an important influ-
ence on the economic underpinnings of Adorno, but the full
implications of Pollock for Adorno's reading of politics
have not been explored. Buck-Morss, Jameson, and Jay (to
name only the most prominent commentators) give political
economy very short shrift, and do no more than gesture at
the importance of Pollock's "state capitalism" thesis.
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More than a gesture is necessary if we are to under-
stand Adorno's skepticism toward the orthodox Marxist faith
in the proletariat, and his disqualification of every other
candidate for political savior.
Pollock's discussion of modern capitalism emphasizes
the acceleration of the trend toward monopoly that Marx had
identified as intrinsic to the logic of capital. He argues
that monopoly capitalism, which was understood as both the
logical result and the death-knell of liberal, market-ori-
ented capitalism, is itself giving way to a new configura-
tion of relations of production. Adorno's understanding of
the contradiction between forces and relations of produc-
tion—and of the prospects for revolution— is decisively
influenced by Pollock's analysis of state capitalism.
The Great Depression demonstrated in dramatic fashion
that capitalism could not contain the contradictions it
generated. Like any economic crisis, the Depression accel-
erated the centralization and amalgamation of capital in an
ever-narrower circle of firms; at the same time it marked an
important readjustment of the relations of production as it
spurred greater intervention on the part of the state.
It is precisely this readjustment of the relations of
production within the framework of capitalism that concerns
Pollock. The configuration Pollock labels "state capital-
ism" signifies a step beyond monopoly capitalism (and there-
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fore beyond the analysis of Marx): a shift toward an inte-
grated, planned economy, whereby mechanisms of centralized
control take precedence over the local calculations of
individual capitalists:
The market is deposed from its controlling func-
tion to coordinate production and distribution.
This function has been taken over by a system of
direct controls. Freedom of trade, enterprise and
labor are subject to governmental interference of
such a degree that they are practically abolished.
With the autonomous market the so called economic
laws disappear.
This does not mean the end of capitalism per se, since
capital still profits from the exploitation of labor; howev-
er, profitable enterprise is constrained by the political
directives of central planning.
Pollock's analysis shares with much of the Frankfurt
School's work a response to fascism that emphasized the
continuity between capitalist business-as-usual and the Nazi
seizure of power. For Pollock, and for Adorno and Horkheim-
er as well, fascism exposed the crisis of liberalism in its
collapse of the already eroded separation of public from
private spheres. This kind of total mobilization was seen
as the prototype for every late capitalist society. 10
Pollock's discussions of state capitalism are confusing
because he fails to distinguish clearly between at least
three different aims. The fully developed model that Pol-
lock presents in the "State Capitalism" essay is meant in
one sense as an ideal type, which no existing system may
23
fulfill in every regard; the model is meant to describe
trends that can be identified in any capitalist economy
(including the Soviet Union). In another sense, Pollock is
clearly attempting to come to grips with the economic foun-
dation of Nazism as a distinct social development. Finally,
as a socialist, he argues against the conviction that a
planned economy is not possible or practical, and seems
rather enthusiastic about the supersession of liberal capi-
talism .
This confusion is illustrated by Pollock's distinction
between "democratic" and "totalitarian" versions of state
capitalism: democratic state capitalism seems to refer
sometimes to a purely descriptive ideal-typical category, 11
sometimes to developments in really existing non-Fascist
economies (e.g. the New Deal), and sometimes to the utopian
prospect of a planned economy oriented around 1 the needs of
free men in a harmonious society. Needless to say, it is
difficult to imagine that Adorno shared Pollock's enthusiasm
for better living through bureaucracy.
The political implications of state capitalist central-
ization and rationalization are enormous. The potential for
managing crises offered by planning allows capital to fore-
stall indefinitely the destructive contradictions of capi-
talist accumulation. In this respect, Pollock's work repre-
sents a major "strategic withdrawal" from the Marxist certi-
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tude in the inevitable and immanent collapse of the capital-
ist economy.
In addition, the conditions addressed by the "state
capitalism" thesis not only made it necessary to recognize
the resiliency of the prevailing exploitation, but also
establish, through the integration and amalgamation of
communications industries, the conditions for a radical
expansion of the possibilities of "planning" consciousness;
in effect, Pollock anticipates the theses of "The Culture
Industry .
"
Finally, Pollock's analysis forecasts an interweaving
of political and economic power along Nazi lines, culminat-
ing in essentially state-directed monopolies—or a polity
owned and operated by a handful of giant conglomerates. And
this was not an invention of the "National Socialists":
what both Pollock and Adorno saw as the death of liberalism
was well underway before the triumph of fascism, in the
erosion of the market under "monopoly capital."
While Adorno indicates that social relations are bar-
ring the way to a qualitatively better life, the explosive
power implied in Marx's metaphor of 'fetters' has been
mysteriously drained away. Adorno is not hopeless; but what
hopes he harbors do not spring from the economic contradic-
tions of late capitalism. As Giacomo Marramao puts it:
The Marxian laws appear ... to have strangely lost
their object and with it the medium of their prac-
tical verification. With the "freezing" of the
real dialectic, critical thought appears damned to
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the exile of contemplation for an unforeseeable
future. Even as Adorno's theory holds to Marxian
orthodoxy, it still cannot allow it to become
effective in the new form of the capitalist orga-
nization of domination.
Marramao criticizes Adorno for neglecting "the social-
izing process of labor" in the factory in favor of a fixa-
tion with reification which leads him to lose sight of "the
real, antagonistic totality." What is required, according
to Marramao, is a reconsideration of "the weakness of the
link with praxis as the immanent limit of the theory it-
self," and insight into "the bursting forth of the qualita-
tive dimension." 14
Leaving aside for a moment the limits of theory—which
Adorno was acutely aware of—Marramao 's critique of the
political economy of Adorno's critical theory is noteworthy
for what it gets wrong, what it gets right, and what it
misses entirely. The complaint against reification is
directed at the image of society, in both Pollock and Ador-
no, as totally integrated and dominated under state capital-
ism; what Marramao ignores is that Adorno's analysis went
well beyond Pollock's schema of a consolidation of economic
and political power to consider—as we'll see directly— the
psychological ramifications of state capitalism. Adorno's
invocations of a totally administered society are grounded
more upon the erosion of resistance at the individual,
libidinal level than on Pollock's early theory of a power
elite. Moreover, Marramao chides Adorno for losing sight of
26
the proletariat—but it is precisely the integration of
unions and the "workers' movement" into the political-eco-
nomic apparatus that most clearly illustrates Adorno
'
s
analysis
.
Still, this doesn't exempt Adorno from the criticism
that he ignores actual production, and that whatever 'relax-
ation of the fetters' (Pollock's phrase) the elite can work
out, the fundamental antagonism of capitalist accumulation
is played out in the production process day after day. One
could object on Adorno ' s behalf that he was not a political
economist, and that it is unreasonable to expect him to
study everything under the sun. But the pacification of
people wounded and warped by late capitalism was one of his
central concerns; that people not only live with capitalism,
but reproduce it, cannot be adeguately explained without
attention to the site which most directly ought to provoke
resistance (and which in some ways is more amenable under
state capitalism to resistance) 15— the workplace.
Finally, the most interesting thing about Marramao '
s
discussion of Pollock and Adorno is that he does not examine
their historical narrative of the decisive shift from com-
petitive/liberal exchange to monopoly /state capitalism.
Adorno attaches a great deal of theoretical freight to the
notion that the market glorified by liberal theorists has
been superceded under state capitalism. Apparently, no one
writing on Adorno has thought to ask (much less document) to
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what extent such market relations ever defined an economy,
or whether twentieth century capitalism is actually less
competitive than liberal capitalism. I suspect that "liber-
al capitalism" was not generally quite so liberal, and that
state capitalism is a bit more complicated than Pollock has
it.
If such suspicions could be substantiated—that the
economic and political elites were never as distinct as
liberal theory would have us believe; that the state has
always been deeply involved in the economy and vice versa;
that monopolies and cartels have always been an important
part of capitalism; and that important sub-sectors of the
economy are still mediated by competitive exchange rela-
tions—we would have to take a hard look at Adorno's radical
distinction of liberal from postliberal politics. But this
is a question to be taken up once we have a clearer notion
what those terms might describe.
A more nuanced analysis of the economy, which would
take into account the dynamic and hybrid nature of produc-
tion and distribution, and would say something meaningful
about the impact of industrialization and imperialism on
late capitalism, would have served Adorno better than the
1
6
simple schema he borrowed from Pollock.
The problems with Adorno's deployment of 'liberal'
capitalism go far beyond bad economic history. The notion
of a historical 'break' between liberal and post-liberal
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capitalism is a major problem with his theorization of
contemporary capitalism; Adorno (and Horkheimer) are seduced
by the oldest political-historical trope known to the West:
a lament for Yesterday, the better to throw the shabby
reality of today into sharp relief.
Certainly, Adorno knows better than to set up twentieth
century capitalism as a Fall from the relatively Edenic
'liberal* capitalism of the nineteenth century; the horrific
reality of capitalism's adolescent years is still fresh and
vivid enough, not only in the writings of Marx: indeed, the
' satanic' mills and factories of the Industrial Revolution
are one of the most important themes in the arts and Geist-
eswissenschaften of the time. And as we will see, at every
point where the reality of the previous economic-psychologi-
cal regime is at issue, Adorno emphasizes the incomplete and
deeply compromised character of liberal capitalism's accom-
plishments .
But a narrative of the Fall from grace is never really
interested in historical fidelity to the past; the point is
how much worse today is than yesterday. Unfortunately, this
is precisely the function that the comparison between 'lib-
eral' and 'late' capitalism usually plays in Adorno' s writ-
ings. This may seem outlandish until we establish in the
next section the crucial role this narrative plays in the
erosion of subjectivity and agency.
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The narrative of the Fall is not a momentary lapse in
Adorno's critique of capitalist modernity, unfortunately.
Like his friend Walter Benjamin (whose influence may be
legible in Adorno here more than anywhere), Adorno's writ-
ings are adamantly backward-looking. As will become clearer
in the following chapters, Adorno is fixated by the hypothe-
sis that a decisive historical moment of possibility was
passed, not to be recalled by any human effort. This fixa-
tion on the cusp between an exploitative, but still somehow
vital, capitalism and the trajectory that carried us past
the brass ring of Revolution into 'totally administered
society' is one of the decisive fixtures of Adorno's 'defi-
cit. 1
All that aside for the moment, we should not casually
discard the basic political thrust of Adorno's appropriation
of Pollock: that the integration and amalgamation of eco-
nomic and political elites puts the liberal "public sphere"
in serious jeopardy. And while Pollock's forecast for the
containment of recurring economic crises has proven much too
optimistic, capital has been able to insulate itself fairly
successfully against the political aftershocks of crises. 17
This means, if we are to take Adorno seriously, that
the consolidation of state capitalism signals more than a
reprieve for Capital: the death of the liberal economy
marks the obsolescence of liberal politics—and of revolu-
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it's enough to make one nostalgic for Weber's iron cage,
which at least had room for "responsibility" and "clarity."
What distinguishes Adorno
' s jeremiads against 'the end
of the individual' from other critics of modern "mass soci-
ety" 19 is his attempt to theorize the economic and libidinal
roots of the "totally administered society" while avoiding
blaming the victims—even as he shows how subjects are bound
to domination by their own desire.
This section will show how the revolutions in economic
integration, centralization, and planning, which tend to
eliminate the mediating force of the market, are accompanied
by a loss of psychological mediation: the ego is made
virtually obsolete. Taken to its logical conclusion, Adorno
argues that as exchange and commodif ication colonize the
domain of the ego, the sphere of psychology is made practi-
cally inconsequential.
In the essay "Sociology and Psychology," Adorno argues
that sociological and psychological analyses deal with two
distinct spheres; no 'grand unified theory' can bring them
to the same theoretical plane. Thus the logics of exchange
and libido cannot be read in terms of simple correspon-
dences, but must be translated from one sphere to another.
This would suggest, and in fact Adorno presents, two
distinct narratives of the end of individuality, one from
the side of the universal (a sociology of self-interest and
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exchange) and one from the side of the particular (the
psychology of renunciation and repression). These two
narratives are linked, but not in a way which can be repre-
sented in the spatial terms of base and superstructure;
Adorno describes the 'internal' reality of the individual as
a 'monad,' which recapitulates the social forces which
constitute it without being reducible to them, and which
must be studied 'from the inside.' 20 We will take up Ador-
no ' s scandal from the 'outside' first.
The erosion of the nodal point between society and
desire— the ego
—
grounds Adorno
' s most apocalyptic assess-
ments of modern society. If the ego is the interface be-
tween the "inside" and "outside" worlds, then it has to be
understood as a historical— i.e. perishable—formation. A
change in the environment of the psyche which no longer
encouraged ego formation around a coherent reality principle
would jeopardize the ego's ability to manage the instincts,
and conceivably dissolve the ego altogether. A close read-
ing of Adorno demonstrates that 'the end of the individual'
springs from just such a change: The shift from liberal,
competitive capitalism to state capitalism.
There are indications throughout Adorno ' s work that the
individual as a social project had just begun to flower
under liberal capitalism, and that this project has stalled
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indefinitely with the triumph of fascism and the "admi
tered world"
:
Individuation has never really been achieved.
Self-preservation in the shape of class has kept
everyone at the stage of a mere species be-
ing.... As it progressed, bourgeois society did
also develop the individual. Against the will of
its leaders, technology has changed human beings
from children into persons.
Horkheimer and Adorno take liberal economic theory at
its word, arguing that individuals sustained the competitive
economy by pursuing their "self-interest" in the market-
place. Again, this is a topic which does not benefit from
an extended, definitive treatment by Adorno, but there is no
doubt that individuality depends for him on the development
of the market:
The individual owes his crystallization to the
forms of political economy, particularly to those
of the urban market. Even as the opponent of the
pressure of socialization he remains the latter'
s
most particular product and its likeness. What
enables him to resist, the streak of independence
in him, springs from monadological individual
interest and its precipitate, character ....[ H ] is
decay must itself not be deduced individualistic-
ally, but from the social tendency which asserts
itself by means of individuation and not merely as
its enemy.
This passage evinces, in Adorno ' s typically compact form,
the critical elements of his account of the liberal economic
and libidinal regimes. The market fosters interest as the
modality of the liberal subject: market relations demand a
certain capacity for calculation and autonomy, and a partic-
ular kind of self-consciousness. Thus, according to Adorno,
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the social action that characterizes liberal capitalism lays
the groundwork for critique, in the form of reason and
conscience. Finally the economic momentum of liberal capi-
talism which, as we have seen, eventually eradicates mar-
kets, threatens to make interest, reason and individuals
obsolete at the same time.
Self-interest is effected through and bounded by equiv-
alence. A market presumes and enforces commensurabili ty
;
while liberal theory wilfully discounts the rebound of
market operations— the abstracting force of calculation and
assessment—onto human subjects, Marx's translation of
liberal self-interest into labor power expresses the fate of
individuality that Horkheimer and Adorno recount in Dialec-
tic of Enlightenment:
Not only are qualities dissolved in thought, but
men are brought to actual conformity. The bless-
ing that the market does not enquire after one's
birth is paid for by the barterer [der Tausch-
ende], in that he models the potentialities that
are his by birth on the production of the commodi-
ties that can be bought in the market. Men were
given their individuality as unique in each case,
different to all others, so that it might all the
more surely be made the same as any other.
Thus the opaqueness of liberal self-consciousness lies
not simply in its inability to grasp its own dependence and
embeddedness , that self-interest is "pursued only on the
terms laid down by society and by the means provided by
society—hence an interest tied to the reproduction of those
terms and means." 24 The critical point for Adorno is that
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self-interest has little to do with the self; self-interest
is really nothing but the internalization of universal
compulsion, embracing individuals precisely on the side of
their uniformity and commensurability (concretized as labor
power): "It is only because, to survive, they have to make
an alien cause their own that there arises that appearance
of reconcilement." 25 Self-interest displaces the self,
making individuals ever more commensurable as exchange value
colonizes the social totality. The self is sacrificed to
interest (to sheer self-preservation), and particularity
surrenders to the bad universal of necessity.
This critigue of self-interest as the social mode of
renunciation is linked by Horkheimer and Adorno to the
domination of nature. The self is founded on the suppres-
sion of non-identity within and without; it is constituted
in opposition to external and internal nature. Self-inter-
est conflates self-preservation with freedom, and the sub-
ject is reduced to purely instrumental terms, to a means
without an end. Like Odysseus, we must continually deny
ourselves to save ourselves.
One striking thing about this account of subjectivity
and the market is the way in which Horkheimer and Adorno '
s
own language brings gender to the fore, while their analysis
is barely cognizant of the most conspicuous implication of
linking subjectivity to gender. The Hegelian link between
autonomy and civil society, which Adorno and Horkheimer
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appear to endorse, carries some heavy baggage for women.
Women are denied—explicitly by Hegel, and implicitly in
Horkheimer and Adorno
' s analysis—even the rudimentary and
crippled individuality promised by liberal market society to
the extent that they are sequestered in the family.
There are passages in Adorno
' s work that demonstrate
some awareness of 'the woman question' and patriarchal
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oppression, but these themes are not elevated to the
prominence Adorno
' s own work seems to demand. 27 We will
return to Adorno
' s treatment of gender when we examine the
psychoanalytic side of individuation, and the interplay
between gender, authority and intersub jectivity
.
If self-interest operated on the basis of an impover-
ished instrumental rationality, at least it allowed (or
required) some thought—the conscious side of the ego is
nurtured to the extent that liberal capitalism still re-
quires calculation and appraisal. So while the "Culture
Industry" essay emphasizes the fragility and pain of indi-
viduation
—
However, every advance in individuation of this
kind took place at the expense of the individuali-
ty in whose name it occurred, so that nothing was
left but the resolve to pursue one's own particu-
lar purpose. The bourgeois whose existence is
split into a business and a private life... at odds
with himself and everybody else, is already virtu-
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ally a Nazi ....
37
The rudimentary individuality fostered by liberal capitalism
was still no small accomplishment. Horkheimer and Adorno
emphasize later in the same book that this compromised and
antagonistic individuality fostered a kind of moral and
intellectual autonomy which is endangered under state capi-
talism :
[T]he conscience consisted in the devotion of the
ego to the outside world, in the ability to take
into account the true interests of others .... When
the big industrial interests incessantly eliminate
the economic basis for moral decision ... reflective
thought must die out. The soul, as the possibili-
ty of self-comprehending guilt, is destroyed. 29
In their respect for the spiritual and cultural accom-
plishments of bourgeois Europe and emphasis on what was lost
in the transition to industrial modernity, we see the blos-
som of the narrative of the Fall I criticized above. Adorno
and Horkheimer adopt here one of the favorite themes of the
great German critics of modernity from the generation before
them (Tonnies, Simmel, and Weber, to name three), who saw in
the triumph of industrial capitalism the dehumanization and
calcification of human relations. Like these writers,
Adorno and Horkheimer could mourn the passing of bourgeois
society because what they saw replacing it threatened to
destroy the limited but real gains of liberal capitalism.
The liberal regime organized around the judgments and ac-
tions of individuals in civil society involved a measure of
freedom, albeit one which was entwined with a capitalist
economy, and ultimately "a mockery of true freedom, an
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expression of the contingency of every individual's social
fate." 30
The entrepreneurial subject, wedded to self-interest
and bound up in the dialectic of enlightenment, falls far
short of a subjectivity that would do justice to itself and
to objectivity, and in itself would hardly merit pangs of
nostalgia. The new libidinal (and ethical and political)
regime heralded by the eclipse of the liberal economic
regime, however, threatens to efface not just the virtues
proper to competitive liberal capitalism, but individuality
itself
.
Eventually, Adorno argues, the role allotted individual
decision-making no longer serves the reproduction and accu-
mulation of capital. The eruption of fascism, far from an
inexplicable lapse into barbarism, merely revealed what late
capitalism had in store for even this fragile and faulty
liberty: The individual has become an obstacle to
production. . . .Economic rationality. . .is
incessantly converting the last units of
the economy, firms and men alike.... In
the era of great business enterprises
and world wars the mediation of the
social process through innumerable mon-
ads proves retrograde. The subjects of
the economy are psychologically expro-
priated, and the economy is more ratio-
nally operated by society itself.
The modality of the liberal subject— interest— turns
out to be a fetter under the monopolistic conditions of late
capitalism. State capitalism makes the ego—and with it
thought and individuality per se—obsolete.
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Ultimately the central question in Horkheimer and
Adorno's analysis of fascism—how (in Adorno
' s words) "the
children of a liberal, competitive and individualistic
society" could be enlisted in a movement which "flagrantly
contradict [s ] their own rational level and the present stage
of enlightened civilization" on behalf of "aims largely
incompatible with their own rational self-interest 1,32—thus
turns out to be a trick question. We are no longer living
in a "liberal, competitive, and individualistic" society;
the fact that "the members of contemporary masses are at
least prima facie individuals" belies the structural trans-
formation of the economy and its psychological repercus-
sions .
It was to trace those repercussions that Critical
Theory turned to psychoanalysis. If the "external" narra-
tive of the end of the individual reveals a society in which
individuality is increasingly obsolete—a world in which
'real' individuals would simply be out of place—the "inter-
nal" narrative is meant to show that, like any other obso-
lete model, individuals can be discontinued. The same
structural changes in the economy that threaten to collapse
the division between civil society and the state were seen
by Critical Theory to radically undermine the mediating role
of the ego—which in turn threatens individuality at its
roots and paves the way for the "totally administered soci-
ety."
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The calamity of fascism, along with what one might call
the historical refutation of the Lukacsian model of class
consciousness, lent a new urgency to the attempt to wed the
insights of psychoanalysis to a critical theory of society.
As various members of the Frankfurt School recognized,
Freud's psychic geography and geology could be indispensable
for elaborating the relation of economics to politics. This
is because Freud gave Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Fromm—and
Adorno—keys which might unlock the black box of the indi-
vidual psyche, the interface between base and superstruc-
ture. Most importantly, Freud's work gave Adorno and the
other critical theorists a way to articulate domination as
an 'internal' as well as an 'external' phenomenon— to ex-
plain how individuals are not merely passively subordinated,
but actively engaged in their own domination—without re-
course to simplistic accusations of "false consciousness."
Adorno 's use of psychoanalytic concepts has received
more attention than his appropriation of economics, but not
much more. Martin Jay, in a chapter entitled "The Fractured
Totality: Society and the Psyche," offers only a handful of
33
pages on Adorno ' s appropriation of Freud. Gillian Rose
similarly devotes about a dozen paragraphs to 'The Theory of
the Individual.' 34 No one has really successfully taken up
an exhaustive account of Adorno ' s deployment of psychoanaly-
sis.
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Admittedly, Adorno does not make this easy. His treat-
ment of Freud is unfortunately similar to his appropriation
of Marx: too often he takes up theses or concepts from
their work without any considerable attention to how they
fit into the larger conceptual apparatuses of their authors.
This is not generally acknowledged in the most impor-
tant secondary literature. Gillian Rose, for instance,
claims that Adorno defended a "strong, orthodox interpreta-
tion" of Freud, on the basis of his critigues of Talcott
Parsons, Karen Horney, and Freud's own later works. 35 It is
true that Adorno sought to ward off any attempt to develop
correlations between psyche and society that substituted a
sociologized psychoanalysis (or a 'psychoanalytic' sociolo-
gy) for the fundamental "clash of psychic forces," viz.,
the conflict between id and ego." However, while Adorno
deploys several elements of Freudian theory prominently in
his discussions of declining individuality, it is hard to
attribute to him a "strong, orthodox" appropriation of
psychoanalysis when he never mentions the Oedipus complex
(nor associated concepts like fear of castration), and
exhibits little interest in the early years of childhood,
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which to Freud were decisive for all that follows.
The appearance of Freudian terminology in Adorno '
s
discussions of consciousness, desire, nature, etc., always
operates within a broader framework in which orthodox psy-
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choanalytic theory is not the central focus. Thus the
account of "projection" in Dialectic of Enlightenment38 is
part of the constellation Horkheimer and Adorno develop
between nature, mimesis, and subjectivity, and the critique
of the superego is woven into a discussion of Kant, freedom,
-
. 39
and conscience.
Adorno' s hybrid of Marx and Freud, then, aimed at
playing selected insights from each against each other, not
at a total synthesis of the two revolutionary thinkers. I
would suggest that Freud's work had several attractions for
Adorno, which moved him to draw on Freudian concepts without
embracing psychoanalysis in all its arcana.
Like Marx, Freud developed a theory aimed at a world
defined by antagonisms and contradictions; Freud's refusal
to posit any ultimate harmony or relaxation of these contra-
dictions was perhaps the most attractive aspect of his work:
The greatness of Freud consists, like all radical
bourgeois thinkers, in letting such contradictions
remain unresolved and disdaining to pretend a
systematic harmony when the subject itself is
torn
.
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The Freudian turn hinges on the psyche as a social
text, open to subtle and suitably devious interpretation.
Adorno turned to psychoanalytic concepts to read the indi-
vidual as the intersection of consciousness and the condi-
tions of production—concepts which might illuminate the
success of fascism as well as the evaporation of opposition
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under state capitalism. This gave Adorno a way to discuss
the psychological ramifications of social and economic
dynamics which could avoid the base/superstructure problems
which plagued orthodox Marxism.
In addition, Freud's emphasis on the unconscious, and
on the central role of sexual drives in mental life, prom-
ised a radical break with the Cartesian model of subjectivi-
ty, which posits a disembodied rational faculty looking down
upon mere objectivity. 41 At the same time, Freudian theory
allows Adorno, as Gillian Rose has noted, 42 to shift atten-
tion from a theory of alienation (from some putative spe-
cies-being) to individuation as a process—a process which
is difficult and uncertain, and vulnerable to interference
and even sabotage. Freud displaces the self-sufficient,
God-given subject of liberal theory with an emphasis on
subjectivity as an achievement, an achievement moreover
which is not transparent to consciousness, and is still
riven by the antagonisms between nature, desire and con-
sciousness .
Finally, it also gave Adorno a way to approach suffer-
ing and renunciation which did not coat them in the syrup of
'necessary evil.' While Freud does, especially in Civiliza-
tion and Its Discontents , practically justify them in terms
of social and cultural accomplishments, he never diminishes
the reality of pain and sacrifice, nor does he posit a
happily-ever-after in which these things will be transfig-
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ured or beatified. Moreover, psychoanalytic theory gave
Adorno a language which could make socially- and self-in-
flicted suffering and renunciation legible.
The crux of Adorno 1 s "internal" analysis of the erosion
of subjectivity is the subversion of the mediating force of
the ego. Under the libidinal regime proper to liberal
capitalism, social imperatives are translated onto the
psychological dynamic through the ego, which internalizes
social standards of necessity and propriety. 43 This sub-
contracting of domination is replaced under state capitalism
by a more direct regime of conformity, which hinges on an
end-run around the ego in which regressive traits of the id
are enlisted directly on behalf of domination.
For Adorno, as for Freud, successful individuation
hinges on the ego, which constrains and transmutes the
polymorphous anarchy of desire to conform to the prevailing
reality principle. In one of the few attempts to develop a
sustained critical commentary on Adorno ' s appropriation of
Freud, Jessica Benjamin has argued that Adorno tied individ-
uation to the internalization of authority. According to
Benjamin, Adorno assumes a process of ego formation tied to
the Oedipus complex, in which the internal authority of the
subject— the ego— is modelled on the nearest external au-
thority: the father.
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Benjamin's otherwise very fine work is hampered by
presuming Adorno relies on an Oedipal model of the ego, and
by loosely associating Adorno with Horkheimer's ambitious
(but deeply flawed) theory of the family. 45 While Horkheim-
er developed his account of the family in the period when he
was collaborating most intensely with Adorno, and one can
find occasional references 46 in Adorno that suggest some
sympathy for Horkheimer's theory, the family simply does not
figure that prominently in Adorno. Adorno generally focus-
ses more attention on the ways in which the mediating force
of the contemporary family is weakened by the larger (eco-
nomic and cultural) environment.
In this respect, Adorno arguably pushes women farther
toward the margins of analysis than either Freud or Hork-
heimer. At least in the work of the latter two men, the
role women are assigned and the essentialist assumptions
each makes about gender are relatively out in the open for
criticism. And while Horkheimer and Freud may be easy to
ridicule for their visions of women and motherhood, their
analyses of gender and authority are attempts to grapple
with a critical aspect of domination
—
patriarchy—that
Adorno simply undertheor ized . Freud and Horkheimer carica-
ture gender relations, but in Adorno—pre-eminent anti-
essentialist and champion of non-identity—gender too often
simply doesn't register.
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While it is not implausible to connect the leitmotif of
erosion of individuality with a transition from internalized
authority to sheer conformity, Benjamin does not substanti-
ate that connection; nor does she offer a citation from
Adorno's own work which directly links individuation with
internalization. There are a few passages one might look to
in this regard, 47 but it is not the Oedipal father figure,
but generalized "social coercion" that is the focus of
Adorno's discussions of internalization. While this rela-
tion to external authority is important, particularly for
the ethical and political dimensions of the eclipse of the
liberal regime, internalization does not play the constitu-
tive role Benjamin attributes to it.
Benjamin nonetheless does establish the two central
moments of Adorno's psychology: that resistance and domina-
tion are both tied to the ego, and that the mediation of
domination through the ego is replaced by a regime of sheer
conformity, under which both resistance and thought atrophy.
What the liberal economy made possible, according to
Horkheimer and Adorno, was an environment in which the ego
could subdue the explosive, insatiable id on behalf of
limited but reliable gratification in an environment defined
by scarcity. 48 In a passage which suggests individuation is
founded not on internalization, but on its virtual opposite,
"projection," it is the demands of this environment, not the
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Oedipal conflict, which account for the decisive character-
istics of the liberal subject:
By learning to distinguish between his own and
extraneous thoughts and feelings under the force
of economic necessity, a distinction is made be-
tween without and within, the possibility of dis-
tancing and identifying, self-awareness and the
conscience
.
The ego serves as a principle of organization which
faces both inward and outward: not only "mastering" desire
on behalf of reliable, long-term gratification, but also
"testing" reality, honing its cognitive grasp of the world
on behalf of the reality principle's regime of gratifica-
50tion. This cognitive side of the ego, which Adorno and
Horkheimer seem to presume is the instinctual foothold for
resistance to domination, is strengthened by the agency the
market requires of individuals, the capacity for calculating
and assaying.
The ego faces potential threats then on two fronts:
from the "inside," in its own contradictory and opaque
relation to the id, and from the outside, in changes in the
environment of the subject which undermine the ego's capaci-
ty for judgement and agency.
Adorno deftly shows that the boundary Freud meant to
define with the distinction between id and ego cannot hold,
because of the irrationality of renunciation under prevail-
ing conditions:
The ego is supposed to be both, qua consciousness,
the opposite of repression, and qua unconscious-
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ness, the repressive agency itself.... To be able
to assert itself in reality, the ego has to under-
stand reality and operate consciously. But to
enable the individual to effect the often sense-
less renunciations imposed on him, the ego has to
set up unconscious prohibitions and to remain
largely confined to the unconscious .... The ego's
cognitive activity, performed in the interests of
self-preservation, has to be constantly reversed,
and self-awareness foregone, in the interests of
self-preservation
.
Thus the ego's "mastery" of desire is founded on renun-
ciations and restraints that are opague to the self, and it
is "constantly taxed beyond its own powers" and vulnerable
to falling back into the unconscious as ego-libido. 52
The "external" threat to the ego comes from what we
have already examined as the advent of state capitalism. It
is not immediately apparent that state capitalism eliminates
the need for calculation and judgement that Adorno and
Horkheimer link to the market under liberal capitalism,
since post-liberal capitalism retains at least the appear-
ance of markets. Adorno argues, however, that a kind of
domestication of the economy takes place under state capi-
talism which radically pre-structures economic life so that
the sphere for individual judgement and decision-making
which had nourished the ego contracts until:
In a highly socialized and rationalized society
most situations in which decisions are made are
pre-determined , and the rationality of the indi-
vidual ego is restricted to choosing between min-
ute options. It is invariably a question of no
more than minimal alternatives ... and 'realism'
amounts to being good at making this kind of deci-
sion . 53
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Thus one of the central themes of "Sociology and Psychology"
is the diminution of the domain of psychology in the face of
objective social imperatives, until the self becomes at best
a wildlife preserve of idiosyncracy and irrationality, and
at worst "no more than an interference and is repeatedly
being overruled by the far more powerful imperatives of the
rational faculty, the embodiment of objective social pro-
, ,
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cesses
.
If the total economy governs behavior, psychology has
to content itself with misbehavior. Taken to its logical
conclusion
:
The subject is separated into the inner continua-
tion of the machinery of social reproduction and
an undissolved remainder which, as a mere preserve
powerless in the face of the wildly expansionist
'rational' component, degenerates into a mere
curiosity
.
The ego, which under liberal capitalism seemed to represent
to Adorno a node of rationality (albeit one-sided and bound
up with the dialectic of enlightenment) not reducible to
'the machinery of social reproduction,' finds itself under
state capitalism facing an unholy alliance between this
machinery and the id:
A brutal, total, standardizing society arrests all
differentiation, and to this end it exploits the
primitive core of the unconscious. Both conspire
to annihilate the mediating ego; the triumphant
archaic impulses, the victory of id over ego,
harmonize with the triumph of society over the
individual
.
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Benjamin has drawn attention to the critical theorists'
acceptance of the Freudian view of the id as inherently and
incorrigibly antisocial and, if left to its own devices,
destructive. While this is complicated by the fact that the
ego is itself in some sense a "quantum" of libido, I think
Benjamin's criticism is a valid one, and indicates one of
the ways Adorno
' s (and Horkheimer ' s ) appropriation of Freud
is insufficiently critical: by following the traditional
interpretation of desire as inherently destructive and
selfish—something which must be "tamed" and "socialized"
—
Adorno and Horkheimer validate the longstanding defamation
of gratification as private and infantile. While Freud's
naturalization of desire did disrupt and scandalize the
Christian discourse of sin and carnality, his own depiction
of desire, which Adorno did not challenge in any significant
respect, reinforces the discourse of renunciation and disci-
pline which warns us away from gratification with epithets
like "barbarism" and "immaturity." In Civilization and Its
Discontents , we receive this message in the starkest and
simplest terms: civilization is renunciation; gratification
belongs to infants and savages, and we ought to grow up and
get with the program.
Adorno in some isolated passages offers hints that this
slander of gratification is itself part of the spell. He
even implies that pleasure is the standard of rationality
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and an essential part of liberation, arguing that Freud, in
his "revulsion for pleasure and paradise,"
rejects the end... which alone could prove the
means, reason, to be reasonable: pleasure. Once
this has been disparagingly consigned to the rep-
ertoire of tricks for preserving the species, and
so itself exposed as a cunning form of reason,
without consideration of that moment in pleasure
which transcends subservience to nature, ratio is
degraded to rationalization. Truth is abandoned
to relativity and people to power. He alone who
could situate utopia in blind somatic pleasure,
which, satisfying the ultimate intention, is
intentionless
, has a stable and valid idea of
truth. 7
But these testimonials to sensuality and gratification—what
Martin Jay calls "the hedonistic impulse in Critical
58Theory" —are in fact part of the culture of denial: the
pleasure Adorno praises in these instances is very clearly
situated in the "beyond," in a world "no longer" dominated
by exchange. Gratification is set utterly off limits to us
here and now, since there can be no gratification that is
not complicit and perverted by the totality: "In a false
world all hedone is false." 59
Adorno sees pleasure in terms of a lapse into immedia-
cy, a loss of distance, and of sense-of-self ; the Christian
opposition of flesh and spirit is revived within the Marxian
horizon of salvation. Pleasure in this world always amounts
to a premature reconciliation with the world, a capitulation
to unity with the bad totality.
60 In bhis respect Adorno
joins with the Church, the State and the Boss, and with most
Marxists, and admonishes us to get back to work—even as he
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demonstrates with unrelenting clarity the wounds we inflict
on ourselves and on the world through discipline and denial.
Even the aesthetic, which plays a critical role in Adorno
precisely because it eludes (partially) the demands of
productivity and utility, has more to do with work than with
pleasure
.
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The status of pleasure goes to the heart of Adorno'
s
"political deficit." In some ways, Adorno is at his most
"radical" and "Marxist" in his refusal to endorse anything
less than the total transformation of society, even as his
own work seems to deny the likelihood of such a transforma-
tion. Any half-measures, any compromises are necessarily
complicit with the world as it is, and the unswerving critic
will refuse any measure that falls short of the whole.
Nothing falls farther short of the whole than short-term
gratification. If pleasure is always a lapse into (false)
reconciliation, then desire can never be subversive, because
it wants to be bought off. Adorno ' s suspicion of gratifica-
tion runs parallel with Marcuse's analysis of "repressive
desublimation , " in which a certain amount of socially sanc-
tioned and channelled gratification strengthens the overall
regime of renunciation. If gratification is equated with a
relaxation of vigilance, a forgetfulness of purpose and ego,
then Adorno will always side in spite of his "hedonistic
impulse" with Odysseus against the Sirens, the Lotus Eaters,
and Circe.
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However, there is another side to the problem. As long
as society continues to enforce renunciations which cannot
be rationally justified, but must be effected 'behind the
back' of subjects, desire retains an explosive potential.
The scope of repression, almost by definition, is much more
socially significant than repressive desublimation
. We will
take this up in the next chapter as it arises in Adorno's
work—under the heading of "spite"— in the context of con-
sumers' response to the culture industry.
It is not hard to see how Adorno came by his reputation
as a pessimistic, even defeatist social critic; like Nietz-
sche, he seems to have set himself up intentionally for
ridicule and misinterpretation with breathtakingly broad and
unconditional aphorisms.
But we have yet to describe what might be the grimmest
side of Adorno's work. If the economy has made individual
reckoning and planning obsolete, and "the appropriation of
mass psychology by the oppressors" has replaced the dialec-
tical processes described by psychoanalysis with a mode of
heteronomy that makes "false consciousness" look almost
guaint, the role of critical thought—even its existence— is
thrown into the most serious jeopardy. Worse yet, it ap-
pears that reason has played a central role in its own
extinction
.
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£L Reason: The Obsolescence of Ideology
The obsolescence of thought parallels the obsolescence
of the subject. There is an "internal" account of the
decline of thought, taken sub specie individuationis
, much
of which is anticipated in what we've already seen. There
is also an "external" account, which culminates in Adorno
'
s
argument that the time of Ideologiekritik has passed, that
state capitalism has outgrown the legitimating narratives of
bourgeois ideology.
As we have seen, Adorno argues that state capitalism
simply takes over the planning and reckoning functions that
were once left to the individual. It seems a stretch to
argue from an atrophy of economic calculation to the aboli-
tion of rationality and thought per se . But the point of
the state capitalism thesis—at least in the hands of Ador-
no— is that the economic model of ( trans ) action colonizes
every realm of contemporary society; exchange penetrates
even the spheres apparently most distant from economic life.
The "totally administered society" is meant to describe
a situation in which industrial capitalism reaches in prin-
ciple across the entire horizon of human activity. Whether
spontaneity or thought are possible any longer is not the
critical question in Adorno' s work: his argument is that
they have been made obsolete. The obsolescence of the ego
signifies the ultimate extension of this— the social ratio
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operates through and in spite of individuals, not at their
behest
:
The rationality operative in individual behavior
is, in fact, far from being lucidly self-aware; it
is largely the blind product of heteronomous forc-
es ... .
The economic sphere embodies a kind of rationality that
opens the way to jettisoning the heavy baggage of subjectiv-
ity, insofar as that is possible:
The truly contemporary types are those whose ac-
tions are motivated neither by an ego, nor,
strictly speaking, unconsciously, but mirror ob-jective trends like an automaton. Together they
enact a senseless ritual to the beat of a compul-
sively repetitive rhythm.
. . ,
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In this context thinking becomes dysfunctional (in more ways
than one )
.
Once thinking becomes subjectively obsolete, its objec-
tive function decays as well. In Adorno ' s closest approach
to the domain of political theory, he argues that state
capitalism no longer needs to rely on the ideals and puta-
tively universal values with which liberal capitalism always
met criticism. While ideology in a kind of local sense has
some continuing relevance (as we'll explore further in the
next chapter (in delineating a "politics industry" parallel
to the culture industry), in the larger sense of society's
account of itself, it has been discontinued along with the
thought that would ask for such an account. The legitimat-
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ing function ascribed to ideology on the classical model no
longer depends upon the rickety and always problematic
scaffolding of bourgeois ideology, which, if it persists at
all, only does so because no one has bothered to tear it
down yet.
This, it goes without saying, is not "progess." Ador-
no's provocative thesis (which has not been given the atten-
tion it deserves in the secondary literature) is that the
gap between bourgeois ideals and bourgeois reality, from
which social and political theory drew better than two
hundred years of nourishment, has been abolished: not by
realizing those ideals, but by allowing them to expire.
Adorno's account of the end of ideology hinges on the
ability of the status quo to masquerade as reality tout
court. In terms which acquire a new resonance with the
expiration of Communism, Adorno argues that the legitimating
function once played by bourgeois ideals is displaced by the
self-evidenct character of a totality pervasive enough to be
invisible, which obviates any questions about the justice or
propriety of the whole:
Unfreedom is consummated in its invisible totality
that tolerates no "outside" any more from which it
might be broken. The world as it is becomes the
only ideology, and mankind, its component.
This is what makes positivism tantamount to fascism in
Adorno's eyes: positivism is nothing more or less than a
prohibition on alternatives, an injunction to content one-
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self with the world as it seems to be. Positivism draws
Adorno 's ire, in fact, because it converges with the larger
social tendency to displace old fashioned ideology—because
it threatens to transmogrify from a particular school of
modern philosophy into modern common sense.
The end of ideology goes hand-in-hand with the extinc-
tion of the entrepreneurial subject which Adorno and Hork-
heimer associate with the liberal economy and, necessarily,
the subject of the liberal polity.
While Adorno never carried through the parallel, the
individual is not only the psychological equivalent of the
corner store, but of the self-legislating citizen. The
erosion of individuality can be seen as the merger of two
senses of "the private": the "private" sector of production
has thoroughly colonized the internal, "private" side of
personality. If the liberal economy cultivated a mode of
individuality that threw the subject back upon his own
resources, it also nourished a sense of individual ends
which were not reducible to those of the Church or the
State. 65
What one might see as the greatest political accom-
plishment of liberalism—the containment and redefiniton of
politics, such that the human ends of individuals were
insulated (to some extent) from the public sphere which was
now said to serve them (at the same time it served the ends
of the collective in the form of the state)— thus collapses
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under the success of the liberal economy and its demonic
offspring, state capitalism.
Adorno's narrative of the eclipse of competitive capi-
talism strongly implies not only the displacement of a
subject with some capacity for political life by one which
is merely subject to the demands of the system, but also the
contraction of the public sphere. It is clear enough that
the erosion of mediation Adorno describes in both the eco-
nomic and psychological realms shatters the liberal model of
politics and citizenship.
The one thinker more than any other who stands at the
cusp of this disaster is Max Weber. Weber, as several
66commentators have noted, tries to save the best intentions
of liberal political theory for a decidedly post-liberal
society. The fundamental political insight of Weberian
political thought is one side of precisely the erosion of
agency that Adorno rails against: politics becomes virtual-
ly a branch of mathematics with the reduction of individuals
in modern democracies to the empty identity of the fran-
chise. In modern nation-states, which Weber believed were
driven by rationalization toward a more or less universal
franchise, electoral politics becomes essentially a question
of administered demagogery: modern political parties devel-
op out of the imperatives of electoral victory in mass
democracies: the efficient corralling of votes.
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While Weber would not have endorsed Adorno's dire
pronouncements on the end of individuality, his narrative of
rationalization and bureaucratization implies a diminution
of the sphere of individual agency with strong echoes in
Adorno's work. Once the manipulation of political life
becomes an industry, the scope for political action and
discourse that would interest Adorno disappears. Moreover,
the liberal political project—namely the mediation of
individual will and collective policy, of legitimation and
consent—also becomes utterly obsolete once the individual
which liberalism always took for granted falls under the
same strictures of mass production as Fords and Frigidaires.
A forced reconciliation with the collective has become
a standard feature, and whatever real tension persists
between the individual and society (which liberal theory and
practice was founded upon) is contained on all sides by
various subsidiaries of the politics industry.
Obviously state capitalism as second nature can only
present itself as first nature to the extent that it can
occupy the entire social horizon: that is, to the extent
that it can render resistance and dissent invisible. In
other words, the seamlessness of the whole depends upon the
failure of (among other things) Marxism.
This is a failure Adorno takes for granted, and however
much his work looks forward to a resuscitation of praxis, it
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is virtually certain it will not resemble the Lukacsian
proletariat's. More than anything else, the debate over
Adorno's Marxism/non-Marxism has been fueled by the lack of
an extended, explicit treatment of the historical failure of
revolution. If there is an autopsy of the revolutionary
moment in Adorno, it is not in the notorious first paragraph
of Negative Dialectics, but in the fiber of Adorno's work
all the way through Aesthetic Theory. Typically, Adorno
offers not a theory of revolution, but a disguieting theory
of non-revolution—a negative "Reification and the Con-
sciousness of the Proletariat."
The major theorists of communist revolution, including
Lenin, Lukacs, and Luxemburg, presume a link between the
proletariat's collective experience of exploitation and
alienation, and its understanding. The proletariat has a
kind of privileged cognitive "standpoint" (one that it pays
for dearly) by virtue of its position in production, and in
Lukacs particularly, 68 it can come to a clearer and deeper
understanding of capitalist society than the bourgeoisie
because it has an essential interest not in reproducing, but
in overturning the prevailing relations of production. In
effect, most Marxists see the proletariat as in some sense
"outside" bourgeois society (or at least with one foot in
and one foot out), and connect its cognitive privilege to
this "outsider" status.
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Whether it constitutes itself in opposition to capital-
ist exploitation and oppression, or, as Marx suggests at
times, comes to realize the potential for new relations of
production through its experience in an increasingly social-
ized process of production, the proletariat must also come
to recognize itself as a class if it is to make anything of
this cognitive privilege.
Adorno's work, which is largely conceived as an effort
to account for the "miscarriage" of "the attempt to change
the world," can not be read as a simple revision of revolu-
tionary Marxist theory. His is not an account of the fail-
ures of particular proletarian movements in the West: it is
an autopsy of the revolutionary subject. In the course of a
tenacious sociological and philosophical genealogy of fas-
cism, the Frankfurt School, and Adorno above all, problem-
atized most of the basic assumptions of revolutionary Marx-
ist theory.
His adoption of Pollock's economic analysis of monopo-
ly, which severs the revolutionary whiplash some Marxists
expected from economic crises, is probably the least signif-
icant of his heresies. More importantly, his work shows
that the proletariat is no longer (if it ever was) "outside'
capitalist society; that consciousness per se, much less
class consciousness, is far from a given; and finally, that
"liberation" is itself by no means a transparent or unprob-
lematic concept.
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This, a radical questioning of the prerequisites and
meaning of "revolution," is what establishes Adorno as a
social theorist who cannot be ignored. Or rather, ought to
establish him as such. If Adorno has gone virtually unno-
ticed by political theory, at least in the United States,
one can attribute this to more than his intentionally de-
manding and difficult presentation; 59 three distinct as-
pects of the "political deficit" that has been associated
with him help to account for the obstacles his work has
encountered in American political discourse.
First of all, a significant part of Adorno' s "political
deficit" is owed to his critics, whose analyses sometimes
fall far short of the thoroughness and nuance required. By
far the most common fault is to take some part for the whole
of Adorno' s thought; most notoriously to read "The Culture
Industry" without Aesthetic Theory, or even without the rest
of Dialectic of Enlightenment . But even writers whom one
would like to credit with a more complete acquaintance,
Habermas above all, have proven capable of astounding feats
of misinterpretation. 70
However, the "political deficit" is not entirely a
figment of the imaginations of unsympathetic critics; in
some important respects, Adorno ' s work does not live up to
its own theoretical aspirations. Critics are not completely
off the mark to demand of him more properly political analy-
63
sis than he delivers. Gillian Rose once again offers the
most astute summary:
Yet Adorno's emphasis on the formation and defor-
mation of the individual did replace any further
definition of the macro-factor, the form of domi-
nation. He might at least have detailed the mech-
anism by which power has become diffuse but omnip-
otent, and how that change is related to change in
the organization of production. Ideology, domina-
tion, and reification are simply eguated with each
other, and the individual is not satisfactorily
reinserted into the socio-political context. 71
It is important to note that the demands Rose makes
upon Adorno are meant as an immanent critique: the thrust
of Adorno's own analysis seems to require an explicit and
nuanced articulation of power, ideology, and resistance. To
the extent that Rose's critique is on the mark, it is hard
to claim Adorno as a "political theorist."
One of the obstacles to a clear explication of all this
is the deep ambiguity of the word 'politics.' No doubt one
of the things that complicates a discussion of "Adorno's
politics" is the discursive explosion of the meanings of
'politics' since the 1960s. In some senses, critical
theory's focus on culture and psychoanalytic concerns antic-
ipated this (and made some of their works 'required reading'
then )
.
Adorno's work is manifestly "political" without having
the slightest interest in the strategic topics that animate
liberal or Marxist political thought. His work is invalu-
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able for showing the political charge that runs through all
philosophy; like Nietzsche, Adorno draws our attention to
the exclusion and suppression involved in every conceptual-
ization, the no-saying and yes-saying that cannot be disen-
tangled from thinking.
And this is precisely where the controversy over his
'political deficit' crops up: how might a politics that
caters to nonidentity be linked to more mundane political
concerns like improving the living conditions of women and
men? As we will see, Adorno himself shows how the blindness
of thought to its own domination of nature (including its
own nature) is deeply intertwined with class domination and
the institution of property.
In this sense, Adorno and his colleagues were blind-
sided by the eruptions that punctured the ostensibly paci-
fied and harmonious regimes of the Cold War. Any attempt to
embrace Adorno for New Left projects had to stumble over the
ways in which 'politics' in his work seems to be stripped of
its sociological side and made into a kind of physical
medium beyond the intervention of those it envelopes. His
analysis of late capitalist society seems to systematically
deny any meaningful 'political' action; there are no sub-
jects that appear capable of politics, and no political
space in which any such subjects could pursue an end to
domination
.
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One could argue that Adorno
' s not-inconsiderable accom-
plishment was precisely to destabilize and problematize the
project of political theory. Indeed, the reason I smuggled
the rather looser term "social theorist" into a paragraph
above was to account for figures like Marx, Nietzsche, and
Freud, who are clearly not doing "political theory" in the
sense we ascribe to thinkers like Machiavelli
,
Rousseau, and
Hegel. In trying to bring the legacy of these not-politi-
cal-theorists to bear on late capitalist society, Adorno
implicitly demonstrates that our political concepts, most of
which were brought to maturity in the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries, are made deeply suspect by the reality of
the twentieth century. In this respect, Adorno foregrounds
his, and our, political "deficit" in a way which has much
more to tell us than the work of political theorists like
Rawls and Nozick.
This is not least because much contemporary political
theory is still wedded to assumptions about subjectivity
that Adorno believes are no longer sustainable. Seen in its
full context, Adorno' s work deeply problemat izes not only
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contemporary political theory, but contemporary politics.
At this point however, we have only half the story of
the suffocation of politics. In the next chapter, I turn to
Adorno 's account of the culture industry, and of the provoc-
ative notion that politics has withdrawn into aesthetics.
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CHAPTER II
AESTHETIC THEORY AND PRAXIS
Adorno saw the collapse of revolutionary praxis in both
East and West in the formative years of his career as a
missed opportunity which could not be willed to return.
That he did not see any credible challenge to capitalism
"after the attempt to change the world miscarried" should
not mislead one to the conclusion that Adorno had given up
hope for practical intervention. It is true that he was
pessimistic—or realistic—about the prospects for any
serious threat to the encompassing systems of domination in
the foreseeable future. This notion of a (temporary) inca-
pacitation of practical struggle is the ground of Adorno '
s
claim that praxis has taken refuge in aesthetics:
The feigning of a true politics here and now, the
freezing of historical relations which nowhere
seem ready to melt, oblige the mind to go where it
need not degrade itself ....[ I ] t is to works of art
that has fallen the burden of wordlessly asserting
what is barred to politics .... [P]olitics has mi-
grated into autonomous art, and nowhere more so
than where it seems to be politically dead.
The riddle of the migration of politics is one of the
major themes of Adorno 1 s monumental attempt, in Aesthetic
Theory and elsewhere, to do justice to the complex dialectic
of art and society. That Adorno chose to devote himself to
this project with such intensity in the last years of his
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life has sometimes been seen as an indicator of his 'poli-
tical deficit'—as a "strategic withdrawal into aesthet-
ics." But Aesthetic Theory is not a retreat or withdrawal;
according to Adorno, the project of social transformation
has been driven into the realm of autonomous art.
Any account of that exodus also has to grapple with the
dialectical poor relation of autonomous art: the "culture
industry." Adorno ' s critique of mass-produced 'popular'
culture —a critique which is more subtle and meticulous
than a glance at the polemical essay in Dialectic of En-
lightenment suggests—mirrors at every important point his
analysis of autonomous art; the two spheres must be under-
stood together.
The relevance of Adorno ' s work for contemporary Ameri-
can politics is clearest in his account of the culture
industry, which in its emphasis on the predominance of mass-
produced culture and on the lapse of opposition is aimed
squarely at the United States as the epitome of Western
democracy
.
Adorno does not offer much to substantiate his argument
that politics— in the broader sense of the vital struggles
over the power relations that structure society—has with-
drawn into the crevices of society. It seems to me that
Adorno takes the dormancy of anti-capitalist praxis to be
obvious. Two historical developments are critical here: the
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manifest failures of the Soviet experiment, and the disaf-
fection of the working classes in the West with revolution-
ary parties—most dramatically the swing of German workers
from socialism to Nazism.
What these dismaying developments share is the gap
between theory and praxis, between intellectual and material
labor, that is one of the themes of Adorno
' s work:
There is much to indicate that a knowledge crip-
pled temporarily, at least, in its possible rela-
tion to practical change is not a blessing in
itself either. Praxis is put off and cannot wait;
this is what ails even theory. 3
So long as theory finds itself "cr ippled . . . in its
possible relation to practical change," politics verges on
one-dimensionality. Under contemporary conditions, Adorno
argues, praxis subsists in marginal enterprises like philos-
ophy and modernist art
—
precisely because these enterprises
are so manifestly impractical.
This chapter is meant to demonstrate how and why
Adorno ' s aesthetic theory privileges autonomous art as
—
alongside critical theory, to which we'll turn in the next
chapter—the locus of credible praxis in the wake of the
miscarriage of resistance.
I will argue that Adorno 1 s elaboration of the inherent-
ly political logic that links capitalist exchange relations
and artistic content is a fruitful and impressive attempt to
develop a Marxian aesthetic theory on behalf of the project
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of freedom. Unfortunately, Adorno's laudable intention to
ground aesthetics in political economy did not devote suffi-
cient attention to that foundation: the critical distinc-
tion of "autonomous" from heteronomous art, which relies on
this (faulty) political economy, is untenable.
This does not invalidate the general direction of
Adorno's aesthetics, but it does require some extensive
rethinking of his conclusions, and I will offer some
thoughts in this direction to conclude the chapter.
A. Autonomous Art as Praxis
Adorno's account of autonomous art as praxis hinges on
the dialectical relationship between the "autonomous" and
the "social" aspects of art. In pitting these moments
against each other, Adorno is arguing against both the
common bourgeois notion of art as a rarified realm somehow
apart from and above society, and against its consignment by
vulgar Marxist theory to a "superstructural" reflection of
basic economic contradictions.
The social relevance of art is rooted in its autonomy
from society, as much as its autonomy is rooted in society.
On one level, art's autonomy denotes the historical emanci-
pation of art from the demands of religious and mythic
signification; in the bourgeois era art is 'left to itself
to pursue the elaboration of its own immanent laws of devel-
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opment. Within each branch of the arts, according to Ador-
no, there is a dynamic relationship between artists and the
tradition they work within and upon. Much like philosophi-
cal problems which are taken up, reworked, made obsolete and
rediscovered, the development of aesthetic form constitutes
the basic project of art.
The concept of form occupies a central place in Aes-
thetic Theory, and it is the crux of Adorno
' s defense of art
as praxis. As one might expect with Adorno, "form" is not a
simple determinate concept, but one that needs to be placed
in the context of the dialectical character of art works.
From the point of view of autonomy, form designates the
arrangement of elements within the constitution or composi-
tion of the art work. It is the shaping power which medi-
ates the social material art draws upon for its "content."
Obviously this does not take place in some pristine
realm uncontaminated by social reality; the very fact that
art is allowed to be 'for itself is prescribed and defined
by society. The formal development of art is not some
freewheeling and whimsical play of invention, nor does it
follow some predetermined logical progression. The aesthet-
ic order imposed by form is not external to or indifferent
toward its material. Artistic problems are social problems
as Adorno puts it, "aesthetic form is a sedimentation of
content." 4 Artistic production, just as much as industrial
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production, is grounded in a specific set of social rela-
tions and embodies the contradictions of those relations:
The unresolved antagonisms of reality reappear in
art in the guise of immanent problems of artistic
form. This, and not the deliberate injection of
objective moments of social content, defines art's
relation to society. The aesthetic tensions mani-
festing themselves in works of art express the
essence of reality in and through their emancipa-
tion from the factual facade of exteriority. 5
Adorno's discussion of aesthetic praxis is no less
complicated than the dialectical accounts of form and auton-
omy on which it relies. Without oversimplifying too gross-
ly, one can discern three distinct but closely interdepen-
dent claims for autonomous art's praxis, having to do with
art works as social texts, the exemplary mediation of sub-
ject-object relations by form, and the exemption of autono-
mous art from economic utility.
Adorno argues that the autonomous work of art embodies
an implicit critique of the contradictions of the society
from which it draws its material. Works of art are social
texts both because they are produced within a specific
social and historical situation and because artistic prob-
lems (like philosophical ones)—no matter how recondite or
obscure they may seem—embody the antagonisms of their
society. What Adorno says here about music applies to
autonomous art in general:
[Music] fulfills its social function more precise-
ly when it presents social problems through its
own material and according to its own formal laws-
-problems which music contains within itself in
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the innermost cells of its technique. The task of
music as art thus enters into a parallel relation-
ship to the task of social theory. 6
Thus non-discursive works by Schonberg, no less than discur-
sive works like those of Kafka and Beckett, articulate the
unfreedom and domination at the heart of modernity. The
truth content of autonomous art is distinct from critical
social theory, but no less valid.
The idea that works of art reflect the social antago-
nisms of their environment is hardly a new one; however,
Adorno's argument does not depend on a simple model of a
superstructural reflection of fundamental economic contra-
dictions. The link between the immanent development of
artistic technique and the irrational nature of bourgeois
society is not some notion that art is an epiphenomenon of
prevailing forces of production. To speak of it as "re-
flecting" social contradictions denies art the autonomy that
Adorno so strenuously defends; the word Adorno himself
sometimes uses is "refraction" which is quite appropriate to
his insistence on the mediating role of form.
This "refraction" and Adorno's alternative to the stale
metaphor of base/superstructure are well illustrated by
art's relation to the domination of nature and the suppres-
sion of the object. Artistic production shares with intel-
lectual and material production the processes of reification
that Adorno discusses at great length in Dialectic of En-
lightenment and Negative Dialectics. In philosophy, reifi-
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cation appears as identity thinking which forces procrustean
concepts onto things and suppresses whatever 'remainder'
will not submit to identification; the analogue of identity
thinking in bourgeois relations of production is the logic
of commodif ication, the universal exchange of unequal
things as equals. While reif ication privileges constitutive
subjectivity at the expense of objects it has disastrous
consequences for actual living subjects, who fall prey to
the conceptual and material domination of nature as they are
reduced to mere instantiations of supposedly universal
categories. Thus the suppression of what falls outside of
these categories—of the "non-identical"—virtually defines
unfreedom
.
This process is played out dialectically in aesthetic
production in the domain of form. On one hand, since the
artist and the art work are part and parcel of a society
under the spell of reification, the formal constitution of
the art work seems to share in the domination of nature and
the imposition characteristic of identity thinking. Form
draws its material from society by wrenching it away from
that society and subordinating it to the imperatives of
aesthetic expression. But Adorno wants to argue that this
process of dissociating particular elements from the reified
and integrated reality of capitalist society potentially
serves as a model for bringing the object to itself, for
doing justice to the particular and the marginal:
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As the language of both domination and reconcilia-
tion, art seeks to revivify the content of what
the language of nature was trying to say to man in
cryptic, almost unintelligible ways .... Works of
art expand the area of domination to the extreme,
not in a literal sense, but in the sense of posit-
ing a sphere unto itself which by its very imma-
nence differs from real domination, thus negating
the heteronomy of the latter. 7
The construction of the art work serves as a model for
subverting prevailing identity thinking and prefigures the
reconciliation of the subject and the object, because it is
somehow able to rescue its object from the reified meaning
imposed upon it: "Aesthetic identity ... is meant to assist
the non-identical in its struggle against the repressive
identification compulsion that rules the outside world." 8
By subordinating its material to its own formal laws, Adorno
argues, art is able to articulate the truth of the object
without succumbing to the dialectic of enlightenment. The
artist uses formal rearrangement and representation to give
voice to what is silenced by reification.
This helps to explain why Adorno would prefer to speak
of art as a refraction rather than reflection of social
reality. To attempt to faithfully mirror social contradic-
tions directly is to maintain and reinforce the silence of
oppression and suffering. What Adorno values so much in the
aesthetic is its capacity to 'pull apart' and reassemble the
congealed and reified reality to bring out the truth of that
reality. Because of the its autonomy, the truth content of
art is able to resist corruption and co-optation.
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It is apparent then that 'form' is crucial to art's
praxis both as a social text which represents society's
unfreedom and domination, and as a prototype for subject-
object relations which do not depend on domination. Art's
indictment of unreason and suffering is only possible
through the refraction or mediation afforded by the princi-
ple of form. Form itself performs something very similar to
what Adorno calls in Negative Dialectics "constellation
construction" to emancipate the object from identity. The
goal of the philosopher's construction of a constellation is
"to use concepts to unseal the non-conceptual with concepts,
without making it their equal." 9 Critical theory and auton-
omous art both aim at an intervention between the object and
the structures that define it; this intervention is carried
out on behalf of the object, with instruments (concepts and
representations) which themselves are important components
of those repressive mechanisms. In each case, Adorno argues
that the approach to the object must rely on those instru-
ments without reproducing the domination they embody in
society at large. In the realm of art, form breaks the
object out of the objectivity imposed upon it, and in effect
places it in an aesthetic constellation which not only
reveals the contradictions of the prevailing objectivity but
the possibility of freedom which is suppressed in it.
Art can keep alive the promise of freedom only insofar
as it is able to sustain its disengagement from society.
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While its autonomy places art 'above' politics, and thus
makes it culpable as an ideological support of the status
quo, Adorno argues that it is precisely its aloofness from
bourgeois society which enables it to serve as an implicit
critique of that society. This is not only because truly
autonomous art is bound to represent, discursively or non-
discursively
,
the unfreedom and domination at the root of
bourgeois society:
Art... is not social only because it is
brought about in such a way that it embodies the
dialectic of forces and relations of production.
Nor is art social only because it derives its
material content from society. Rather, it is
primarily social because it stands opposed to
society. Now this opposition art can mount only
when it has become autonomous. By congealing into
an entity unto itself—rather than obeying exist-
ing social norms and thus proving itself to be
'socially useful'—art criticizes society just by
being there. Pure and immanently elaborated art
is a tacit critique of the debasement of man by a
condition that is moving towards a total-exchange
society where everything is for-other. This so-
cial deviance of art is the determinate negation
of a determinate society.
The social deviance of art— its allegiance to form rather
than function—exempts it from the social imperative of
usefulness, and at the same time prefigures emancipation
from ruthless utility. Autonomous art's impracticali ty
embodies the promise of a rationally ordered society which
does not reduce subjects or objects to commodities: "Works
of art are plenipotentiaries of things beyond the mutilating
sway of exchange, profit and false human needs."
11
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Thus art, when it holds fast to its autonomy, embodies
a species of praxis that is able to stand just beyond the
grasp of integration. This helps to explain why Adorno
worked so hard to finish Aesthetic Theory in the 60s; auton-
omous art becomes for him the haven of the project of free-
dom in the administered world.
B. The Culture Industry and Praxis
Adorno ' s defense of art as praxis is ingenious and
provocative, but it is bound to appear to some as a virtual
redefinition of "praxis." To assess this redefinition and
its relation to conventional notions of praxis, it is neces-
sary first to see why the culture industry is disqualified
from this praxis, and why Adorno takes a rather dim view of
explicitly political art.
Adorno' s aesthetic theory hinges on the thesis that the
political economy of cultural production affects the aes-
thetic (and political) content of works. Adorno argues that
the structural logic of the culture industry tends toward
the promotion of obedience, conformity, and passivity.
The defining distinction between art and the culture
industry is clear enough (although it deserves critical
attention): the culture industry is an industry, defined by
its ability to sustain an acceptable rate of profit. Fol-
lowing Friedrich Pollock, Adorno and Horkheimer situate
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contemporary culture in a new stage of capitalism marked by
increasingly integrated monopolies throughout the economy.
Not surprisingly, the heteronomous conditions of pro-
duction within the culture industry have important aesthetic
consequences. Unlike autonomous art, producers working in
the culture industry are not at liberty to focus on the
immanent artistic problems within their field. More pre-
cisely, the cultural combines shy away from sponsoring
aesthetically "advanced" works, and orient their efforts to
promoting and distributing work that will duplicate the
success of the last smash hit. This, according to Adorno,
accounts for the most striking aesthetic feature of indus-
trial culture: standardization; the task of the managers of
cultural capital is to produce a new product just like the
old that was snapped up most eagerly. The latest thing must
be just different enough to appear "novel" without disrupt-
ing the formula of familiarity:
Only if it is the same does it have a chance of
being sold automatically, without requiring any
effort on the part of the customer, and of pre-
senting itself as a musical institution. And only
if it is different can it be distinguished from
other songs—a requirement for being remembered
and hence for being successful.
The products of the culture industry are not only not-
art, they are, measured against Adorno' s aesthetic theory,
anti-art. Aesthetic praxis, then, is barred to industrial
culture at every point. Rather than offering a mediated
critique of social relations refracted through form, indus-
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trial culture tends toward a hollow, false reconciliation of
real contradictions. The individual detail is not recuper-
ated from the false totality on behalf of a world that would
do justice to non-identity, but reduced to the gimmick which
aims at distinguishing particular products from the din of
virtually identical and intentionally fungible competitors.
Unlike autonomous art, which Adorno argues maintains and
mediates the tension between the universal and the particu-
lar on behalf of the unfulfilled promise of reconciliation,
the culture industry subordinates the apparently rebellious
detail to the demands of the bottom line:
the detail remains openly connected with the un-
derlying scheme so that the listener always feels
on safe ground.... Any harmonic boldness, any
chord which does not fall strictly within the
simplest harmonic scheme demands being apperceived
as "false," that is, as a stimulus which carries
with it the unambiguous prescription to subtitute
for it the right detail, or rather the naked
scheme
.
In this, the fate of the aesthetic detail corresponds to the
fate of the individual in industrial culture; the "rebel-
lion" allowed to a particular atom serves to sustain our
interest until the inevitable victory of the (false) collec-
tive :
The detail has no bearing on the whole, which
appears as an extraneous framework. Thus the
whole is never altered by the individual event and
therefore remains, as it were, aloof, imperturb-
able, and unnoticed throughout the piece. At the
same time the detail is mutilated by a device
which it can never influence and alter, so that
the detail remains inconsequential.
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While Adorno shies away from developing an aesthetics
oriented around reception (for reasons discussed below), he
does argue that consumption of industrial culture plays an
important role in the maintenance of alienated labor. By
pre-digesting its material, the familiar and unchallenging
character of the culture industry's products offers itself
as the antidote to the regimentation and duress of work.
The culture industry calls itself entertainment because it
requires no effort: "The composition hears for the listen-
er."
15
This again is a step backward from the autonomous art
championed by Adorno, which demands (or fosters) an active
and supple engagement. The entertainment industry virtually
promises not to challenge its consumers, who 'deserve a
break today.' But this escape from the rigor of work proves
illusory to the extent that the culture industry is grounded
upon the same heteronomy and standardization of every other
industry
:
Amusement under late capitalism is the prolonga-
tion of work . . .
.
[ M ] echanization has such power
over a man's leisure and happiness, and so power-
fully determines the manufacture of amusement
goods, that his experiences are inevitably after-
images of the work process itself. The ostensible
content is merely a faded foreground; what sinks
in is the automatic succession of standardized
operations
.
Whereas autonomous art's qualified and complicit exemp-
tion from exchange allows it to stand as an implicit rebuke
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to commodification, the culture industry makes no apologies
for its complete integration with the status guo:
Movies and radio no longer pretend to be art. The
truth that they are just business is made into an
ideology in order to justify the rubbish they
deliberately produce.
Unlike the conservative culture critics who shared his
horror of 'mass culture,' Adorno does not blame the victims;
the culture industry is seen as deeply implicated in the
deepest forces of modernity: capitalism and rationaliza-
tion. The star-crossed relation between art and industrial
culture— i.e. between truth and demos—can be traced through
each of the three spheres we discussed in the last chapter.
Whereas the work of autonomous art is able to shield
the non-identical from identitarian logic, and thus preserve
both the memory of suffering and the promise of utopia, the
culture industry is thoroughly colonized by administration.
The fate of the non-identical in industrial culture is
visible in the subjugation of the detail, which, wrenched
from the force-field of aesthetic form, provides the perfect
alibi for the liquidation of the individual.
The critique of commodification embodied in works of
autonomous art—themselves commodities—depends upon their
purposelessness . This moment of praxis is barred to the
interchangeable products of the culture industry, since they
are assigned a social purpose from the outset. In the
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subordination of form to formula they directly embody and
reinforce commodity fetishism and the crisis of value.
Finally, we have seen that autonomous art serves as one
of the last bulwarks against the crisis of subjectivity we
analyzed in the previous chapter. Adorno's deepest and most
compelling grievance against the culture industry is the
contribution it makes to the erosion of subjectivity and to
an authoritarian personality structure. Adorno's critigue
of the culture industry's impact goes far beyond an asser-
tion that industrial culture promotes passivity and confor-
mity; in his analysis, the audience is as much a product of
industrial culture as movies, radio shows, and advertising.
As we will see, this is not accomplished without resistance;
but, according to Adorno, it is more-or-less accomplished.
These claims, formulated as provocatively as possible
in Dialectic of Enlightenment , are meant to counter the
claim
—
put forward by both defenders and conservative crit-
ics of "mass" culture— that the culture industry is giving
people what they want. The culture industry derives its
alibi of "popularity" from the standardization of consumers
which it mimics in its own products:
Now any person signifies only those attributes by
which he can replace everybody else: he is inter-
changeable, a copy. As an individual he is com-
pletely expendable and utterly insignificant, and
this is just what he finds out when time deprives
him of this similarity.
89
The concept which flickers between the lines here is "labor
power"; this interchangeability is the basis of a society of
"classes" of individuals. The success of an industry which
"aims at standardized react ions ...[ at ] a system of response-
mechanisms wholly antagonistic to the ideal of individuality
in a free, liberal society," 19 depends upon this identity
foisted upon the majority by the economy.
This is one of the points at which Adorno
' s analysis of
the culture industry is most misunderstood; by occasional
references to its customers as the culture industry's "help-
less victims," we are inclined to see the audience as wholly
passive and receptive, as if the culture industry were
simply perpetrated upon a senseless and supine population.
But this objection— that Adorno neglects the audience's
capacity for resistence and reinterpretat ion—overlooks his
arguments detailing the necessity of a process of active
appropriation for the success of the culture industry.
Without careful attention to the 'psychoanalytic'
arguments in "The Culture Industry...," "On Popular Music,"
and "Fetish Character in Music..." it appears as though the
culture industry establishes its hegemony by fiat, or that
the audience is so debased that it willingly gobbles up what
the culture industry sets before it. But the consumption of
the culture industry is not so simple.
One of the perennial problems faced by the culture
industry is shoring up the regime of fashion across shifts
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in taste which expose yesterday's enthusiasm to be just
that. Consumers' scorn for the outdated, "corny" hits of
the previous day exposes, according to Adorno, the ambiva-
lence and spite repressed in the consumption of industrial
culture. Precisely because consumers are not "helpless"
victims, the incorporation of the standards and stereotypes
of the culture industry amounts to an arduous process of
self-overcoming: the culture industry does not simply
"fool" or delude its victims, it turns the subject's own
instinctual energy against subjectivity.
This self-overcoming is dictated by the unprecedented
strength of the apparatus:
The ambivalence illustrated by the effect of
corniness is due to the tremendous increase of the
disproportion between the individual and the so-
cial power. An individual person is faced with an
individual song which he is apparently free either
to accept or reject. By the plugging and support
given the song by powerful agencies, he is de-
prived of the freedom of rejection which he might
still be capable of maintaining toward the indi-
vidual song. To dislike the song is no longer the
expression of objective taste but rather a rebel-
lion against the wisdom of a public utility and a
disagreement with the millions of people who are
assumed to support what the agencies are giving
them ....
This of course does not imply absolute elimi-
nation of resistance. But it is driven into deep-
er and deeper strata of the psychological struc-
ture. Psychological energy must be directly in-
vested in order to overcome resistance.
Thus, according to Adorno, the culture industry wins its
hegemony at the price of bad faith and ressentiment .
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This is the truly grim dimension of the culture indus-
try: if it were simply an ideological 'veil', one might
cast it aside; but Adorno locates the roots of degraded,
affirmative culture within the instinctual economy of con-
sumers. The passive connotations of "consumption" fail to
grasp the hazards and effort involved in this continually-
renewed incorporation of the culture industry; the enthusi-
asm of the most energetic followers of a popular "craze"
expose the mechanism upon which the culture industry's
success rests:
This fury cannot be accounted for simply by the
passive acceptance of the given. It is essential
to ambivalence that the subject should not simply
react passively. Complete passivity demands unam-
biguous acceptance. However, neither the material
itself nor observation of the listeners supports
the assumption of such unilateral acceptance.
Simply relinquishing resistance is not sufficient
for acceptance of the inescapable.
Enthusiasm for popular music requires wilful
resolution by listeners, who must transform the
external order to which they are subservient into
an internal order. The endowment of musical com-
modities with libido energy is manipulated by the
ego
.
21
This may not seem to accord with the theses of the
"Culture Industry" essay, which emphasizes the passive,
effort-less consumption of entertainment, and seems to
attribute the hegemony of the culture industry simply to its
inescapability—the victory of monopoly on the side of pro-
duction and distribution predetermines consumption:
The stronger the positions of the culture
industry become, the more summarily it can deal
with consumers' needs, producing them, controlling
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them, disciplining them, and even withdrawing
amusement: no limits are set to cultural proq
of this kind. 22
This emphasis on the domesticated and domesticating nature
of industrial culture is the basis of Adorno
' s most provoca-
tive claims in "The Culture Industry...":
The need which might resist central control
has already been suppressed by the control of the
individual consciousness.
One might be tempted to see the repression thesis as a
later "discovery" of Adorno' s, but "On Popular Music" and
"The Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listen-
ing," which develops similar arguments around ambivalence
and spite, were both written before "The Culture Indus-
try...". One could speculate on the different intentions of
these essays, but in any case the repression thesis is
consistent with the basic thrust of "The Culture Indus-
try. .. " and offers a more sophisticated account of the
reception and internalization of industrial culture. Where-
as "The Culture Industry..." is content to gesture at the
parallels between industrial culture and the industrializa-
tion of the lives of its consumers, the other two essays
link this argument to the analysis of the instinctual econo-
my of the psyche, opening up the black box of heteronomous
sub jecti vi ty
.
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The goal of the culture industry, according to Adorno,
is to occupy the ideological horizon at least as scrupulous-
ly as late capitalism dominates the material landscape.
Nothing could be as dysfunctional from the point of view of
the culture industry as a capacity to imagine alternatives;
fortunately the aesthetic logic of industrial culture goes
far to minimize this hazard. Judgment and thought are not
only disappointed by the products of the culture industry:
they are actively discouraged. The distraction offered by
industrial entertainment does not really amount to an "es-
cape"; the product consumed not only bears the unmistakeable
marks of the mechanized work-process one hoped to leave
behind, but more importantly, the possibility of unre-
strained or unplanned pleasure is systematically foreclosed:
Pure amusement in its consequence, relaxed self-
surrender to all kinds of associations and happy
nonsense, is cut short by the amusement on the
market: instead, it is interrupted by a surrogate
overall meaning which the culture industry insists
on giving to its products, and yet misuses as a
mere pretext for bringing in the stars.
This "overall meaning" discredits the notion of escape. The
magic trick which is the culture industry's main responsi-
bility is inculcating the lie that the status quo is the
whole, that there is no "outside" and no beyond—but without
ever bringing to consciousness the idea of the whole, which
(precisely in its presumption of an outside) contains a
dangerous footing for critical leverage. In this respect,
positivism fits snugly with the culture industry:
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The new ideology has as its object the world as
such. It makes use of the worship of facts by no
more than elevating a disagreeable existence into
the world of facts in representing it meticulous-
ly. This transference makes existence itself a
substitute for meaning and right. Whatever the
camera reproduces is beautiful....
Continuing and continuing to join in are
given as justification for the blind persistence
of the system and even for its immutability. What
repeats itself is healthy, like the natural or
industrial cycle. The same babies grin eternally
out of the magazines; the jazz machine will pound
away forever
.
The repression thesis brings another dimension to this
argument about the liguidation of alternatives. In some
essays, Adorno argues that the consciousness of alternatives
is not so much effaced as suppressed:
Not only do the listening subjects lose... the
capacity for conscious perception of music, which
was from time immemorial confined to a narrow
group, but they stubbornly reject the possibility
of such perception .... [T ]hey display the pinched
hatred of those who really sense the other but
exclude it in order to live in peace, and who
therefore would like best to root out the nagging
possibility
.
The implications of such a suppressed awareness that another
type of music—and another type of society—are possible
will be pursued in the last chapter.
C. A "Politics Industry"
This liquidation of the consciousness of alternatives,
with its legitimating power, suggests that a critique of tt
"politics industry" might run very much parallel to the
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theses on the culture industry. This part of our analysis
will necessarily be more speculative than what has gone
before, since Adorno does no more than hint at the parallels
between mass culture and mass politics.
If we are to see politics as an industry, we must meet
the objection that politics does not produce identifiable
commodities in the way that the culture industry does. What
is "consumed" by citzens? Adorno
' s basic approach to the
culture industry suggests that the significance of particu-
lar cultural commodities is being effaced in favor of corn-
modification as a cumulative social process: use value is
eclipsed by exchange value. In a way, we are sold not so
much a particular unit of culture or satisfaction, but the
ideology of "entertainment"; what we are being sold is the
system itself. Like pop songs and movies, the moral of
every election and every party congress is that the system
works—or in any case that since it is the only one possible
we must adjust to its imperfections.
If it is possible to trace the political consequences
of commodif ication in aesthetics, we ought to be able to say
something about the commodi f ication of politics per se, even
acknowledging that the political sphere is subject to rather
different imperatives than the culture industry: Hollywood
is not Washington, but they are both beholden in critical
respects to Wall Street.
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We can begin with the crux of Adorno ' s aesthetics. In
no small part because it is mediated through the same com-
bines, political discourse in contemporary capitalism is
subject to the central complaint Adorno brings against
industrial culture: heteronomy.
We will leave to the last chapter the problem of wheth-
er there could be an "autonomous" politics parallel to
autonomous art. Even without knowing quite what Adorno has
in mind when he alludes to a "true politics" (in the passage
quoted at the outset of this chapter), it is not difficult
to imagine how the basic features of contemporary politics
disappoint the Adornian project of freedom. To the extent
that the politics industry has merged with industrial cul-
ture to become a rather boring sector of entertainment,
political life becomes a spectacle that, precisely in its
tedium and manufactured irrelevance, wards off participa-
tion .
The politics industry too has an interest in a particu-
lar type of consumer, and works to eliminate the inefficien-
cy of catering to the needs of its consumers by pre-forming
them in accord with its own requirements. Here Adorno'
s
analysis of the recognition and acceptance of popular songs
can serve as an indicator of the internalization of the
manufactured political horizon. The trick of the culture
industry is to get consumers to clamor for the alternatives
97
they were going to get anyway, in a way which leaves as
little foothold as possible for critical thought.
The success of the politics industry's effort to market
its own legitimacy depends, like the culture industry, on
its status as a monopoly: the marketplace of ideas is
coordinated by a handful of distributors. Hence the neces-
sity for hype which the politics industry shares with (or
borrows from) the culture industry: the promotion of an
ideology of free choice between meaningful alternatives,
which obscures the imposition of a mass-produced commodity
whose "variety" is as significant as the presence or absence
of fins on a Cadillac. In a world where such trivial "di-
versity" is taken as given in every forum of "serious" and
"respectable" political debate, legitimacy can approach the
standard of automation which Adorno ' s analysis warns
against
.
If we pursue in this connection the psychoanalytic
insights of "On Popular Music," we can theorize that indus-
trial politics is not just passively ingested by the popu-
lace, but requires a certain amount of wilful renunciation,
which is accompanied by a violent backlash against any
Utopian suggestions which might expose the price paid by
this self-overcoming.
Our intuitions concerning how Adorno views the inter-
section of art, culture, and politics, receive some verifi-
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cation in his critique of consciously political or "commit-
ted" art.
While Adorno does not dismiss politically committed art
out of hand, he is suspicious of conscious attempts to
politicize art and make it an explicit vehicle of praxis.
In subordinating autonomy to political "impact", committed
art fails even to achieve the impact it strives for, and
misunderstands profoundly the nature of the social praxis of
art
.
The fundamental mistake of committed or "tendentious"
art in Adorno
' s eyes is a simplistic conception of the
relations between art and society and between form and
content. Besides overestimating the importance of the
artist's intentions for the social truth content of works,
art with a message confuses aesthetic praxis with a dubious
attempt at political intervention. "Political" artists seek
to intervene directly into the social meaning of their
artworks by a more or less sophisticated infusion of a
"message" . But this involves a serious misconception of
art's relationship to political consciousness. Adorno
argues that the truly revolutionary 'impact' of art is
subterranean and oblique:
The impact works of art have operates at the level
of remembrance; impact has nothing to do with
translating their latent praxis into manifest
praxis, the growth of autonomy having gone too far
to permit any kind of immediate correspon-
ds 27dence ....
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The significance and direction of the impact of a work
of art have little to do with the subjective intentions of
the artist, but depend rather on the cultural and historical
situation which receives it. But even in the most favorable
circumstances the social impact of an art work is not likely
to propel people to the barricades, partly because the
autonomy of art blunts the direct political intentions of an
art work:
If art works have any social influence at all, it
is not by haranguing, but by changing conscious-
ness in ways that are ever so difficult to pin
down. Any directly propagandistic effect evapo-
rates quickly, perhaps because even works of this
genre tend to be perceived as being ultimately
irrational, with the result that the mechanism
that is supposed to trigger praxis is interrupted
by the intervention of the aesthetic principle. 28
This accords with Adorno ' s evaluations of the works of
specific artists, particularly of two of his favorite exam-
ples: Beckett and Brecht. Brecht serves on almost every
occasion as Adorno 1 s example of tendentious art. Adorno
downplays the direct political significance of Brecht 's
work, while arguing that Brecht ' s effort to translate his
political commitment into artistic practice marks a signifi-
cant artistic development:
The sententious directness with which Brecht tran
slated such stale gems of wisdom into dramatic
gestures gave his work its uniqueness. His didac-
tic approach prompted him to introduce dramatic
innovations designed to oust the old theatre of
intrigue and psychology. In his plays 'theses'
are important not for what they say but for what
they do ...
.
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Beckett, on the other hand—very much like Kafka
—
exemplifies the relentless portrayal of the desiccation of
reality, while maintaining its distance from that reality:
[Beckett's] stories, sardonically called 'novels',
neither provide objective accounts of social real-
ity nor, as is often falsely believed, represent a
reduction of life to a basic human condi-
tion .... Beckett draws the lesson from montage and
documentation and other such attempts at discard-
ing the illusion of meaning-constitutive subjec-
tivity. Reality may be allowed to enter— it may
even crowd out the poetic subject—and yet we get
a sense that there is something wrong with that
reality .
Beckett's art is to Adorno a more potent indictment of
society because it is able to "store up the experience" of
the process by which "reality itself becomes lifeless".
What the comparison of Beckett and Brecht brings to the
fore is the role of mediation in artistic production. Art
that digests its social material and translates it into its
own language—whether that be the next step beyond the tone
row in music, or cubism in painting—represents for Adorno
true praxis better than the attempt to impose politics on
the artwork from 'outside'.
But this should not be taken to mean that Adorno ex-
pects the work of Kafka or Beckett to be more politically
effective than Brecht or Sartre:
One decisive reason why art works, at least
those that refuse to surrender to propaganda, are
lacking in social impact is that they have to give
up the use of those communicative means that would
make them palatable to a larger public. If they
do not, they become pawns in the all-encompassing
system of communication.
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The "message" of art works is virtually doomed to be
'neutralized' or co-opted in its reception. This is one
reason Adorno wants to distinguish the praxis embodied in
artworks from the political prescriptions they wear. The
success or failure of aesthetic praxis does not depend upon
the immediate reception of particular works of art, nor on
the intentions of the artist; thus a great artist with
reactionary political convictions may nonetheless produce
art that according to Adorno is truly radical, so long as it
remains faithful to the aesthetic project. The reception of
art works marks for Adorno a moment when the autonomous
sphere of production is all but completely obscured by art
as social fact; society's embrace of art works takes place
'outside' of the aesthetic realm:
Neutralization is the price art pays for its au-
tonomy. Once art works are buried in the pantheon
of cultural exhibits, their truth content deterio-
rates. In the administered world neutralization
32becomes universal.
Suspicion of communication is a leitmotif of Adorno '
s
thought. Rather like Nietzsche, he tends to view communica-
tion as a corruption of truth:
Direct communication to everyone is not a criteri-
on of truth. We must resist the all but universal
compulsion to confuse the communication of knowl-
edge with knowledge itself, and to rate it higher,
if possible—whereas at present each communicative
step is falsifying truth and selling it out.
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This is not, however, because Adorno dismisses the herd as
infinitely inferior to the intrepid philosopher, but because
in modernity the media of communication are thoroughly
dominated by the culture industry, which regulates in subtle
and not-so-subtle ways the limits of credible and acceptable
discourse
:
culture now impresses the same stamp upon every-
thing. Films, radio and magazines make up a sys-
tem which is uniform as a whole and in every
part.
It need hardly be noted that this holds as true for Face the
Nation as it does for Rambo or Whitney Houston.
This is not all there is to Adorno ' s critique of commu-
nicability. While it is not possible here to do him justice
on this score, the central point at issue touches directly
on the question of reception. Both the philosophy and the
art that Adorno most admires demand an engaged, critical
involvement; it cannot be passively assimilated or 'appreci-
ated': it must be grappled with. This is behind Adorno '
s
critique of the 'enjoyment' of art, and his claim that "What
works of art really demand from us is knowledge or, better,
a cognitive faculty of judging justly: they want us to
35
become aware of what is true and what is false in them."
Even aside from their "political" content in the broad-
er sense, the major theses of the cultural industry can be
read directly onto the political realm. The commodif ication
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of political discourse accompanies a centralization and
concentration of the means of communication, whose driving
tendency is to remake its consumers according to its own
specifications. Not only would challenging or unusual
discourse risk unpopularity (failure in the market), but
might disrupt consumers' unstable, repressed satisfaction
with what is offered them. The most impressive trick of the
politics industry is to turn the spite provoked by the
broken promise of culture against subjectivity itself; no
doubt this is audible in some of the rabid hostility to
communism, which, even in its historical "perversion," on
some level reminds us of hope we have given up.
D. Monopolies and Markets in the Culture Industry
Adorno ' s effort to link the political economy of cul-
tural artifacts with their aesthetic content and political
content is admirable and insightful, but flawed in some of
its basic presuppositions. In a nutshell, Adorno's differ-
entiation of autonomous art from the culture industry de-
pends upon a series of questionable assumptions about mar-
kets and competition. What is needed is an attempt to take
up the general direction of Adorno's social aesthetics on
the basis of a more sophisticated approach to political
economy
.
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The decisive difference between the high bourgeois era
that nurtured "autonomous art" and the advent of the culture
industry is premised on Pollock's description of "state
capitalism." This term was meant, like the arguments of
Dialectic of Enlightenment, to describe tendencies at work
in both the Western "democracies" and the openly totalitari-
an regimes with which they were at war. Under state capi-
talism :
The market is deposed from its controlling func-
tion to coordinate production and distribution.
This function has been taken over by a system of
direct controls.... These controls are vested in
the state which uses a combination of old and new
devices, including a "pseudo-market," for regulat-
ing and expanding production and coordinating it
with consumption.
It is the existence of a more "competitive" stage of capi-
talism, which was premised upon a more or less clear separa-
tion of the state from the economy, which secures the stra-
tegic position of autonomous art:
Art as a separate sphere was always possible only
in a bourgeois society. Even as a negation of
that social purposiveness which is spreading
through the market, its freedom remains essential-
ly bound up with the premise of a commodity econo-
my. .. . In so far as, until the eighteenth centu-
ry, the buyer's patronage shielded the artist from
the market, they [works of art] were dependent on
the buyer and his objectives. The purposelessness
of the great modern work of art depends on the
anonymity of the market. Its demands pass through
so many intermediaries that the artist is exempt
from any definite requirements—though admittedly
only to a certain degree....
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Again, we encounter the suspect appeal to a narrative
of the Fall from more humane, promising times. It is far
from clear that a nineteenth-century artist's dependence on
exchange left him or her any freer to pursue immanent artis-
tic development than someone producing with the demands of
the culture industry in mind. The claim that the mediating
role of the market operated in favor of aesthetic praxis
merits skepticism; it certainly astonishes this student of
Adorno to read that the anonymity of the market is the
guarantor of art's autonomy.
In the absence of a close and comprehensive study of
the conditions of production of the modernist masterpieces
Adorno admired, suffice it to say that the necessity of
surviving in the marketplace—which certainly never con-
formed to the neat diagrams of liberal economists, least of
all in the sphere of culture—seems every bit as much a
recipe for heteronomy as pleasing Samuel Goldwyn or the
Warner brothers. Someone writing a symphony in the 1820s
seems to work within constraints that are not radically
different from those binding someone writing a pop song in
the 1970s: the work must please one of a handful of possi-
ble patrons.
The decisive difference between art and the culture
industry might be that whereas art is appropriated or bought
by people whose interest is in realizing a profit on further
exchange of the work as an appreciating commodity, the
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culture industry commissions works with the explicit inten-
tion of re-selling them at a profit. To the extent that
late capitalism centralizes artistic production in indus-
tries, we could speak of the "proletarianization" of art-
workers; certainly this is a description with some applica-
bility to commercial illustrators, composers, and writers.
But this does not seem to be the crux of Adorno
'
s
critique. He seems to argue that the monopolization of
production and distribution converges with planning: that
Hollywood is not radically different than a Socialist Minis-
try of Culture.
This casual invocation of a new phase of monopoly or
"state capitalism" deserves closer scrutiny. The strength
of Adorno ' s bifurcation of culture along the axis of autono-
my /heteronomy lies in the obvious heteronomy of spheres like
the Hollywood studio system and the popular music industry
(and eventually television), where it is apparent that a
handful of conglomerates controlled (and continue to con-
trol) the vast majority of the product which is actually
"consumed." In these spheres—we might include the other
two that Adorno addresses in the "Culture Industry" essay,
architecture and publishing—aesthetic heteronomy follows
plausibly from the direct, continual supervision of capital
over the products it sponsors.
Is the thesis of "state capitalism" the best approach
to describing the changes in the political economy of cul-
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ture? What actual changes can be identified in the twenti-
eth century mode of cultural production Adorno criticizes?
While production was centralized in a number of subsec-
tors of the cultural economy (film, television), arguably
the critical shift was in the centralization of distribu-
tion; Adorno points out that music at least was still pro-
duced in a kind of "handicraft" fashion. 38
This industrial model of distribution means that a
profit-oriented intermediary apparatus stands between pro-
ducers and consumers. This monopoly (or at least oligopoly)
obviously aims to realize a "return" on its "investments,"
but it is subject to additional constraints:
Culture monopolies are weak and dependent....
They cannot afford to neglect their appeasement of
the real holders of power.... 39
Art and commerce are not congruent, and not only because
there is no guarantee that artistically worthy products
would be profitable; as we have seen, industrial culture
plays a crucial legitimating role, by accustoming its audi-
ence to look upon its renunciation of a real escape as
harmless diversion.
Is there reason to challenge Adorno ' s claim that mass-
produced culture makes up "a system which is uniform as a
whole and in every part"? One could complain that the
"Culture Industry" essay neglects the margins of popular
culture which have not been integrated with industrial
culture—e.g. that there are "independent" filmmakers, small
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record labels etc. While Adorno
' s argument that the rela-
tionship between art and popular culture in the twentieth
century is very different from that of the nineteenth is
undeniably correct, it is difficult to sustain the sharp
disjuncture Adorno seems to suppose between an earlier
"competitive" era, and a modern monopolistic one. It may be
a mistake to read into this a rigid per iodization on Ador-
no 1 s part. In some places at least, he clearly presumes
that authentic, autonomous art has not yet perished alto-
gether, so presumably some space persists which has not yet
been integrated into the newly centralized economy.
But even if one could show that the giant cultural
combines accounted for only a portion of the films, music
and magazines consumed at any particular time, this would
hardly invalidate Adorno ' s argument. Broadly speaking,
Adorno ' s analysis of the aesthetics of industrial culture is
likely to hold wherever we find a monopoly or guasi-monopoly
at any stage of production or distribution of a particular
class of cultural "goods." One reason we continue to be
fascinated by the theses of "The Culture Industry..." is no
doubt the correspondance we find between Horkheimer and
Adorno 's inflammatory charges and the shallowness and repet-
itiveness of contemporary culture.
In the context of "post-Fordist " production—de-cen-
tralized production aimed at continual adjustment to a
bewilderingly fragmented series of market-segments— the
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critique of industrial culture is arguably even more apt,
since all this "flexible accumulation" takes place at the
behest of an even tighter culture oligopoly than Adorno
lived to see. When Time-Warner and Columbia-Sony account
for a majority or near majority market-share in every sub-
category of music and film and substantial chunks of televi-
sion and publishing, it is difficult to argue that Adorno is
not more relevant now than in the 1940s. Of course Adorno
was not unaware himself of the apparent diversity of the
cultural market:
Marked differentiations such as those of A and B
films, or of stories in magazines of different
price ranges, depend not so much on subject matter
as on classifying, ordering, and labeling consum-
ers. Something is provided for all so that none
may escape ....
In addition, the products of the culture industry, whichever
market-niche they are custom-made for, exhibit today exactly
what Adorno decried decades ago: standardization, repeti-
tion, plugging, etc.
Beyond this, while Horkheimer and Adorno pointed then
to the culture industry's dependence upon other industries,
in the 1990s the culture industry has moved toward total
integration with other industries, such that the same compa-
ny that makes movies and records is likely to make stereo
equipment and VCRs
.
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E. The Death of the Political Subject
Ultimately, I want to hold on to Adorno
' s attempt to
link the conditions of production of cultural goods, their
aesthetic character, and their political character. I think
his attempt to mark off a contemporary "monopoly" stage of
capitalism from an earlier "competitive" stage is untenable,
but this does not invalidate the crux of his argument: that
the modern mass production of culture has had unprecedented
aesthetic and political conseguences
.
The most provocative claim made by Adorno in this
regard deserves to be taken very seriously: that the his-
torical project of "the individual"—and at the same time
the projects of freedom and justice—have been set back
dramatically in our century. The dialectic of enlightenment
threatens a dusk much darker than Minerva's owl could have
anticipated
.
The dearth of "politics" in Adorno can then be ascribed
very directly to the death of the subject. This is not, to
Adorno, some felicitous postmodern insight, but the histori-
cal defeat of both the liberal and Marxist project. For
both the revolutionary subject and the liberal citizen are
at the threshold of extinction, if we are to give Adorno '
s
analysis credence. The liberal vision of self-sufficient
and independent political subjects coming together to form
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the public was invalidated in both theory and practice by
the industrial-administrative state. Not long after, the
revolutionary "identical subject-object of history" fell in
the line-of-battle—or simply fell in line—with the reali-
ties of "state capitalism" in the East and West. To Adorno,
National Socialism and the New Deal serve as the capstones
of the same defeat.
While Adorno exagerrates the parallels between the two
capitalist regimes, it is clear enough that he was not
encouraged by what he saw in the United States. It is worth
pointing out that the hegemony of behavioralism in postwar
American political science seems to confirm Adorno 1 s autopsy
of the political subject: finally the political subject can
be grasped by the same quantitative methods of administra-
tion, without recourse to metaphysical constructs such as
justice and freedom.
That Adorno ascribes a species of praxis to autonomous
works of art ought to alert us to the profoundly political
bent of his thinking; art is praxis precisely because poli-
tics is not confined to parliaments and parties.
If there is something unsatisfying about Adorno '
s
account of aesthetic praxis, it is not that he fails to
offer a blueprint for revolution (hopefully we know better
than to expect this of him), but rather that somehow poli-
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tics—not just parliamentary politics, but any sort of
practical intervention—does not seem politically relevant.
This seems to me to be the root of critics' complaints
that Adorno turned away from political commitment. In his
major works, which are not ostensibly about politics, but
whose constant reference points are nonetheless domination
and resistance, the most obvious forms of contention over
these go almost unmentioned.
This is all the more vexing since Adorno indicates that
politics does count:
[T]here is no guarantee anywhere that art will
keep its objective promise. That is why every
theory of art must also be critical of art. Even
in radical art there is as much mendacity as there
is illusory creation of possibilities and there-
fore non-creation, lack of real creation. Works
of art take an advance on a praxis which has not
yet begun.
This suggests that freedom depends on more than just the
subterranean influence of art and the clarity of critical
theory. Why then is Adorno so reticent about 'a praxis
which has not yet begun'?
The argument of this chapter suggests that this reti-
cence is grounded in an assessment of the demise—or at
least hopeless compromise—of a subjectivity which could
engage in meaningful politics. This would call for a thor-
ough re-thinking of the enterprise of political theory, and
I explore the extent to which Adorno ' s work can contribute
to such a project in the next chapter.
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Before turning to that however, I would like to put to
rest the notion that Aesthetic Theory somehow represents a
'strategic withdrawal' from politics and from praxis. The
argument that Adorno turned away from politics in his later
years to immerse himself in aesthetics not only neglects his
intense lifelong involvement with art; it also relies on a
narrow and shallow conception of what counts as politics.
One would have to reduce politics to government and policy
(or to explicit outbreaks of class struggle) to read Aes-
thetic Theory as a step away from politics.
It is a grievous mistake to dismiss Adorno as a disil-
lusioned and cranky ex-Marxist. His "pessimism" was by no
means idiosyncratic or unwarranted, and his analysis of the
interlocking administration of capitalism and culture is
even more trenchant and appropriate in our era of global
mega-media
.
Finally, though, there is a sense in which Adorno too
easily dismisses the relevance of political conflicts that
are still happening. In the last chapter, I raised some
questions about Adorno ' s economic and psychological premis-
es
—
questions that hint that perhaps subjectivity is not
quite as infirm as Adorno argues, and that there might
perhaps still be political 'action' worthy of attention. If
these first two chapters have argued as stringently as
possible for the existence of a political deficit in the
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world, it is finally time to examine Adorno's
own limita-
tions and lacunae.
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CHAPTER III
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY
The appropriate relation between revolutionary theory
and practice has always been one of the most hotly contested
topics in Marxism. In the rush to criticize Adorno 1 s work
as "too theoretical," many critics have neglected his in-
sightful and nuanced contribution to this precisely this
debate. The "melancholy" tone of Adorno' s work, the aporias
to which he drives the reader again and again, are all
intimately related to his attempt to grapple with the "theo-
ry and praxis" problem in a situation where both seem to
have stalled.
This chapter will situate Adorno ' s subtle reworking of
the theory-praxis problem in the context described by the
previous two chapters (the commodified, "administered" world
of late capitalism). We will be led, along the way, into a
discussion of Adorno 1 s rejection of the strategy of critigue
perfected during the Enlightenment.
A clear account of the political aspirations and strat-
egies of Adorno' s work will allow us to reassess the charge
that Adorno 's work falls short of its own expectations in
this regard; if Adorno drives critical theory relentlessly
into a dead end, we may still challenge the necessity of the
detours he enforces.
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A. Theory as Praxis
Adorno offers (primarily in Negative Dialectics,) an
account of theory and praxis that promises something more
meaningful than the obvious blandishments about a 'dialec-
tic' between the two. His attempt to maintain and even
intensify the lived tension between theoretical and practi-
cal opposition to the status quo may be his most important
contribution to Marxist theory.
Adorno' s accomplishment was to bring the ritual invoca-
tion of 'dialectics' to life in a subtle and sophisticated
discussion of theory-and-praxis
. He is able to demonstrate
that theory has a practical dimension at the same time that
praxis is always infused with theory, all the while insist-
ing that the boundary between the two cannot be wished away.
Yet ultimately Adorno ' s rearticulation of the theo-
ry/praxis dialectic disappoints, because praxis (and politi-
cal intervention in general) remains uninterrogated . The
opacity of praxis throws into suspicion the elaborate and
sophisticated account Adorno develops of the contribution of
theory
.
No doubt with the examples of Korsch and Lukacs (among
others) in mind, Adorno was intransigent in his opposition
to the notion that theory should subordinate itself to the
demands of 'praxis' as interpreted by the Party. But lest we
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begin to think otherwise, the relation between theory and
praxis is not historically invariable, as Adorno reminds us
in one of the most stunning, most vexing passages in criti-
cal theory
:
Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on
because the moment to realize it was missed. The
summary judgment that it had merely interpreted
the world, that resignation in the face of reality
had crippled it in itself, becomes a defeatism of
reason after the attempt to change the world mis-
carried.... Theory cannot prolong the moment its
critique depended on. A practice infinitely de-
layed is no longer the forum for appeals against
self-satisfied speculation; it is mostly the pre-
text used by executive authorities to choke, as
vain, whatever critical thoughts the practical
change would require. 1
Here, in nuce
,
is the position Adorno stakes out for
theory, and for himself: keeper of the revolutionary flame
in a non-revolutionary time, and heretic railing against
both the devil and a corrupt mother Church. Adorno would
have us believe that the miscarriage of the Soviet experi-
ment and the defeat of socialism in the West force upon
revolutionary praxis an indefinite period of hibernation.
What makes critical theory critical will occupy our
attention for the remainder of this chapter. But first, we
should take a closer look at the particular historical
moment within which Adorno self-consciously situates this
ringing defense of theory's independence.
The status of praxis, as Adorno conceives it, is the
explicit backdrop for his discussion of the task of theory.
It is striking that Adorno should open a book published in
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1966—some thirty-plus years after the purported decisive
turning point—with a defense of theory addressed to an
orthodoxy no longer on the side of what 'practical change
would require
.
1
The official enemy of the status quo is explicitly
addressed in another critical passage, where communism is
taken to task for its attempt to domesticate theory for its
own purposes, not least because a politics that would bridle
theory undermines praxis:
The call for the unity of theory and practice has
irresistibly degraded theory to a servant's role,
removing the very traits it should have brought to
that unity. The visa stamp of practice which we
demand of all theory became a censor's placet.
Yet whereas theory succumbed in the vaunted mix-
ture, practice became nonconceptual , a piece of
the politics it was supposed to lead out of; it
became the prey of power.
The liquidiation of theory by dogmatization
and thought taboos contributed to the bad prac-
tice; the recovery of theory's independence lies
in the interest of practice itself.
'External' interference with theory harms not only theory,
but practice itself. If the 'results' and boundaries of
speculation cannot be guaranteed ahead of time, then whatev-
er 'practical' use theory has for revolutionary struggle
will only be manifest if it is allowed to follow its own
internal dictates.
Adorno establishes the pressing need for theory, in the
vacuum created when official Marxism has effectively dis-
owned what he understands to be revolutionary in Marx (and
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Hegel). This dismissal of theory effectively mirrors the
capitalist West's attempt to brand theory as obsolete:
Today, with theory paralyzed and disparaged by the
all-governing bustle, its mere existence, however
impotent, bears witness against the bustle. This
is why theory is legitimate and why it is hated;
without it, there would be no changing the prac-
tice that constantly calls for change. Those who
chide theory as anachronistic obey the topos of
dismissing, as obsolete, what remains painful as
thwarted. They thus endorse the world's course
—
defying which is the idea of theory alone.... 3
These two passages contain, in Adorno's typically
compact, ingrown formulations, much of the relation of
theory and practice which this chapter seeks to tease out.
Theory inherits a lonely privilege of resistance from a
world in which the West has abandoned even the rhetoric of
the liberal Enlightenment, and the East has made 'Marxism'
into a state religion. "What remains painful as thwarted,"
the "cast aside but not absorbed," finds a voice not only in
the coded dispatches of autonomous art, but in the dogged
pursuit of a theoretical vocation which does not shy away
from its own contradictions and limitations.
Adorno's defence of the pursuit of theory never allows
the reader to forget the limits of theory, nor the necessity
for a praxis that is more than theoretical. Theory does not
pull its truth content out of thin air, and its insights
will not make themselves felt without a practical challenge
to the status quo.
1 22
This puts theory in the uncomfortable position of
having to carry on an endeavor that it knows it cannot
consummate; at the same time, the present "uselessness" of
critique can be seen as an opportunity:
Paradoxically, it is the desperate fact that the
practice that would matter is barred which grants
to thought a breathing spell it would be practi-
cally criminal not to utilize. Today, ironically,
it profits thought that its concept must not be
absolutized: as conduct, it remains a bit of prac-
tice, however hidden this practice may be from
itself
.
Of course the notion of a 'breathing spell' comes unfortu-
nately close to 'quietism,' even a reverse-Kautsky ist faith
that the revolution is historically fated to not happen.
In and of itself, the claim that theoretical work is a
kind of praxis should not provoke much complaint from Marx-
ists, given (among other things) the importance Marx at-
tached to his time in the British Museum. But Adorno '
s
emphasis on individual critique, which unmistakably comes at
the expense of old-fashioned meditations on the conditions
for collective resistance, has set off all the fireworks
Adorno anticipates in the Preface to Negative Dialectics.
Adorno ' s argument for 'theory as praxis' has provoked a
fierce response from Marxist critics especially, on the
grounds that Adorno refuses to legitimate or even consider
"real" political struggles in the context of praxis. Helmut
Dubiel offers a particularly unqualified and unsubtle ver-
sion of one popular interpretation of 'theory as praxis':
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This option for a purely theoretical critique
incapable of being joined to political action;
this clear preference
—
given the alternative of
political activism— for a self-sufficient cri-
tique, represents a self-hypothesization of theo-
retical work that, because it no longer has a
political addressee, can now be only self-referen-
tial. If the texts of the 1940s still speak of a
(para- )political praxis on the part of theory, it
is only programmatically in the form of philosoph-
ical "discourse" or of the culture-critical "max-
im" which merely reverberates around itself. 5
It would be easy enough to follow Dubiel and assume
that because Adorno had nothing of consequence to say about
praxis (in the conventional Marxist sense), that his notion
of theory-as-praxis must be hollow and self-serving.
But to do so would miss Adorno ' s compelling and relent-
lessly self-reflective account of intellectual life after
the 'miscarriage' of revolution. This, despite the real
shortcomings of Adorno ' s political analysis, would be a
mistake
.
B. Individuality and Critique
Adorno re-articulates the Enlightenment's faith in
reason for a modernity that has known not only Marx, Nietz-
sche, and Freud, but also Auschwitz and Hiroshima. He
situates very strong claims for the individual's ability to
challenge the truth claims of the collective within a dia-
lectical account of subjectivity that recognizes both the
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limits of reason and the embedded and entangled construction
of individuality.
Unfortunately, in the course of Adorno's construction
of a theory of theoretical resistance, politics in the old
fashioned sense slips quietly out of a side door. What
Drucilla Cornell has called "the ethical message of negative
dialectics" 6 leaves Adorno with a breathtakingly subtle and
trenchant analysis of individual resistance that teeters on
the brink of solipsism.
Adorno saw in the full flowering of the "totally admin-
istered society," the bad universality of the Hegelian
system come to life; society composes itself of individuals
whose social and political function is the mere instantia-
tion of universality. But society, like the Hegelian sys-
tem, necessarily fails to achieve the seamless, total inte-
gration to which it aspires, and this is the saving grace of
critique. The process of individuation through which uni-
versality comes into its own has assumed a form which,
Adorno argues, universality may ignore but cannot entirely
annul
:
the social process of production preserves in the
basic exchange process [Tauschvorgang ] the prin-
cipium individuationis
,
private disposi tion . . . . The
individual survives himself. But in his residue
which history has condemned lies nothing but that
which will not sacrifice itself to false identity.
The function of the individual is functionless-
7
ness ....
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The dialectic of self-preservation awakens within individu-
als, at the same time that it adapts them to the abstract
domination of the economy, a capacity which rebounds on the
false universality of a society mediated by exchange. It is
this "residue," which is the foothold of thought for Adorno,
and the foothold of hope as well: "Even if it does not know
it, the reason of the individual ... is always potentially the
reason of the species." 8 With this, Adorno reclaims for
Marxism the revolutionary moment of the Enlightenment, by
reading Hegel against the grain and recovering the motive
power of particularity which Hegel buries in his rigged
dialectic. But this "residue" of Reason which survives even
the obsolescence of self-preservation, remains only poten-
tially rational (and critical) until it comes to recognize
itself as bound up in this dialectic of universality and
particularity
:
Experience and consistency enable the individual
to see in the universal a truth which the univer-
sal as blindly prevailing power conceals from
itself and from others. The reigning consensus
put the universal in the right because of the mere
form of universality .... for the mind to perceive
and to name that side of it is the first condition
of resistance and a modest beginning of practice.
Thought then becomes practice, precisely to the extent
that it grasps the ways in which individuality—and true
universality—are thwarted, and the constraints on practice
in a regime that would do away with thought.
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Certainly to keep critique alive in the "administered
world" is no small accomplishment. In a society in which
the general irrationality of prevailing practice has become
blind to itself, maintaining the capacity to recognize that
irrationality is all the more important.
After the 'miscarriage' of praxis, Adorno has to re-
think two critical questions that had formerly been answered
by referring to the proletariat's position at the fulcrum of
industrial capitalism. Whereas earlier Marxists could take
for granted the epistemological privilege of labor, and of
its embodiment of a universal interest in liberation, Adorno
has to account for the status of the 'critical' individual
in both these senses: how can an individual have reliable
knowledge of society, and how can it derive a critical
standard by which to judge society?
Adorno grounds critique in the capacity to reflect upon
the dialectical tensions between experience and reason,
subject and object, and particular and universal.
Adorno is able to rehabilitate the notion of "experi-
ence" for critical theory by showing how experience is
necessarily social. Through experience, the subject comes
to know a material that is always already social, regardless
of whether it is recognized as such; the object of experi-
ence always bears the marks of society.
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In Adorno's argument, the damage inflicted by the
administered world (on nature and on reason) is legible in
experience, at least potentially. The total society is
guaranteed to perpetuate at least one ineradicable reminder
of negativity—the experience of suffering:
It is the somatic element's survival, in knowl-
edge, as the unrest that makes knowledge move, the
unassuaged unrest that reproduces itself in the
advancement of knowledge.
Negative dialectics is propelled, like Hegel's account of
self-consciousness, by the subjective, felt experience of
negativity. But Adorno refuses to look forward to a Hegel-
ian supersession (and justification) of suffering in a
reconciled and harmonious whole; the experience of suffering
retains its critical potential:
Conscious unhappiness is not a delusion of the
mind's vanity but... the only source of whatever
hope the mind can have. The smallest trace of
senseless suffering in the empirical world belies
all the identitarian philosophy that would talk us
out of that suf fering . . . . The physical moment tells
our knowledge that suffering ought not to be, that
things should be different.
The analysis of the culture industry, and Adorno's
comments on the transformation of ideology may go a long
way toward explaining how this experience of negativity is
dampened or diverted without becoming a reflexive critique
of prevailing social relations. But this leaves Adorno to
explain how some people do come to 'convert' felt negativity
into critique.
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Here Adorno reverses Lukacs
' argument of History and
Class Consciousness: a critical perspective on society is
grounded not in a negative interest in the status quo, but
in social privilege:
Only a mind which [the administered world] has not
entirely molded can withstand it. Criticizing
privilege becomes a privilege—the world's course
is as dialectical as that. 13
Elsewhere, Adorno argues that a critical foothold is only
accessible with some distance from practice, understood both
as political praxis and as the organized "bustle" of late
capitalism
:
Only as exempt from the general practice is the
individual capable of the thoughts that would be
required for a practice leading to change. 14
Far from sidestepping the privileged position of the
theorist, Adorno intensifies the tensions and hazards of his
account of opposition in a world that has classes but no
class-consciousness
:
Under social conditions ... which prune and cripple
the forces of mental productivity [geistigen
Produktivkraf te ] . . . it would be fictitious to as-
sume all men might understand, or even perceive,
all things ....
If a stroke of undeserved luck has kept the
mental composition of some individuals not quite
adjusted to the prevailing norms—a stroke of luck
they have often enough to pay for in their rela-
tions with their environment— it is up to these
individuals to make the moral and, as it were,
representative effort to say what most of those
for whom they say it cannot see or, to do justice
to reality, will not allow themselves to see.
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A passage like this makes great fodder for those who would
dismiss Adorno as an old-fashioned "German mandarin."
Adorno himself anticipates this objection, and goes on to
suggest
:
As for the privileged character which rancor holds
against it, truth will lose that character when
men stop pleading the experiences they owe it to
—
when they let it enter instead into configurations
and causal contexts that help to make it evident
or to convict it of its failings. Elitist pride
would be the last thing to befit the philosophical
experience. He who has it must admit to himself
how much... his experience has been contaminated by
existence, and ultimately by the class relation-
ship .
His argument here parallels the relation of works of art to
praxis in several critical respects. Recalling from the
previous chapter the signal features of the politics of art:
art 'pays for' its mere survival by its apparent irrelevance
and luxury character; this aloofness is precisely what
allows it to encode a perspective outlawed in the practical
world; and finally, it points toward, but cannot bring into
being itself, another sort of society.
Theory, just as much as art, is put in an odd postion
by this 'luxury' status. The intertwined themes of alien-
ation and complicity—not just reason's own tendency to fall
into its opposite (i.e. the dialectic of enlightement ) , but
the real complicity of reason with domination in social
relations
—
pervade Adorno ' s work.
The division of mental from manual labor is an impor-
tant but often overlooked theme in this regard. This ap-
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pears not only as the real division of thought from manual
labor in the economy (what we would nowadays call de-
skilling), but as well in the general obsolescence of
thought (as I recounted in chapter I). Thought is inextri-
cably bound up with privilege and domination; in the guasi-
anthropological sections of Dialectic of Enlightenment,
conceptuality and fixed property, thought and domination,
are defined by a rather more intimate relation than the
polar opposition assumed by Aufklarern:
With the end of a nomadic existence, the social
order is created on the basis of fixed property.
Mastery and labor are divided .... The universality
of ideas as developed by discursive logic, domina-
tion in the conceptual sphere, is raised up on the
basis of domination in reality. 17
In a class society, thought is identified with mastery, and
theory becomes a privilege of those with 'free' time. In
Negative Dialectics, Adorno reads Idealism as a response to
the complicity of thought:
Ever since mental and physical labor were separat-
ed in the sign of the dominant mind, the sign of
justified privilege, the separated mind has been
obliged, with the exaggeration due to a bad con-
science, to vindicate the very claim to dominate
which it derives from the thesis that it is prima-
ry and original—and to make every effort to for-
get the source of its claim, lest the claim lapse.
Deep down, the mind feels that its stable
dominance is no mental rule at all, that its ulti-
ma ratio lies in the physical force at its dispos-
Nonetheless, Adorno was not to be moved by the reading
of the Theses on Feuerbach that insisted theory could only
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atone for its complicity by reversing this subordination, by
subservience to praxis. Aside from the fact that the prac-
tical demands of class struggle are always a matter of
interpretation, this kind of abstract negation of theory's
service to oppression could not satisfy Adorno, who insisted
that the division of mental and manual labor could not
simply be wished away, or abolished by fiat: it is part and
parcel of modernity.
This brings us back to the question of experience. To
say that class-consciousness is stunted under late capital-
ism means that in an important sense, people are cut off
from their own experience. The culture industry plays a
critical role here, substituting what Adorno sees as a
prefabricated pseudo-experience.
The model of critique that Adorno refines in Negative
Dialectics depends upon a dialectic between theory and
experience. Theory keeps experience from lapsing into
Lebensphilosophie
, as it "corrects the naive self-confidence
of the mind without obliging it to sacrifice its spontane-
ity." 19 Experience, in turn, serves to remind thought of
its non-identity with the object.
Experience can play a critical role in assisting
thought's own self-correcting capacity because it is not
simply a catalog of events which a subject has endured.
Adorno argues that experience is a mode of knowledge which
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is not burdened with the stringency and mediation that
define dialectics. Experience approaches objectivity (in-
cluding nature) in a way which is barred to dialectics: "An
aspect of immersion in particularity, that extreme enhance-
ment of dialectical immanence, must also be the freedom to
step out of the object...." 20
This 'free spirit' operates as a sort of outlaw
thought, in tandem with a dialectics bound to identity which
works upon the bad totality through immanent critique:
The immanently argumentative element is legitimate
where the reality that has been integrated in a
system is received in order to oppose it with its
own strength. The free part of thought, on the
other hand, represents the authority [die Instanz]
which already knows about the emphatic untruth of
that real-systematic context. Without this knowl-
edge there would be no eruption; without adopting
the power of the system, the outbreak would
fail. 21
Experience and dialectics both reach for an objectivity
which the reified totality would deny. This defense of
'experience' armed with dialectics allows Adorno to reverse
the connotations of 'subjective' and 'objective' by deftly
showing how the injunction that thought be "objective" is
often a cover for policing the bounds of acceptable thought,
and that an openness to 'subjective' experience that yields
to the object "without reservations" can attain an objectiv-
ity denied by the Spell.
In "Subject and Object" and throughout later works like
Negative Dialectics , Adorno seeks to push Hegelian idealism
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beyond the hollow transcendence it offered subjectivity at
the expense of real subjects. Reclaiming the real "tran-
scendental" potential of subjectivity, according to Adorno,
would require grappling with the objectivity of the subject,
and with the ideologies which console the subject with a
story of the mind's omnipotence while mocking its real
unfreedom
.
The sovereign free subject of idealism neglects its own
objectivity, and in its overestimation of its own power over
the object actually consigns objectivity to the blind domi-
nation of the prevailing system. Thus the fate of the
subject is bound up with breaking the dialectic of enlight-
enment: the spell that imprisons both Reason and Nature can
only be broken if reason ministers to nature. Not least
because the prevailing instrumental relation to nature
recoils on our embodied, objective selves as the blind
'revenge' of Nature.
Breaking with the dialectic of enlightenment does not
entail embracing a direct, immediate relation to nature.
That would amount (in the terms of Dialectic of Enlighten-
ment) to a kind of atavistic variant on the domination of
nature: this immediacy still masks a colonizing impulse.
To assume that we can simply ignore what is 'more-than'
natural in ourselves and commune 'directly' with Nature (as
seems to be popular among 'New Age' enthusiasts) is to
impose a vision of the natural on objectivity that is no
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less questionable than the passage by Bacon that open Dia-
lectic of Enlightenment. In short, Mother Earth (or whatev-
er) is just as much a projection of ourselves (and our
wishes) as Nature-as-plunder
.
Horkheimer and Adorno make it clear that the way out of
the dialectic of enlightenment has to lead through reason,
not around it. But it will not be the magisterial transcen-
dental reason of Kant, which reincorporates the subject
object split in the division of phenomena from noumena. Nor
will it exhibit the cunning of a Hegelian reason which has
already decided what it will find in the object. Rather, it
would be a reason which keeps the promise Hegel makes in The
Phenomenology of Spirit: "Scientific cognition ... demands
surrender to the life of the object, or, what amounts to the
same thing, confronting and expressing its inner necessi-
ty." 22
Adorno understands this 'inner necessity' rather dif-
ferently than Hegel. Unlike Hegel's dialectic, in which
objectivity serves only as a foil against which Geist must
test its ever-maturing consciousness, Adorno' s 'negative'
dialectic renounces closure and harmony in favor of a "fear-
lessly passive" approach to the object. The construction of
constellations is meant to break particularity out of the
conceptual stockade of 'the particular' at the same time
that it defuses reason's complicity with domination.
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This has dramatic consequences for our relation to
Nature. In the context of Dialectic of Enlightenment, the
attempt to "use concepts to unseal the nonconceptual"
amounts to a dialectical self-overcoming of Nature: if the
dialectic of enlightenment signified reason's unwitting
bondage to fear (and thus its reversion to myth and a 'nat-
ural' commitment to blind self-preservation), then a suc-
cessful negative dialectics would transform the 'nature' of
both subjectivity and objectivity. Adorno's work suggests
not only a path beyond the subject's carnivorous (merely
natural) relation to the object, but objectivity is at the
same time brought out of its mute 'natural' silence (into
some almost 'communicative' relation to reason).
Whereas Hegel ' s Nature remains sheer otherness even as
the dialectic enfolds it in its larger spectacle (as if
Hegel were doing Nature a favor, in incorporating his oppo-
sition), Adorno's dialectic recognizes the fear of nature as
a natural obstacle to nature's own hope for reconciliation.
Adorno overturns Idealism's demotion of nature to one side
of the dialectic (the outside), in no small part by remind-
ing the subject of its own materiality, of its intimate and
inalienable particularity in Nature.
Adorno's validation of the critical leverage the par-
ticular can bring to bear on the universal represents an
attempt to turn Western philosophy against the grain of its
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history, on behalf of precisely what that history nearly
always denigrated:
The matters of true philosophical interest at this
point in history are those in which Hegel, agree-
ing with the tradition, expressed his disinterest.
They are nonconceptuality
,
individuality, and
particularity—things which ever since Plato used
to be dismissed as transitory and insignifi-
cant 23
This is not simply an admonition to take an interest in the
1 nonidentical 1 which slips through the net of our concepts;
the ash-heap of 'mere contingency' is the philosophical
expression of the historical fate of actual particulars, as
Adorno ' s reading of Hegel reminds us. Hegel, of course, is
the ultimate victor's philosopher: despite his assurances
to the contrary, the outcome of the dialectic is never in
doubt, and what cannot identify totally with the progress of
the Weltgeist , is afforded by Hegel only the consolation it
can wring out of the ambiguities of the magic verb aufheben
.
But Hegel only codifies and dramatizes one of the constant
themes of philosophy; even iconoclasts like Marx, Nietzsche,
and Freud are interested (in more subtle ways) in what falls
by the wayside only for what it tells us about what marches
on
.
Adorno 's attention to philosophical and historical
detritus marks again the impression of Walter Benjamin's
work on Adorno. Benjamin insisted in "Theses on the Philos-
ophy of History" that 'historical materialism' breaks deci-
sively with the dominant "empathy with the victor," but
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Marxism up until Benjamin empathizes exclusively with the
eventual victors as much as any other philosophy of res-
sentiment. Benjamin's reading of Klee's "Angelus Novus" as
an allegory for history as "one single catastrophe which
keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage... a storm blowing from
Paradise" 25 is more than a little 'heterodox'.
This sensitivity to what "fell by the wayside—what
might be called the waste products and blind spots that have
escaped the dialectic" 26 plays a critical role in Adorno's
attempt to short-circuit thought's complicity with positivi-
ty.
In Negative Dialectics
,
Adorno suggests that a dialec-
tical reason might even heal some of the wounds that ratio-
nality, seduced into the service of domination, has inflict-
ed on the world:
Though doubtful as ever, a confidence that philos-
ophy can make it after all— that the concept can
transcend the concept... is one of philosophy's
inalienable features and part of the naivete that
ails it.... But whatever truth the concepts cover
beyond their abstract range can have no other
stage than what the concepts suppress, disparage,
and discard. The cognitive utopia would be to use
concepts to unseal the nonconceptual with con-
cepts, without making it their egual.
Adorno anticipates a knowledge not bound to the imperatives
of the carnivore, as Peter Sloterdijk has aptly put it, a
'knowledge that would not be power.' 28 Adorno's hopes for
1 38
disrupting the dialectic of enlightenment rest upon a strin-
gent (and unnatural) openness to otherness (on behalf of
Nature )
:
The reconciled condition would not be the philo-
sophical imperialism of annexing the alien. In-
stead, its happiness would lie in the fact that
the alien, in the proximity it is granted, remains
what is distant and different, beyond the hetero-
geneous and beyond that which is one's own. 29
Dialectics, in this sense, intends to disentangle
reason from domination, to mark the path to a new relation
to nature, and to ourselves. Adorno seeks a way to slip the
dialectic of enlightenment, and bring reason out of its
(natural) bondage to fear.
C. An Ethic of Negation
But while Adorno ' s work establishes this self-critique
of reason as an essential task of modern social theory, this
model of critique seems to validate Marxists' complaints
that Adorno was seduced away from materialism and praxis.
It is not simply that Adorno ' s work does not explicitly
link itself with concrete political constellations; Adorno '
s
'political deficit' is not a simple omission. Much more
radically, Adorno' s work seems to close off political ave-
nues taken for granted by Marxists and leftists. He system-
atically (if implicitly) disqualifies political interven-
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tions until the 'praxis' he defends is hard pressed to
justify its own persistence.
It is very hard to see how the kind of break with
identity-thinking and with the domination of nature Adorno
envisions could be a political project; there are very few
instances of "we" in Negative Dialectics
.
In the context of the preceding chapters, Adorno '
s
"political deficit" looks less like a deficiency of Adorno
than of the political. Adorno does not devote much atten-
tion to questions of political strategy or institutions
because what he considers to be the "political" problems of
his time are situated on a much deeper level, one which
neither liberal nor Marxist political action can any longer
address
.
A Marxist politics presupposes some level of class
consciousness and unity, even in the absence of a "revolu-
tionary moment" when the overthrow of capital is a concrete
possibility. But the bulk of Adorno ' s work is precisely an
account of the short-circuiting of understanding and soli-
darity, of the recognition of the enemy and the will to
resist
.
Liberal politics also depends upon a subject with the
capacity to recognize its interest and the initiative to act
upon it, in a terrain contested by other (formally equal)
subjects. With the mass-production of subjectivity, the
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bourgeois citizen assumes, like the sovereign he replaced, a
purely symbolic, commemorative role in the polity.
Thus Adorno's critical theory represents a radical
departure from the Enlightenment model of political cri-
tique, which places its faith in the efficacy of truth and
reason on the political plane. The central trope of en-
lightenment critique is exposure: the revelation of injus-
tice, irrationality, and hypocrisy in the light of reason as
a virtually self-sufficient critique.
The trope of exposure is still a powerful political
motive, which persists in some measure in most organized
movements of political resistance. While the relationship
of the media to politics has turned out to be much more
complicated than the first theorists of mass propaganda
thought, it is hard to avoid thinking, "if people only knew
what was going on...."
Both the liberal and revolutionary branches of enlight-
enment politics are beholden to illumination; Marx certainly
meant the exposition of the mechanics of capital, shaken
free of the ideological barnacles encrusting it, to inspire
a will to act on newly-acquired truth.
While Adorno's colleagues in the Frankfurt School
operated largely within this orbit of Aufklarung , whatever
their doubts concerning instrumental reason or "one-dimen-
sional" society, Adorno's work articulates a deep disruptior
between knowledge and action, theory and praxis.
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This 'disruption' is hardly an invention of Adorno
' s
;
twentieth-century history seems to dispute the Enlighten-
ment's faith in the political efficacy of reason; if not the
first Great War, if not the Depression, if not Stalin's
terror, if not the ascension of Hitler and Mussolini, then
certainly the concentration camps and the atomic bomb force
some kind of revision of the battle cry sapere aude.
Adorno 's contention that theory is a form of praxis, then,
aims at a kind of illumination that could rehabilitate the
project of Aufklarung in the cumulative shadow of these
events
.
A critique oriented around exposure no longer seem
viable to Adorno, because political strategies of revelation
aim at a catalytic reaction in a public; the outrageous is
only politically effective if there are people who can be
outraged, and whose outrage has some political repercus-
sions. The argument of the last two chapters has made clear
that the hole where the public ought to be in society has
everything to do with the hole where "politics" ought to be
in Adorno.
Essentially, Adorno argues (fairly consistently from
the late '20s onward) that the front door to liberation, and
in fact to positive political change of any significant
kind, has been indefinitely slammed shut. The alternatives
then become to abandon any concern for freedom and justice,
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or to find another approach to the edifice of state capital-
ism
.
Thus it is no surprise that the 'practical justifica-
tion' of independent theorizing is addressed precisely to
this problem of finding a backdoor or 'subterranean' ap-
proach to praxis. As with his account of 'aesthetic prax-
is,' in Adorno 'theoretical praxis' comes to be defined as a
kind of politics-which-is-not-a-politics
, as a response to a
world where overt political intervention, even more than
explicitly political art, finds itself systematically
thwarted and disparaged.
In effect, Adorno looks toward a broader notion of
praxis, one which can encompass the indirect and 'subterran-
ean' impact of works of art and theory. Like the aesthetic,
speculative theory is defended for developing a critigue of
the status quo that is all the more incisive for being
indirect or subterranean.
We already rehearsed much of Adorno 's suspicion of
political engagement in the discussion in the previous
chapter of his critigue of 'commitment' in artistic produc-
tion. In the realm of theory too, Adorno 's conviction is
that "Real partisanship... dwells deep down"; not in blind
loyalty to the perceived interests of the proletariat, but
(as we'll explore in a moment) in relentless critigue of
everything that stunts and deforms human life, and poisons
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our relation to nature. Like a work of art, a work of
theory that is able to give itself up to the demands of its
material, Adorno argues, is intimately related to guestions
of justice and liberation.
What is critical about critical theory has as much to
do with "form" as with content: as with aesthetic form, the
project of critical theory is to dislodge particulars from
the relations that suspend them in the present, to place
them in new constellations that illuminate the possibility
of a different world.
Adorno
' s own political project is in large measure to
demonstrate, in persuasive dialectical detail, how thorough-
ly political theorizing itself is. This is Adorno' s clear-
est link to the original impulse of the Enlightenment: that
knowledge itself is ultimately intertwined with guestions of
freedom and justice.
The political project of thought as Adorno develops it,
is essentially to keep faith with 'the cast aside,' to break
open (in thought at least) the closure which the Spell would
pawn off on us as 'the way things are,' and finally, to
undermine the dialectic of enlightenment by continually
bringing thought to bear on its own limitations.
Keeping faith with what identity has rolled over is not
simply a matter of resisting the victors' devaluation of
what it judges obsolete. Adorno charges philosophy with the
difficult task of remembering suffering without justifying
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it or aestheticizing it. Suffering itself discloses both
the genesis and implicit mission of thought:
[Suffering] is the somatic element's survival, in
knowledge, as the unrest that makes knowledge
move... the one authentic dignity it [the mind] has
received in its separation from the body. This
dignity is the mind's negative reminder of its
physical aspect; its capability of that aspect is
the only source of whatever hope the mind can
have.... The physical moment tells our knowledge
that suffering^ ought not to be, that things should
be different.
The spell, the artificial naturalness of the status
quo, aims first and foremost to short circuit the protest of
suffering. Breaking the spell requires a resuscitation of
experience, and of history—reminding the reader of the
possibilities which are socially repressed by the impera-
tives of late capitalism:
What dissolves the fetish is the insight that
things are not simply so and not otherwise, that
they have come to be under certain circumstanc-
es.... The means employed in negative dialectics
for the penetration of its hardened objects is
possibility— the possibility of which their reali-
ty has cheated the objects and which is nonethe-
less visible in each one.
The spell denotes the farthest advance of the dialectic of
enlightenment: the service rationality and thought have
rendered to the perpetuation of irrational domination:
The spell seems to be cast upon all living things,
and yet it is probably not.... The animal species
homo may have inherited it, but in the species it
turned into something qualitatively different.
And it did so precisely due to the reflective
faculty that might break the spell and did enter
into its service. By such self-perversion it
reinforces the spell and makes it radical evil,
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devoid of the innocence of mere being the way one
Reason plays a critical role in the domination of
nature, both directly as the conceptual Procrustean bed of
identity, and indirectly in the form of technical knowledge
Still, contrary to critics who see Adorno as some kind of
Nietzschean blasphemer against the Enlightenment, 33 Adorno
argues that philosophy is revolutionary in its marrow:
Thought, as such, before all particular contents,
is an act of negation, of resistance, to that
which is forced upon it.... The point which think-
ing aims at its material is not solely a spiritu-
alized control of nature. While doing violence
to the object of its synthesis, our thinking heeds
a potential that waits in the object, and it un-
consciously obeys the idea of making amends to the
pieces for what it has done. In philosophy, this
unconscious tendency becomes conscious. 34
The bulk of Negative Dialectics is occupied with the
project of a dialectical thought which might grasp objectiv
ity without breaking it, to make good on the task Adorno
assigns philosophy at the end of Minima Moralia:
The only philosophy which can be responsibly prac-
tised in face of despair is the attempt to contem-
plate all things as they would present themselves
from the standpoint of redemption .... Perspectives
must be fashioned that displace and estrange the
world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevic-
es, as indigent and distorted as it will appear
one day in the messianic light. To gain such
perspectives without velleity or violence, entire-
ly from felt contact with its objects—this alone
is the task of thought.
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The 'material' of theory itself draws thought to dialecti
precisely because thought necessarily always fails its own
sense of adequacy:
The name of dialectics says no more, to begin
with, than that objects do not go into their con-
cepts without a remainder .... Dialectics is the
consistent sense of nonidenti ty . . . . My thought isdriven to it by its own inevitable insufficiency,
by my guilt of what I am thinking. 36
The logic of identification cannot simply be rejected or
reformed: "To think is to identify." To give voice to
suffering and nonidentity, then, will require a reason sworn
to serve objectivity, to continually feel for its own edges
and contradictions.
This is precisely why, much like deconstruct ion , the
"matters of true philosophical interest at this point"
become the cast aside, the neglected and repressed. Unlike
Derrida and other poststructuralists , Adorno insists that
the goal remains uttering the unutterable:
Though doubtful as ever, a confidence that philos-
ophy can make it after all—that the concept can
transcend the concept ... and can thus reach the
nonconceptual— is one of philosophy's inalienable
features and part of the naivete that ails it.
Otherwise it must capi tulate . . . , But whatever truth
the concepts cover beyond their abstract range can
have no other stage than what the concepts sup-
press, disparage, and discard. The cognitive
utopia would be to use concepts to unseal the
nonconceptual with concepts, without making it
their equal.
At this point we might return to the question raised at
the beginning of this section: what does the kind of praxis
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Adorno outlines have to do with the old-fashioned Marxist
kind? His analyses of non-identity and the domination of
nature have been seized upon by several critics, who attack
Adorno for replacing a historically grounded materialist
critique of capitalism with a quasi-metaphysical narrative
of man's tragic confrontation with nature. Mining the pages
of Dialectic of Enlightenment for passages which indicate to
them that the equivalence embodied in exchange grew out of
the prior, more general unfolding of identitarian logic,
these critics see in it a decisive turning away from the
program of early critical theory, into either a virtual
relapse into Idealism, or a Nietzschean repudiation of
Reason and the Enlightenment.
Hostile Marxist critics tend to see Dialectic of En-
lightenment as an departure from the Frankfurt School's
ostensible commitment to historically grounded critical
social theory— in other words, as an abandonment of Marxism.
Helmut Dubiel offers the most explicit and emphatic version
of these arguments:
[I]n the 1940s, Horkheimer and Adorno depart from
the Marxist theoretical tradition. Their theory
no longer takes as its object the forms
—
particu-
larly the capitalist forms—of social intercourse
by which the human species reproduces itself in
appropriating nature. Instead their concern is
the world-historical drama of the active confron-OQ
tation of the human species with nature.
What is overlooked here is that the discussion of myth,
magic ritual, and mana is continually juxtaposed with the
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operations of the bourgeois economy. The very subtle, dense
dialectical account of reason and nature that Horkheimer and
Adorno construct in this essay is severely misread if one
misses the links Adorno makes between the the Procrustean
abstraction of conceptual thought and the exchange of com-
modities. The homology between identitarian logic and
exchange is central to Dialectic of Enlightenment: the crux
of both is the forcible imposition of commensurabili ty upon
heterogeneous, unique particulars. Philosophy and economy
are both founded on domination.
The precise nature of this link between identity and
exchange is not immediately clear; many passages dealing
with this relation are couched in terms ambiguous enough to
make it difficult to assign "priority" to one or the other;
i
most often, exchange and identity-thinking are simply placed
side-by-side in the paratactical fashion Adorno favored.
i
It would be surprising if it were otherwise; to explic-
itly take up the question of the "priority" of exchange or
identity-thinking would foreground the kind of base/super-
structure problems which Adorno continually tried to dis-
place and suspend. Adorno had no interest in reducing
identitarian logic to an epiphenomenon of exchange, which we
could therefore afford to ignore (in the certainty that the
victory of the proletariat would solve these sorts of sec-
ondary problems).
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Oddly enough, in their eagerness to strip Adorno of his
Marxist credentials, Dubiel and Connerton overlook passages
where Horkheimer and Adorno do try to specify the relation
between indenti ty-thinking and exchange:
Even the deductive form of science reflects hier-
archy and coercion. ... the whole logical order,
dependency, connection, progression, and union of
concepts is grounded in the corresponding condi-
tions of social reality— that is, of the division
of labor. 39
It is hard to imagine what significance one could find in
the guest to privilege exchange over identity, or vice
versa, given Adorno' s compelling insistence that the two are
always already intertwined (and virtually two sides of the
same impulse )
.
Arguably, Adorno ' s attempt to articulate the brutality
of identification should be seen as a deepening of the
materialist tradition. One of Adorno' s central concerns is
to rescue concrete living particulars from a 'materialism'
that is rather too confident in its grip on objectivity.
Jiirgen Habermas too wants to portray Dialectic of
Enlightenment as a theoretical regression or retreat from a
substantial, historically grounded social theory. His
Theory of Communicative Action develops two of the most
common objections to "The Concept of Enlightenment": that
the dialectic of myth and enlightenment recounts an ahistor-
ical confrontation between "Man" and "Nature," and that
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various forms of power and exploitation are reduced to a
vague, amorphous conception of "domination." 40
Habermas' critique is directed not so much at Dialectic
of Enlightenment' s deployment of exchange as its besmirch-
ment of Reason. Habermas at this juncture dons the robes of
the Responsible Adult lecturing the nihilistic Horkheimer
and Adorno, who have clearly spent too much time with that
troublemaker Nietzsche. According to Habermas, Horkheimer
and Adorno conduct a kind of imploding critique of instru-
mental rationality, subjecting everything to the caustic
bath of a totalizing theory of identity that must corrode
even their own theoretical endeavor. 1
This criticism requires a willful forgetting of Hork-
heimer and Adorno
' s explicit purpose in writing Dialectic of
Enligh tenmen t
:
The point is... that the Enlightenment must consid-
er itself, if men are not to be wholly betrayed.
The task to be accomplished is not the conserva-
tion of the past, but the redemption of the hopes
of the past.
How is it that Horkheimer and Adorno fail to convince Haber-
mas that their project is an immanent critique of Enlighten-
ment? It seems to me that Habermas is so intent on rooting
out any surviving theoretical progeny of the Nietzschean
will-to-power that he utterly fails to grasp the ambition of
Horkheimer and Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment: to
make good on a social critique that takes both the Nietzsch-
ean and Marxist challenges to Enlightenment seriously.
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We have still to cope with the charge that Horkheimer
and Adorno's critique is
' ahistorical . ' What may irritate
both Habermas and Marxist critics more than the alleged
demotion of exchange to one interpretive principle among
several 43 is the apparently casual way Horkheimer and Adorno
deploy concepts like "bourgeois" and "Enlightenment" in ways
which flout the historical specificity we usually attach to
them. Baldly stated, Odysseus can't really be a prototypic-
al bourgeois, can he?
The relatively literal reading of Dialectic of Enlight-
enment as an attempt to tell the world-historical story of
domination, to narrate the age-old dialectic of myth and
enlightenment, humanity and nature, certainly accounts for a
large part of the impatience critics have for the Adorno's
deployment of "domination." It seems to me that it is
absolutely critical to recognize what Eva Geulen describes
as the " untimeliness" of Dialectic of Enlightenment . 44
In effect, the attempt to map the critique of domina-
tion onto "history" waits in Dialectic of Enlightenment as a
kind of booby-trap. Remembering what I suggested about the
function of 'liberal capitalism' in Adorno's work, I would
suggest that the anti-historical tropes of Dialectic of
Enlightenment are meant to describe the momentum of Enlight-
enment, of thought itself, and to highlight in the most
dramatic terms its interruption. In this respect, Dialectic
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of Enlightenment has as much in common with History and
Class Consciousness as with The Genealogy of Morals: the
problem it takes up is the intertwined structural failures
of Western philosophy and society, and the practical problem
of solving them.
At the same time, "The Concept of Enlightenment" has to
be seen as Horkheimer and Adorno
' s attempt to contextualize
the disaster of Fascism, to come to grips somehow with the
'disrupture' in history marked by Hitler, the war, and the
camps
.
The analyses of Odysseus, Juliette, and the culture
industry are meant to remind us that winning the war is not
the end of the struggle against barbarism, and that barba-
rism is not something utterly Other, but something harbored
in the heart of human intelligence long before Nietzsche.
D. The Limits of Philosophical Praxis
I have argued that the political project legible in
Adorno 's work represents a continuation and a refinement of
both the Marxist tradition and of the Enlightenment; cer-
tainly Adorno counterposes to this world the real possibili-
ty of a world free from the domination of nature and social
domination (his refusal to describe it in positive terms
notwithstanding)
.
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Adorno's focus on individual resistance, on the
thoughts of people who are not completely under the Spell,
has often been seized upon by Marxist critics to show that
he had abandoned any serious analysis of the conditions for
transformative politics. 45 Adorno is almost uniformly
suspicious of collectivities, and revolutionary action
—
indeed concerted action of any kind— finds no sympathetic
mention in his work.
But the basis for Adorno's oft-repeated suggestion that
"part of the social force of liberation may have withdrawn
to the individual sphere" 46 is not his "deviation" from
Marxism, but precisely the reverse: Adorno locates the last
residue of hope in individual recognition because he expects
collective opposition to capital to take the form that Marx
predicted. The failure of the proletariat leaves a politi-
cal vacuum that Adorno refuses to fill by finding another
"revolutionary subject."
I think Adorno's unwillingness to follow Marcuse in
looking for other subjects whose oppression entails an
interest in radical change is best explained by this commit-
ment to the classical theory of the proletariat as the class
embodying a "universal" interest in liberation. Adorno
begins his career at a point when the tide of militant
socialism has visibly receded, leaving not new opportunities
for resistance and opposition, but a refined and extended
apparatus for domination. This is as true for the East,
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where the proletariat supposedly triumphed, as for the
West. 47
The belief that twentieth-century capitalism has won a
decisive defeat (for the foreseeable future) over its only
credible opponent, coupled with Adorno
' s basic sociological
insight into the "total" organization of social life, even
reaching into the psyche, precluded any sympathy for collec-
tive action in the short-term. Again, the partial legitima-
tion of the workers' movements in the West only validated
Adorno' s reading of a general pacification of the class that
was supposed to make the revolution.
i
:
Self-consciously isolated from any organized opposition
to capitalism, Adorno (particularly in his later works)
develops a Marxian ethic for anti-Marxian times. This
oppositional ethic is an attempt to think through the prob-
lem of living in a world where 'the whole is false' and
where
there is no longer beauty or consolation except in
the gaze falling on horror, withstanding it, and
in unalleviated consciousness of negativity hold-
ing fast to the possibility of what is better.
This can not be a search for revolutionary purity nor an
otherworldly asceticism, since Adorno is hyperaware of the
skeins of complicity that bind everyone in capitalist soci-
ety to the status quo. 'Purity' is simply not an option:
That intellectuals are at once beneficiaries of a
bad society, and yet those on whose socially use-
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less work it largely depends whether a society
emancipated from utility is achieved—this is not
a contradiction acceptable once and for all and
therefore irrelevant. It gnaws incessantly at the
objective quality of their work. Whatever the
intellectual does, is wrong. He experiences dras-
tically and vitally the ignominious choice that
late capitalism secretly presents to all its de-
pendants: to become one more grown-up, or to
remain a child.
Adorno offers a trenchant and poignant analysis of the
meaning of opposition in a world which does its best to
efface and diminish such. The focus of this analysis is not
on revival of class-based politics, or on anti-capitalist
strategy, but on keeping faith with non-identity and nega-
tion in a totalizing web of identity and positivity.
This stance makes some sense if one believes, with
Adorno, that the psychological basis for class-identity, and
therefore for a meaningful politics, has been eroded beyond
(foreseeable) repair. If the 'totally administered society'
has indeed made politics practically 'obsolete' then a
revival of old-style ideology critique is doomed. Under
these conditions, the task of opposition might mean, as
Adorno ' s work suggests, reviving not so much critique it-
self, but the preconditions of critique: i.e. attacking the
calcified facade of a positivity with the insistence that
things could be otherwise
.
So Adorno pursues theoretical work, radical negation in
thought, without any rational hope that dialectics alone
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will have any demonstrable 'impact': theory can no more
make a "revolution" than art works can.
Certainly, however much Adorno might have wanted to
wring out of the notion that "Practice itself was an emi-
nently theoretical concept," 50 he always reminds the reader
that theory alone is not sufficient. Like aesthetic praxis,
critical theory seems to wait upon some (unspecified) move-
ment to actualize the alternative it holds out.
But it is precisely the ineffable guality of this
"other" praxis, which might intervene in the world in a way
which is barred to aesthetic and philosophical praxis, that
arouses such widespread, palpable disappointment with Adorno
among readers who want to read him as a "political" writer.
This 'other' praxis is assumed to be dormant, and
Adorno unfortunately says virtually nothing about the pros-
pects of resuscitating it.
This is the most substantial criticism that can be made
of Adorno' s attempt to show the deep political implications
of concepts: there are precious few political concepts that
attract his interest. Indeed, we have reached the heart of
Adorno ' s political deficit.
It is not simply that Adorno is at a loss for a concep-
tion of anti-capitalist praxis after the calamity of Fas-
cism. The political failure of the proletariat, on which
his whole conception of the meaning and mission of philoso-
phizing after the 'miscarriage' of revolution depends, finds
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astonishingly little examination. The reader of Adorno is
presented, exactly as the infamous passage of Negative
Dialectics would have it, with the "missed opportunity" as a
fait accompli.
This reading of the political balance-of-forces
throughout Adorno ' s life may be no less plausible than those
of optimistic Marxists who saw in every third world rebel-
lion the death-knell of Capital. Still, as I suggested in
the previous chapter, some attempt to rescue political
struggles from the disparaged realm of 'superstructure' (as
Adorno did with his work on art and the culture industry)
seems all the more urgent when solidarity and collective
action are going out of style.
And of course however much history to this point has
validated Adorno
' s 'pessimism,' politics did not die off
with the citizen and the proletarian. The American Civil
Rights movement, growing anti-colonial resistance and rebel-
51lion, and the international eruptionsof the late 1960s all
evince a persistence of 'politics' that Adorno cannot really
account for.
This would hardly be of any interest, if Adorno were
just another Old Leftist who clung to dogma that were as
ill-suited to the 'thirties as to the 'sixties. But Adorno
develops, in forty years of looking backward at an irre-
trievable historical moment, an analysis of the deeper
deformation wrought by capitalism that makes compelling
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reading nearly thirty years after the 'New Social Movements'
opened a new chapter in the history of 'liberation.'
Adorno
' s refusal to connect "praxis" with any post-war
political currents is best seen as a most consistent "Marx-
ist" response to mid-twentieth century events. What is
frustrating about Adorno 's work is that he seemed to have
the tools to push Marxism beyond its own historical limita-
tions in this respect. This is precisely what will occupy
our attention in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
DESIRE AND SOLIDARITY: RESUSCITATING POLITICS
The argument of the previous chapter suggests that
commentators who emphasize Adorno's 'political deficit' tend
to miss the significant political accomplishments of his
lifework, and obscure his contribution (or potential contri-
bution) to contemporary debates over the meaning/role of
political theory.
Adorno's writing demonstrates in an exemplary fashion
the inalienable political dimension, the inner partisanship,
of every philosophy. His insistence on the centrality of
the question of liberation, of doing philosophy from the
standpoint of reconciliation, is all the more important in a
time when nobody can say with any confidence what 'revolu-
tion' would look like, much less how we might get there.
As relentlessly and systematically as any other writer,
Adorno fixes our attention on the dialectical tension be-
tween theory's disengagement from the 'practical' world and
its engagement. Thought helps to forge both the fetters of
the dialectic of enlightenment and, if there is to be one,
the key.
Not the least of Adorno's accomplishments is his aware-
ness of the limits of theory. At best, his work suggests
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that political theory serves the interests of liberation
best by devotion to its own internally defined problems
(which, like aesthetic problems, are rooted in the contra-
dictions of their society). Thus theory itself has a prac-
tical dimension, as a kind of critical analysis that opposes
reaction and domination.
But theory cannot steer, much less replace the 'other'
sort of praxis. Certainly a large part of the response to
critics of Adorno
' s 'political deficit' has to be: what
exactly do we expect from Adorno? Policy recommendations?
Political strategy? A 'plan' for revolution? Do we really
expect Negative Dialectics to do what 120 years of socialist
praxis (with a much-advertised commitment to various strains
of theory) hasn't succeeded in doing?
Still, if we are to see Adorno as one of the noblest
heirs to the radical aims of the Enlightenment (as I've
argued), we are liable to run aground precisely on the
question of 'engagement.' We don't need Marx's injunction
to change the world to feel some disappointment with the
limits of Adorno' s political analysis.
To return to the concise barrage from Gillian Rose I
quoted earlier:
Adorno 's neglect of social forms diminishes his
ability to offer a compelling analysis of politi-
cal organization and of relations of pow-
er .... Throughout his work^ power in society is
paramount but elusive....
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In place of a thorough analysis of the 'correlation of
forces, 1 Adorno gives us an insightful and at least partial-
ly compelling account of the commodif ication of every aspect
of social life under late capitalism, and an analysis of the
erosion of the basic units of both Marxist and liberal
politics
.
The political conclusions that emerge from a reading of
Adorno seem to verge on quietism, even resignation. Taken
to its ultimate limit, his emphasis on the death of praxis
would have us believe that no political contest of any
significance could happen, that politics of any subspecies,
whether in the Senate or in Selma, has no relevance to the
deep institutionalized mechanisms of domination.
The critical question that emerges from the preceding
three chapters is: how necessary is Adorno' s unwillingness
to grapple with explicitly political questions of anti-
capitalist organization and strategy?
Adorno 's attempt to skirt questions of politics is
bound to disappoint us to the extent that the political
horizon has not quite collapsed as completely as Adorno 's
account would have it. However plausible the argument for a
sort of systematic effacement of politics (i.e. capitalism
has proven astonishingly capable of containing political
challenges), there is too much evidence that opposition has
not finally receded to the pages and canvases of the modern-
ist avant-garde .
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This chapter will briefly recapitulate the ways in
which political action becomes virtually inconceivable in
the confines of Adorno's analysis, and go on to consider the
central question of this dissertation: might there be an
Adornian path out of Adorno's own political dead-end?
What I will suggest as an answer to this is no simple
correction of Adorno's 'mistakes,' nor so much the filling
of a 'hole' in his work, but something possibly even more
arrogant: something along the lines of his critique of
Hegel, which seizes upon the theoretical 'best intentions'
of Hegel as a key to critique him from the 'inside.'
This immanent critique will draw on the previous three
chapters to reconstruct the line of thinking that leads
Adorno to such a steep devaluation of the sphere left for
political action under late capitalism; at the same time, I
will make good on the claims made earlier that Adorno's
analysis does not always live up to its best theoretical
intentions. This critique will suggest that politics may
have more breathing space left to it than Adorno allowed,
and it will allow us to make some modest suggestions about
the most important considerations for the project of resus-
citating the kind of oppositional subjectivity that Adorno's
analysis seems to wait upon.
Ultimately, the constellation of interest, desire and
agency that Adorno constructs needs to be rethought from the
ground up; the scope of this project allows me only to
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suggest some possible avenues for such a rethinking. The
two key maneuvers here will be: First, to re-examine the
role 'totality* plays in Adorno's work; our basic concern is
with the status of notions like the 'totally administered
society,
'
and the suffocating sense of enclosure that seems
to warrant Adorno's neglect of political struggles.
Secondly, I will argue for the importance of the prob-
lem of intersubjectivity, and suggest that an analysis of
the politics industry that resists the temptation to consign
political activity to the superstructure might extend the
insights of Adorno's work on the culture industry in fruit-
ful ways
.
A. A Message in a Bottle
Three main lines of analysis undergird Adorno's dis-
missal of politics: that politics has become thoroughly
colonized by the logic of commodif ication; that society is
integrated into a totally administered web of domination,
and that the psychological friction generated by life under
late capitalism is redirected in ways which support the
status quo.
These three reasons correspond roughly to the schema I
outlined in the first chapter: a meaningful political
dimension to social life is undermined in contemporary
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capitalism on the level of reason (the commodif ication of
discourse), the economy (the integration and closure associ-
ated with state capitalism), and desire (the turning of
subjectivity against itself).
The argument about the far-ranging repercussions of
commodification is the most compelling part of Adorno's
critique of late capitalism. It is not simply that nearly
all communication in contemporary society is sponsored by
some economic interest; the marginalizing, silencing effect
of commercialized communication was certainly palpable even
before Adorno. Content, as Adorno never lets us forget, is
not immune to form.
The implications of this for political discourse are
rather vaster than we can take up here, and are barely
explored by Adorno. However, the commodif ication of dis-
course is the key to understanding the political project of
Adorno's texts. The image Adorno offers of his critical
theory as a 'message in a bottle' is more than just a casual
metaphor—his central propaedeutic intention is to make the
catastrophe of late capitalism real for the reader. But the
message one pulls from bottles like Negative Dialectics is
not to save the sender, but the receiver.
Thus, Adorno's critique of simple notions of communica-
tion, and of the demand for clarity and intelligibility,
reflect a deeply political awareness of the need to break
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through (or sneak around?) the conventions of language in a
world made of, by and for the reproduction of capital. 2
The commodification of discourse cannot be severed from
the invocations of totality that recur throughout Adorno;
we are repeatedly told we live in a 'totally integrated,'
'totally administered,' society, under the spell of 'total
domination.* The political implications clearly run toward
the kind of closure of the political realm that Marcuse
elaborates in One-Dimensional Man. In Adorno 's sociology,
there are virtually no margins, and no 'outside.' Even the
solitary thinkers with whom Adorno identifies whatever
persists of the revolutionary moment can hardly be said to
be 'on the margins of society,' given the web of complicity
even critical individuals find themselves in. We are all on
the inside, and the atmosphere is decidedly suffocating.
As I suggested in the first chapter, the notion of a
"totally administered" society is grounded in the disappear-
ance of mediation between the individual and society. The
thesis of "state capitalism" suggests that the political-
economic elite has brought to fruition a kind of negative
image of socialism, in which the world has indeed become, as
Lenin's memorable phrasing would have it, "one office and
one factory."
This sense of the totally administered society is
buttressed by Adorno 's hints that it may run up against an
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internal limit, precisely by doing away with any mediation
between universal and particular:
The universal that compresses the particular until
it splinters, like a torture instrument, is work-
ing against itself, for its substance is the life
of the particular; without the particular, the
universal declines to an abstract, separate, erad-
icable form.
Within the individual subject, this 'compression' takes
place via the subversion of the field of tension maintained
by the ego; ego weakness, as we saw in chapter one, is a
loss of mediation in within the subject.
Still, Adorno too easily neglects mediation in his own
description of internal and external domination. He too
easily plays off a lost, mediated 'liberal' capitalism
against contemporary unmediated totalizing capitalism,
without examining that mediation whose loss is so important
to the force of his critique.
Indeed, in the construction of the entrepreneurial
subject, one finds a fairly superficial discussion of the
mediating institutions and practices Hegel summarized under
the heading civil society, but no attempt to engage either
Hegel or other robust theories of civil society. Nor does
Adorno take an interest in any Marxist theories of politics
meant to supersede Hegel and liberal theory more generally.
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B. Excursus: Hegel and Civil Society
Adorno can only dismiss the sphere of politics as
thoroughly as he does if his account of the 'end of the
individual' is compelling. What makes rational social
action practically unthinkable under late capitalism is
Adorno 's narrative of the liguidation of autonomy in the
passage from liberal capitalism to state capitalism. In the
first chapter, I suggested that this narrative was deeply
flawed; it is time to see what one can make of the insuffi-
ciencies of this critical thread in Adorno 's sociology.
To recapitulate briefly: Adorno, building on Hegel's
and Marx's account, describes capitalist civil society as a
realm of potential freedom and eguality. Individuals in a
capitalist market operate in a way which prefigures a ratio-
nal, free social life without being able to realize it
within the confines of capitalism. The replacement of
liberal, competitive capitalism by 'state capitalism' fore-
closes these glimmers of what a free society would be like.
This transition, which I've argued is decisive for
Adorno' s sociology of contemporary life (and especially his
'political deficit'), hinges on three critical moments, all
of which involve the enclosure or 'integration' of social
life into (what would present itself as) a seamless totali-
ty. Economic production based on an 'open' system of compe-
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tition between distinct firms is replaced by vertically and
horizontally integrated monopoly. The autonomy the liberal
market fostered in formally free economic actors is replaced
by obedience and conformity within a socially pre-manufac-
tured role. Finally, the totality is guaranteed outside the
workplace by an omnipresent and integrated culture industry,
which itself embodies the transition from 'anarchic' cultur-
al production to monopolistic, mass-produced culture.
I noted in the first chapter that the first of these
three moments in Adorno's narrative is certainly open to
challenge. The simplicity of this narrative already throws
into doubt Adorno's claim for a qualitative break between
nineteenth and twentieth century society. If the second
moment—the liquidation of economic agency—were coherent
and compelling, then it would be incumbent upon me to take
this critique of Adorno's simple economic history much
further
.
For our purposes though, a re-writing of Pollock's
'state capitalism' thesis is not necessary. The sociologi-
cal argument which this suspicious economic story is meant
to guarantee unravels under close attention, and the re-
writing of the relation of agency and subjectivity to eco-
nomic conditions that I will propose is consistent with the
modest observations of chapter one about the mixed nature of
capitalism before and after Henry Ford. What I've called
the entrepreneurial model of agency in Adorno would be
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flawed, and would not warrant the political conclusions he
seems to draw from it, even if the notion of a qualitative
break between competitive and post-competitive capitalism
could be substantiated.
The moment of incipient freedom and autonomy visible in
the liberal market is attached by Adorno to the individual's
ability (and of course necessity) to sell his or her labor
power in a situation with some level of meaningful choice.
This invites a number of obvious criticisms.
In privileging the classic homo economicus
,
Adorno not
only begs the question of the subjectivity of men who do not
happen to sell their labor power on the market before the
triumph of monopolies, but also throws the status of women
into question. Not the least of the flaws of the entrepre-
neurial model are the problematic gender implications of a
narrative which comes uncomfortably close to reprising
Hegel's paean to civil society from the Philosophy of Right,
including the latter 's explicit and adamant exclusion of
women from true subjectivity.
Unlike Horkheimer's more ambitious version (which
doubly compounds its gender trouble by explicit reference to
Freud and fatherhood), Adorno' s discussions of agency before
and after state capitalism are not explicitly tied to gender
difference. Adorno neither excludes nor includes women in
his narrative of the 'end of the individual.' Still, as
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feminist thinkers have long pointed out, such forgetfulness
is hardly ever innocent.
One could conceivably object that, to the extent that
(pace Hegel) some women did work for wages under the 'liber-
al' regime, the entrepreneurial model of agency need not be
assimilated to a Hegelian disguisition on the passive,
plant-like gualities of women. But whether or not one can
read Adorno as 'gender-neutral' is not really the most
important issue here. One of the fundamental problems with
the entrepreneurial model of agency is its lack of attention
to the specificity of the ways in which gender plays out in
the economy—something about which Adorno simply has little
to say.
Another of this model's fundamental problems is its
narrow focus on a particular species of economic rationali-
ty. The focus on market-oriented rationality denies not
only women a capacity for full-fledged subjectivity, but
anyone whose activity is not essentially directed toward the
market. Thus Hegel guite consistently calls attention to
the civic limitations of people who work on the land:
the agricultural mode of subsistence remains one
which owes comparatively little to reflection and
independence of will, and this mode of life is in
general such that this class has the substantial
disposition of an ethical life which is immediate,
resting on family relationship and trust.
As noted far above, Adorno seems oblivious to the
exclusionary implications of taking homo economicus as a
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model for human rationality per se. Even though the criti-
cal intention behind his deployment of the entrepreneurial
model of subjectivity is really only focussed on the compar-
ison between liberal capitalism (which fostered it) and
state capitalism (which discontinues it), this only begs the
question of the status of those to whom this model was never
meant to apply in the first place.
The theoretical intention behind the entrepreneurial
theory of agency is one a renewed critical theory would do
well to take up; but Adorno's effort to link what one might
call 'structural' social imperatives (like the market) to
the maintenance of a certain kind of subjectivity gives us
far too incomplete an account of these structural impera-
tives .
A return to the comparison with Hegel is instructive on
a number of points. Adorno's account of the market departs
from Hegel's in decisive and revealing ways. What Adorno
seems to borrow from the Philosophy of Right is the sense of
civil society as a sphere that inculcates a certain level of
rationality. Adorno identifies (along with Horkheimer)
certain desirable traits with the liberal, competitive
market they assume preceded 'state capitalism': rationali-
ty, autonomy, and conscience, even 'character' and 'soul.'
Like Hegel, this economic rationality is seen to nur-
ture the germ of a more comprehensive, more adequate ratio-
nality, which ought to find its realization in a rational,
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just society which transcends the anarchy and injustice into
which a capitalist economy left to itself would degenerate.
For Hegel, both these moments are secured by mediation
of particular needs and interests in the market:
The aim here is subjective particularity, but the
universal asserts itself in the bearing which this
satisfaction has on the needs of others and their
free arbitrary wills.
In civil society individuals encounter the universal, in the
guise of the other people whose well-being is entwined with
theirs. The Reason latent in particular interest makes its
first appearance in the Bildung the market imposes on indi-
viduals :
Consequently, individuals can attain their ends
only so far as they themselves determine their
knowing, willing, and acting in a universal way
and make themselves links in this chain of social
connexions. In these circumstances, the interest
of the Idea—an interest of which these members of
civil society are as such unconscious—lies in the
process whereby their singularity and their natu-
ral condition are raised... to formal freedom and
formal universality of knowing and willing—the
process whereby their particularity is educated up
to subjectivity. 7
Obviously we should be rather reluctant to assimilate Adorno
to a model of political economy that celebrates the way in
which people are made "links in this chain of social con-
nexions." Already, there is a subtle difference of emphasis
in the accounts of the link between economic interest and
freedom. For Hegel, the first hint of freedom is latent in
the interdependence of individuals (which they can not come
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to fully recognize within the bounds of civil society); the
entry into civil society acquaints men with the (abstract
and still implicit) universal that will eventually blossom
into the fully rational universal of the state. The educa-
tion Hegel attributes to civil society stems from the way it
brings men together.
Adorno challenges the harmony between the particular
and the universal which Hegel's system guarantees. While
Adorno recognizes the universalizing power of civil society,
it can only be a bad universal, a delusion of harmony which
reaches its apotheosis under the 'integrated' society of
state capitalism. For Adorno, Hegel's assurance that the
particulars and the universal fit smoothly within one dia-
lectical whole subverts the truly progressive moment of
civil society: the moment of an independent, oppositional
individuality capable of taking up a critical stance toward
the collective:
The individual feels free insofar as he has op-
posed himself to society and can do something
—
though incomparably less than he believes—against
society and other individuals. His freedom is
primarily that of a man pursuing his own ends,
ends that are not directly and totally exhausted
by social ends. In this sense, freedom coincides
with the principle of individuation. A freedom of
this type has broken loose from primitive society;
within an increasingly rational one it has
achieved a measure of reality.
The fragility of this individuality, Adorno makes
clear, lies (dialectically enough) in the way in which
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liberal 'freedom' was forced on the individual by the work-
ings of the capitalist economy:
The process of evolving individual independence is
a function of the exchange society [ Tauschgesell-
schaft]
. . . .The individual was free as an economi-
cally active bourgeois subject, free to the extent
to which the economic system reguired him to be
autonomous in order to function. His autonomy is
thus potentially negated at the source. The free-
dom of which he boasted had a negative side, which
Hegel was the first to notice; it was a mockery of
true freedom, an expression of the contingency of
every individual's social fate. 9
Adorno's discussion of freedom does not really pursue
Hegel's schema beyond civil society. In "Aspects of Hegel's
Philosophy," he critigues Hegel's "idolization" of the state
as a deus ex machina, a suspension of the dialectic neces-
sary to save his system from the antagonisms Hegel himself
had shown civil society incapable of mastering. Without
mentioning Marx directly, Adorno argues that the apotheosis
of the State which artificially caps the Philosophy of Right
was the only way Hegel could avoid developing the implica-
tions of his own insights into class society into a radical
critique of the not-terribly-rational reality of the capi-
talist state. 10
This argument—that Hegel recoiled at the last possible
moment from inventing Marxism— is about all we get from
Adorno on the subject of the Hegelian state. The last few
pages of my argument here suggest, however, that a deeper
engagement with Hegel's state has important implications for
the question of individuality and agency.
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Adorno argues that Hegel appeals to the state "in
desperation as a seat of authority beyond this play of
[antagonistic] forces." 11 But the legitimacy of the state
doesn't fall from the sky, nor is Adorno quite correct (it
seems to me) to argue that the state is tacked onto the
Philosophy of Right in a 'tour de force': the state is
implicit from the very beginning of civil society, precisely
in the material interdependence embodied in the market:
In the course of actual attainment of selfish
ends... there is formed a system of complete inter-
dependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness, and
legal status of one man is interwoven with the
livelihood, happiness, and rights of all.... This
system may be prima facie regarded as the external
state, the state based on need, the state as the
Understanding envisages it. 12
Hegel's extravagant claims for the state hinge on its
claim to be this implicit universality and interdependence
made concrete and self-conscious. The state is meant to be
the political community's self-conscious intervention in the
self-destructive tendencies of civil society; it amounts,
Hegel wants to claim, to a collective, conscious self-limi-
tation of individual rights and interests, which is in the
ultimate interest of those particular individuals at the
same time it embodies the Idea of ethical life, of the
"absolute unmoved end in itself."
Hegel admits that one is not likely to find a self-con-
scious, seamless harmony between the state and its citizens,
and he leaves no doubt where the resolution of any conflicts
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ought to lie. Adorno's own critique of the fate of the
concrete particular at the hands of the Hegel's universal
ought to force a radical re-writing of the Hegelian theories
of freedom and justice. Unfortunately, no such re-writing
is forthcoming in Adorno.
Hegel's construction of the legitimacy of the state
opens the door to a critical standard by which really exist-
ing states might be judged; the Enlightenment comes very
close to spelling out its radical political implications in
the Philosophy of Right, in the dialectical sustenance of
the universal through particulars. It is not enough, real-
ly, for Adorno to point out that suspension of the dialectic
at precisely this point, and draw the (apt) comparison
between Hegel's disingenuous universal and really existing
bad totality.
But this is only to restate the problem that we have
been concerned with here from the outset: Adorno's convic-
tion is that the facade of autonomous individuality on which
a political theory of rational consensus (Habermas, for
instance) hangs its aspirations simply will not support such
weight
.
We can close this excursus to Hegel, and bring this
question to a head, by recalling Marx's response to the
Hegelian ode to the state. If the state is not "the actual-
ity of the ethical Idea," but rather primarily an instrument
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of class domination, then the immediate project for Marx
becomes the Aufhebung of both class and the state itself.
This, Marx and Engels insist, is not to be left to the self-
destructive tendencies within capitalism, but must be taken
up as a collective, political project:
If the proletariat ... is compelled, by the force of
circumstances, to organize itself as a class; if
by means of a revolution, it makes itself the
ruling class, and, as such sweeps away by force
the old conditions of production, then it
will... have swept away the conditions for the
existence of class antagonisms, and of classes
generally, and will thereby have abolished its own
supremacy as a class. 14
As we saw in the last chapter, the very notion of a
collective, political project finds little encouragement or
attention in Adorno. Adorno shies away from questions of
political organization, leaving one with the distinct im-
pression that there is no such thing as a good collective.
Is there a way to draw Adornian theory out of its own solip-
sism?
In a passage which virtually sums up my previous chap-
ter's account of Adorno 's politics, Adorno seems to nod in
the direction of the (lapsed) ideal of the Philosophy of
Right:
The methexis wrought between each individual and
the universal by conscious thinking ... transcends
the contingency of the particular vis-a-vis the
universal, the basis of both Hegel's and the col-
lectivists' contempt for individuality. Experi-
ence and consistency enable the individual to see
in the universal a truth which the universal as
181
blindly prevailing power conceals from itself and
from others.
Unfortunately, Adorno never applies this dialectical account
of a critical engagement with the universal to a discussion
of lesser collectivities. Martin Jay makes the same point
in Marxism and Totality:
Despite his stress on mediation, [Adorno] made
little real attempt to investigate the concrete
social forces and forms between such an individual
and the totality. Micrological stress on the
smallest detail went hand in hand with macrologic-
al emphasis on the largest whole. What Adorno
lacked was any analysis of a possible intermediate
level between the collective subject of the ideal-
ists and Hegelian Marxists, on the one hand, and
the isolated, defensive individual of the bour-
16geois empiricists on the other.
Jay lays this insufficiency at the door of Adorno'
s
intense focus on non-identity, and no doubt the fear of
being swallowed up in a collective, any collective, plays an
important role in Adorno 1 s recoil from concrete speculations
on politics. Still, in the dialectical tension palpable in
the passage on the truth a critical individual is able to
"see in the universal," Adorno plants a seed for a theoreti-
cally-informed politics that points beyond simple consent,
to a solidarity that is not identity—but allows it to sleep
in what he takes to be the utterly fallow ground of the
totally administered society.
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c. Rediscovering Politics
Adorno's political deficit may not be incurable after
all. Greater attention to mediating institutions and prac-
tices, as well as a finer grasp of the antagonisms within
even late, 'state' capitalism, might show not only that
society is not as 'total' as it wants us to believe, but not
quite as totalitarian as Adorno would have us believe.
Politics, it might turn out, is not quite dead yet. Perhaps
there are institutions and practices neglected by Adorno
(and Hegel) which are more resilient and significant for
resistance to domination than he could have imagined.
Before we can elaborate on these intuitions, we need to
return to the psychoanalytic narrative, which is perhaps for
Adorno the capstone of the social dialectic of enlighten-
ment: the Spell is not something which oppresses people
from 'above' or 'outside,' but is rooted in precisely the
psychological dynamic proper to an economic system that
rationalizes its irrational obstruction of satisfaction and
welfare
.
The analysis of anti-Semitism in the last chapter of
Dialectic of Enlightenment is especially pertinent here.
Anti-Semitism, Adorno and Horkheimer argue, is not some
localized, particular 'social problem,' or psychological
'dysfunction'; it is a crucial mechanism in late capitalism
for turning the psychic friction generated by the system
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back against the subject. Anti-Semitism not only directs
the attention of the exploited away from exploitation, 17 but
also serves as a channel for the aggression and violence
that accrues to the powerless under late capitalism, a
senseless "discharge" of the anger of "blinded men robbed of
their subjectivity
. . . set loose as subjects." 18
In that sense anti-Semitism is totally irrational: it
has no intelligible relation to its target, which might well
have been something else: Gypsies, communists, gays, etc.
At the same time, however, Adorno and Horkheimer insist
there is something particular about the symbolic status of
Jews that calls forth an especially virulent, especially
implacable violence:
No matter what the Jews as such may be like, their
image, as that of the defeated people, has the
features to which totalitarian domination must be
completely hostile: happiness without power,
wages without work, a home without frontiers, a
religion without myth. These characteristics are
hated by the rulers because the ruled secretly
long to possess them. The rulers are only safe as
long as the people they rule turn their longed-for
goals into hated forms of evil. 19
The image of Jewish "happiness without power" evokes
the prohibited sense of Utopia, and wounds the exploited by
reminding them of what they have been forced to renounce.
We saw a very dialectical reinforcement of renunciation
in the second chapter, in the discussion of ambivalence and
spite. Here too, the emphasis was on the recoil of pent-up
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aggression upon anything and anyone who would remind the
dominated what they have been made to give up. 20
In both anti-Semitic aggression and the smash hits of
the culture industry, Adorno suggests that the constituents
of totally administered societies retain some link to agency
and rationality. Even when they seem to have been reduced
to lockstep conformity, there are signs that the sacrifice
of volition and autonomy wrung from them is not completely
effaced.
These considerations lead Adorno in "On Popular Music"
to argue that it would be a mistake to see the conformity of
culture industry 'crazes'—which are "examples of much
broader issues of mass psychology" 21—as a passive falling
into line or relinquishing resistance. On the contrary,
Adorno argues
:
They need their will, if only to down the all too
conscious premonition that something is "phony"
with their pleasure. This transformation of their
will indicates that will is still alive and that
under certain circumstances it may be strong
enough to get rid of the superimposed influences
which dog its every step. 22
Even allowing that the proximity to consciousness of
this wilful subordination to the culture industry leads to
the paradox that "it is almost insuperably difficult to
break through this thin veil," 23 Adorno concludes on a
surprisingly optimistic note. In Negative Dialectics, he
offers the more familiar Adornian lament (in a similar
context of wilful renunciation) that "The subjective con-
185
sciousness of men is socially too enfeebled to burst the
invariants it is imprisoned in." 24 But in "On Popular
Music," we hear a rarer motif:
Even the belief that people today react like in-
sects [i.e. jitterbugs] and are degenerating into
mere centers of socially conditioned reflexes,
still belongs to the facade.... To become a jitter-
bug or simply to "like" popular music, it does not
by any means suffice to give oneself up and to
fall in line passively. To become transformed
into an insect, man needs that energy which might
possibly achieve his transformation into a man. 25
Adorno ends the essay at this point, and does not go on to
consider (here or anywhere else) how one might seek to
defuse the fury that meets any reminder of the Utopian.
The analyses of anti-Semitism and of the consumption of
culture both tend to reinforce the notion that resistance to
domination is marginalized or turned away from its proper
focus; the anti-Semite trains the rage and frustration
wrought by late capitalist society against the Jews as
prominent 'Others,' and the jitterbug vents the friction of
self-sacrifice demanded by the culture industry on the
antisocial 'highbrows' who balk at the aesthetic and social
travesty everyone else has been compelled to embrace.
But the analysis of spite suggests another line of
argument, which Adorno just barely gestures toward in "On
Popular Music." That even the most conformist and 'integra-
ted' subjects are not insensitive to reminders of what they
have been forced to forego suggests that an important part
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of a politics of critical theory would attend to this anam-
nesis of Utopia.
Adorno's frequent invocations of Utopia certainly are
meant as precisely such reminders. His analysis of late
capitalism as a closed, politically and socially domesticat-
ed society reduces this insight to a fairly harmless ritual.
The argument that the costs of conforming cannot be com-
pletely effaced hints that the volatility of 'mass' enthusi-
asms—the potential for backlash—masks some consciousness
of domination and fraud. At the same time, this spiteful
consciousness remembers the promises that were made to it,
and might yet be shown how they were broken.
But breaking the Spell, circumventing spite, can not be
envisioned as a political project within the bounds of
Adorno's theory, since the domain of politics is understood
to be completely woven from the bad totality. Politics, as
I suggested above, is left in the sphere of 'superstruct-
ure, ' as long as the only conceivable collectives are bad
ones
.
How necessary is this dismissal of politics? To the
extent that his suspicion of collective identity leaves
Adorno so cold to politics that the defeated proletariat
becomes a kind of excuse to ignore political conflicts
happening around him, Adorno can not be easily made into a
'political theorist.'
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While we need not take 'polities' in late capitalism at
face value, we ought to challenge Adorno's willingness to
decide beforehand that politics is no longer politically
relevent, that apparent manifestations of resistance can't
touch the real structure of domination. A determination to
take up the question of politics after the miscarriage of
revolution, can only do so by departing from Adorno when his
conclusions fall short of the best theoretical intentions of
his work.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will sketch what I
think this involves, with the understanding that this can
only constitute a kind of prospectus for another project
entirely
.
D. Renewing Critical Theory
On the basis of what I have written here, one can
conclude that Adorno's political sociology is limited by
(among other things) the shortcomings of the analysis of an
integrated, pacified state capitalism. A renewal of critical
theory would have to situate political conflicts within a much
more adequate vision of the dynamic, antagonistic constella-
tion of contemporary capitalism.
Pollock's theses on state capitalism—the displacement of
markets by planning, the fusion of economic and political
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elites —have a measure of truth, but obviously can not stand
without a thorough re-writing. It is not possible here to do
much more than gesture at the mountain of Marxist and non-
Marxist work in this area; some common concerns, however, are
impossible to ignore: the ever more complete international-
ization of markets, the inadeguacy of the classic Marxist
account of class, the importance of government policy and of
credit and finance, and the importance of intracapitalist
relations
.
Each of these things highlights the complex, crosscutting
antagonisms and political pressures at work within capitalism.
This complexity is both daunting and encouraging: it is
certainly not the monolithic, integrated system that Pollock
described. At the same time, it is some kind of 'system, 1 (if
a system of interlocking systems) and there are no guarantees
that the workings of its antagonisms are preparing the ground
for a post-capitalist, non-exploitative system.
Still, this attempt to rearticulate the economic and
political landscape of late capitalism will not force a
revision of Adornian conclusions unless his account of the
decline of the subject can be shown to be flawed in some
relevant way.
Here again, Adorno's own accomplishments in this regard
need to be extended and rearticulated . The question of
subjectivity and politics could hardly be more relevant in a
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time when politically organized hatred and 'barbarism' seem to
be resurgent nearly everywhere.
The link Adorno attempts to draw between economic
imperatives and individual rationality, character, and
conscience—what I
'
ve called entrepreneurial agency—addresses
only a very narrow range of subjects, and makes a poor
standard for contemporary individuality, given its exclusion
of subjects who are not in a position to sell their labor
power in the market. Critical theory needs a thorough re-
thinking of the problem of subjectivity: a theory of agency,
labor and desire that can speak to (among other things) the
workings of structural imperatives of sexism and racism on
subjectivity
.
If Adornian social analysis needs more sociology, more
economics, and more politics, his account of subjectivity
likewise can be pushed beyond its limitations with 'more'
psychology. There are two moments in Adorno that are critical
to the problem of political consciousness, and yet relatively
undeveloped: the unsettling force of desire, and the mode of
subjectivity Adorno ascribes to aesthetic understanding.
By and large, Adorno tends to emphasize the ways in which
subjects are bound to domination through their own desire.
But there is more to desire than this; Horkheimer and Adorno
hint at this in Dialectic of Enlightenment:
In every product of the culture industry, the
permanent denial imposed by civilization is once
again unmistakably demonstrated and inflicted upon
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its victims. To offer and deprive them of some-
thing is one and the same.
The notion of "the permanent denial imposed by civilization,"
in its echo of Civilization and Its Discontents, reminds us of
the unsettling, relentlessly anti-institutional side of
desire. If Adorno presents the totally administered society
as a totality which is not quite as total as it claims, as a
circle that appears to close but can't quite, then unfulfilled
desire ought to be the most important marker of late capital-
ism's non-identity with itself.
To switch to the sort of classical metaphor Adorno
favors, if our society is as arrogant, efficient and deadly as
the Greeks' greatest hero, might desire not be its Achilles'
27heel? There is some persistent ambivalence in Dialectic of
Enlightenment over the relation of desire to the prevailing
totality. On the one hand, they abhor the kind of mindless,
unmediated pleasure the culture industry seems to offer; at
the same time, they tend to insist that the culture industry
really can't deliver: it promises escape from the drudgery of
work, but in the end reinforces the heteronomous rhythm of
production. Surely the reader is bound to trip over a
sentence like:
Pleasure hardens into boredom because, if it is to
remain pleasure, it must not demand any effort and
therefore moves rigorously in the worn grooves of
28
association
.
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Horkheimer and Adorno try to reconcile the culture
industry and desire by emphasizing the extent to which the
former manufactures its customers' needs to accord with its
output. Still they admit that there is a limit to this
strategy, since the culture industry can hardly admit what it
is really selling:
The culture industry perpetually cheats its consum-
ers of what it perpetually promises. The promisso-
ry note which, with its plots and staging, it draws
on pleasure is endlessly prolonged; the promise,
which is actually all the spectacle consists of, is
illusory: all it actually confirms is that the
real point will never be reached, that the diner
must be satisfied with the menu.
As long as it seems to offer pleasure and escape, the culture
industry (and its liegelord, late capitalism) is playing with
fire. Desire always comes back for more than it can get, and
fascism and revolution both seem to take root in the gap
between the socially preformed needs the culture industry
caters to and the 'more' that persists in the memory of
desire
.
Adorno and Horkheimer argue in almost Foucauldian terms
that the culture industry dampens the critical force of desire
by continually reinforcing the illusion of its own totality
and inescapability
:
What is decisive today is... the necessity in the
system not to leave the customer alone, not for a
moment to allow him any suspicion that resistance
is possible ... .Not only does it make him believe
that the deception it practices is satisfaction,
but it goes further and implies that, whatever the
state of affairs, he must put up with what is offered.
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Still, Adorno's comments on ambivalence and spite make clear
that this gambit is never entirely successful.
Adorno's 'ascetic' distrust of pleasure (which I criti-
cized earlier) is an important part of the awkward status of
desire and pleasure in the dialectic of enlightenment.
Adorno's stress on the unavoidably complicit nature of
pleasure causes him to undervalue the negative force of
desire. Here again, we might look back to Hegel, where
Begierde is the motive force of dialectics: it is desire that
set The Phenomenology of Spirit in motion, and desire as sheer
negativity—as Geist' s felt non-identity with itself—is
ultimately at one with critique.
Horkheimer and Adorno's emphasis on fear as the root of
the dialectic of enlightenment displaces the role desire could
play as the link between central Adornian concepts of nature,
suffering and reason. A dialectical account of desire that
remembered Hegel (without suspending the dialectic as he does
with women) would have to work along two axes. Desire has not
only a critical and an affirmative side, but a social dimen-
sion that has been overshadowed by its more obvious antisocial
dimension
.
The affirmative side of desire is bound up with what
Adorno saw as its conciliatory nature (as we saw in chapter
I). Desire seems to be always on the verge of capitulating;
satisfaction, we usually imagine, is the end of desire (at
least in the moment).
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Even here though, it has to be noted that the relation of
gratification to desire is far from linear and simple. The
pleasure of gratification does not simply cancel or exhaust
desire; certainly in what Jean Baudrillard calls 'societe de
consommation, ' gratification is planned to call forth more
desire. Contentment, a shortage of desire, would sabotage the
whole more surely than any shortage of oil or coal.
This suggests a refinement of the culture industry
thesis: the culture industry, as recent work in cultural
studies {Dialectic of Enlightenment' s bastard godchild)
recognizes, constantly mobilizes our discontent in a field of
commodities, in which our half-conscious fetishism takes most
of its pleasure in the lusting after of things more than in
their 'use.' In this respect, Horkheimer and Adorno deploy a
rather too simple understanding of desire and gratification,
especially in the field of culture.
Adorno 's backward-looking orientation allowed him to look
down upon the culture industry from the beleagured heights of
classical Bildung, an option that is hardly conceivable
anymore. Two generations of scholars have now grown up under
a more mature, realized, and sophisticated culture industry,
and the persistence of Adornian themes in works like Guy
Debord's Society of the Spectacle is modulated through the
increasing recognition that there is no longer an 'outside'
from which to condemn the culture industry. Even elitists and
hip avant-gardists can hardly ignore the extent to which their
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aesthetic judgements are just one more set of pigeonholes
thoughtfully provided by the cultural combines. And even the
hippest and most erudite, it seems to me, feel the erotic pull
of consumption. Even political theorists go to the mall now.
All this seems only to confirm Adorno 1 s suspicion that
the cycle of desire and pleasure work primarily to interrupt
thought and reflection. Still, thought can hardly be imagined
to emerge from anything else than desire, as Hegel elegantly
demonstrates. Desire appears very suddenly in the
Phenomenology, early in the section on 'Self-Consciousness';
we labor through a thicket of convoluted meditations upon
perception and self-perception to be ambushed by the conclu-
sion, "...i.e. self-consciousness is Desire in general." 32
Desire commences the analysis of self-consciousness, and is a
turning point in the ontogeny of Reason, because it draws the
subject out of itself, making it conscious of its own noniden-
tity with itself, and ultimately of its dialectical dependence
on other subjects. At every step in the analysis of self-
consciousness, desire is the moment of negation that pushes
the subject out of its complacency and drives it to renew its
engagement with the world to discover the truth of itself.
Desire and the self-certainty obtained in its
gratification, are conditioned by the object, for
self-certainty comes from superseding this other:
in order that this supersession can take place,
there must be this other. Thus self-consciousness,
by its negative relation to the object, is unable
to supersede it; it is really because of that
relation that is^ produces the object again, and the
desire as well.
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Self-consciousness, discovers it needs a special kind of
object to continue its education. Desire sets the mas-
ter/slave dialectic in motion, and frustrated desire marks the
irrationality of domination, and makes possible the extended
meditation on freedom, reason, and nature that make up the
rest of the Phenomenology.
Here we come upon the second axis necessary to any
discussion of desire: its affinity to both anti-social and
social ends. The failure of the master/slave dialectic marks
the point in Hegel's narrative that may be the key to resusci-
tating a critical theory that can speak to politics. As we
saw in our earlier discussion of the Philosophy of Right, one
of Hegel's great accomplishments is to highlight the irrevoca-
bly social nature of subjectivity and rationality. We learn
the same lesson early in the Phenomenology: self-conscious-
ness is a social project, and reason and desire intertwine our
lives, whether we like it or not, with those of other people.
This insight tends to be crushed under the weight of the
universal it comes to support, since Hegel, as Adorno put it
so eloquently, was not so much interested in individuals as in
individuality
.
Still, here as in the Hegelian state, we have the germ of
a compelling attempt to navigate the tension between the
'inside' and the 'outside' of subjectivity. Desire and reason
both mark the point at which the I finds itself through
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mediation with not-I; both find their highest satisfaction in
relations with other people.
One of the central projects of the Enlightenment was to
confirm exactly this congruence, to overcome the opposition
between mind and body, between individual interest and the
common good. When Freud (following Nietzsche's similar
manuevers a generation-and-a-half earlier) revitalized the
time-honored narrative of the irreconciliable tension between
desire and civilization, he revoked the focus on recognition
and intersub jectivity which lay dormant in Hegel.
Freud's narrative of the internal dynamics of the ego
promises more intersubjectivity than it delivers. Desire in
Freud does bind subjects together—but not as subjects;
Freud's naturalization of desire shifts attention away from
recognition and intersubjectivity , toward the instrumental,
amoral impact that subjects have on each other. His account
of the child's relation to his parents is not about a real
relationship between individuals, but a narrative of imperson-
34
al shadow-play going on within every little boy.
Unfortunately, in this regard, Adorno chose to follow
Freud rather than Hegel, developing an account of the anti-
social nature of pleasure without any of the Oedipal window-
dressing. Several critics have taken Adorno to task for
lacking an appreciation for intersubjectivity
.
35 Connerton's
critique is undermined by his reductive reading of the
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dialectic of enlightenment, and leads him to argue that Adorno
loses sight of "the notion of the self as socially produced." 36
Habermas criticizes Adorno for a 'philosophy of conscious-
ness, ' arguing that Adorno and Horkheimer conflate reason and
'instrumental reason.' Not only is this a misreading of
Adorno, but it is very hard to see how Habermas* own theory of
'communicative ethics' includes any meaningful intersub jective
dimension
.
37
Only Jessica Benjamin has really given this topic the
attention it deserves, and even her attempt to move Adorno
beyond his own limitations is hampered by the conflation of
Adorno and Horkheimer I remarked upon earlier. Benjamin does,
however locate the root of the problem in Adorno' s indebted-
ness to Freud.
In Civilization and Its Discontents
,
anti-social desire
warrants explicitly conservative political conclusions; in
Adorno it serves more to warn us against any conflation of
revolution with hedonism or utilitarianism. But it also
forecloses on the most promising source of 'revolutionary'
energy: the desire for Utopia is only intelligible in the
38
context of solidarity .
If there is anything that would arouse more suspicion in
Adorno than pleasure and enthusiasm, it could only be collec-
tive enthusiasm and a feeling of 'identifying' with some
larger community of people. Adorno is deeply suspicious of
the notion of community because he doubts that meaningful
198
community could be founded on the prevailing sort of mass-
produced, conformist subjectivity. Adorno would argue, I
think, that there is no hope for community without individual-
ity.
At the same time, Adorno is clearly wary of the coercive
power of every collective. Certainly this has something to do
with his interpretation of the avenues of 'solidarity'
available to him throughout his life: he was not about to go
the route of Lukacs (or Brecht). The argumentation of
Negative Dialectics is instructive here: arguments for the
independence of theory and critigues of party discipline recur
throughout the book paired with critigues of identity-think-
ing, and attempts to specify how negative dialectics might
'unseal the nonconceptual ' with concepts. 39 Adorno 's 'aloof-
ness 1 from contemporary politics stems, I think, from a fear
that any conceivable involvement with politics in this world
necessarily compromises the kind of hard-won and endangered
individuality he prized, and makes one subject to "the
insatiable identity principle that perpetuates antagonism by
suppressing contradiction." 40
This may have been, in some sense, a reasonable political
judgment during most of Adorno 's lifetime: not one beyond
challenge, but it was certainly not a ridiculous assessment,
and looks much smarter with hindsight than falling in step
with the Comintern. However, even granting the unsuitability
of a critical solidarity with the major Marxist options,
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Adorno's justified suspicion of the demands of party politics
slides too easily into paranoia, and a kind of purism which
would rather lacerate itself for its complicity in domination
than explore affiliations that are not immediately present.
The point here is not to scold Adorno for a personal
failure to find a good spot on a barricade, but rather, to
question the ways in which his revulsion at the political
options in his field of vision pushed his theory into near-
solipsism. To recall the opening of chapter two: politics
may have been driven into aesthetics, but its retreat was
awfully hasty.
As I argued in the last chapter, the persistence of
political struggles that do not register on Adorno's radar
highlights his (in this case unfortunate) reliance on surpris-
ingly orthodox Marxist categories. It is striking that Adorno
fails to consider any form of collective resistance (any form
of meaningful politics) outside of the classical Marxist one.
His approaches to explicitly political questions begin and end
with the conclusion that Communism is "the very relapse into
barbarism which it was supposed to prevent.
Coupled with the critique of the culture industry, which
is meant to expose the claims of pluralist apologists in the
West, this grants Adorno leave to ignore conflicts in the
social realm, and abandon any concern with politics to the
superstructure critical theory ought to have discredited.
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E. Recognition and Solidarity
However much it might seem otherwise at this juncture, we
need not set Adorno beside Nietzsche as a brilliant anti-
political philosopher. The question of intersubjectivity , and
of a social dimension to desire allow us to push Adorno ' s
analysis in a direction which might maintain the intransigent,
dialectical critique of Adornian political theory, without
walling it off from political engagement in the way that
Adorno does
.
The Hegelian emphasis on recognition, most especially in
the account of its failure in the master/slave dialectic, lays
out the criteria for real intersubjectivity . But not only
that: Hegelian recognition opens the door to a critical
theory of solidarity, which can shift the ground of liberal
and Marxist thinking about politics, and at the same time
assuage Adorno' s fear of the collective.
Recognition in the Hegelian sense, when and if it is
successful, defines mutuality in terms that Adorno himself
intimates are the key to defusing the dialectic of enlighten-
ment: a relationship that does not aim at the subsumption of
the other, but needs to sustain the other in its alterity.
While Adorno' s writing evinces little hope in intersubjective
relations, these are precisely the terms which he uses to
discuss a reconciliation with nature:
Things congeal as fragments of that which was
subjugated; to rescue it means to love things....
201
The reconciled condition would not be the philo-
sophical imperialism of annexing the alien. In-
stead, its happiness would lie in the fact that the
alien, in the proximity it is granted, remains what
is distant and different, beyond the heterogeneous
and beyond that which is one's own. 42
Substitute 'other people' for 'things,' and one has a summary
of "solidarity" that is hard to improve upon.
This model of intersubjective relations is an exemplary
basis, it seems to me, for rethinking democratic citizenship
and solidarity. Understanding others as other people, as at
the same time alike and not the same as oneself, is the very
foundation of democratic theory and praxis.
Further, if we challenge the quarantine between reason
and desire, between rationality and the emotions (as Hegelian
theory aspires, unsuccessfully, and as Nietzsche, Freud, and
Foucault have made ever more the pressing task of social
theory), this understanding of solidarity pushes democratic
theory beyond the liberal schema of formal rights and respon-
sibilities. Ultimately, the Hegelian logic of recognition is
only the dressed-up-in-its-Sunday-clothes version of the logic
of love.
To the extent that twentieth-century social theory has
seen psychoanalytic and Nietzschean challenges to liberal
rationalism, these have almost always been to cast doubt on
the project of an enlightened politics. The Frankfurt
School's work on fascism and anti-Semitism is a not insignifi-
cant case in point.
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Perhaps the less mainstream inclinations of writers like
Reich and Marcuse were on to something more promising.
Recognition, understood as a basic emotional need for mutuali-
ty, grounded in our ineluctable connectedness, ought to allow
us to push politics beyond mechanical theories of interest,
and presage an Aufhebung of liberal rights-talk, grounding it
in the living—but yet to be realized—solidarity of people in
a particular society.
One could hardly imagine a better definition of the
substance of a positive theory of democracy than solidarity,
understood as an identification with community that sustains
the self without subsuming it. It also happens to be, I would
suggest, the project of a renewed critical theory, precisely
because: you can't buy this kind of solidarity ready-made.
Community is more than a natural formation into which one
is 'thrown'; it is a continual problem and project, whether or
not it is consciously understood as such. For a politics
determined to make good on the wild optimism of the Enlighten-
ment, the form and content of solidarity are really the same;
sustaining a political movement can be nothing else than
sustaining democracy.
Liberal political theory's mechanical focus on interest,
obscures the fact that politics changes people. Even Marxist
notions of solidarity, which might hope at least for some
strategic outbursts of enthusiasm, have largely neglected
this. 43 Again, it is Hegel foremost among modern political
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philosophers that highlights the constitutive dimension of
political life: 44 if the universal that citizens come to
consciously recognize in the life of the state ultimately
buries them, we should not forget that it is this encounter
with the universal that makes citizens, properly speaking.
This insight is critically important if we are to rescue
Adornian critical theory from its affinity with solipsism.
Adorno ought to have been interested in political conflicts
around him, regardless of the 'unprecedented power of the
apparatus,' for two reasons. The moment a group of people
press their demands upon recalcitrant authorities, even
limited, very conventional attempts at reform potentially
expose subjects to precisely the sort of structual imperatives
he identifies with liberal capitalism.
Beyond this, every political space, even gatherings of
political parties, brushes up against an intimation of genuine
solidarity, and threatens to cathect the social dimension of
desire in ways which can not be foreseen beforehand.
In this respect, nothing could be more salutary for the
cliques in power than the widespread conviction that politics
is meaningless and hopeless, and only people desperate enough
to have no choice but to hope against hope can pose any threat
to their power.
There are a number of conceivable objections to this line
of argument around solidarity and an insistence on the
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constitutive dimension of politics; in the remaining pages, I
will take up some response to the most significant and obvious
ones
.
One may suspect this privileging of community and
solidarity of mirroring what has been one of the persistent
shortcomings of social theory until very recently, and of
radical social theory especially: its fixation on one encom-
passing community, which would contain and domesticate the
petty, 'partial' differences that sully it.
It is no longer (if it ever were) tolerable to speak this
way; we know too much now of the costs of suppressing and
subordinating difference, and can look back on a long history
of self-defeating attempts to put aside the concerns of women,
or of blacks, etc. on behalf of the 'larger' interests of the
collective
.
What is needed now, is rather a theory of solidarity and
collective action that can address the problems of articula-
tion and coordination between collectives. 45 This project
obviously faces a host of difficulties; there are two sugges-
tions I would offer in this direction.
First, it nearly goes without saying, we need to appreci-
ate and be able to speak to the ways in which ideal communi-
ties overlap concrete individuals in nearly infinitely complex
ways. This kind of meta-identity politics is a topic that has
benefited from an avalanche of attention in recent social
theory: 46 there cannot be a theory of 'working class poli-
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tics,' 'lesbian politics, 1 or 'Latino politics,' but only
theories of the articulation of these around particular
political questions in ways which can negotiate these kind of
cross-cutting identif icatons
.
Secondly, I think we should not forget the Hegelian mega-
collective; if only as the negative universal hanging over the
community. The world-historical genie that Hegel tried to
stuff back into the bottle of the nation-state expresses our
real interconnectedness
, which is becoming ever more impossi-
ble to forget at the same time it seems less and less amenable
to conscious intervention. This ultimately, I think, has to
orient concrete political strategies within the 'partial'
communities of race, class, sexuality, and gender
—
without, it
should be apparent, attempting to dissolve or 'reconcile'
these differences in the mega-community.
A possibly more damaging objection comes from the same
arguments of Freud to which this argument was meant in some
sense to respond. In Civilization and Its Discontents , Freud
(explicitly arguing against a link between love and socialism)
dons the majestic robes of the Hobbesian hard-nosed Realist to
remind us that a person's neighbor is:
not only a potential helper or sexual object, but
also someone who tempts them to satisfy his aggres-
siveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work
without compensation, to use him sexually without
his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate
him, to cause him pain, to torture and kill him.
Homo homini lupus. Who, in the face of all his
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experience of life and of history, will have the
courage to dispute this assertion?
Amidst this florid sado-masochistic fantasy, there is a
serious social and political argument, as old and honorable as
any in the canon: that people are not inclined to cooperate,
that a society that takes for granted any measure of goodwill
not wrung out of its members by the ultimate promise of
violence, cannot be imagined to perpetuate itself.
Freud updates this chestnut for post-Nietzschean moderni-
ty: we all have an inherent, ineradicable drive to aggres-
sion; we cannot escape or wish away our animalistic, Darwinian
heritage
.
It is not necessary (thankfully) to embroil a defense of
solidarity in the sprawling controversy over human nature,
competition, and aggression. It seems to me that we don't
need to refute the argument that desire has an anti-social
side, to argue that it also has a 'social' side, and that the
project of a humane politics is self-evidently to cultivate
institutional cathexes with the side of desire that ties
48people to one another in non-dominating ways.
One might object that an emphasis on love and solidarity,
taken even to the point of an endorsement of the transform-
ative potential of mass enthusiasm, leads directly to what
Adorno fears most: the dissolution of the individual into the
newly validated "community."
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But solidarity is not meant to connote the kind of
experience that Freud ridicules as the "oceanic feeling" of
oneness with humanity. It is precisely the conscious engage-
ment with domination and suffering in the society one lives
in, made real through concrete membership in various cross-
cutting communities. It is an attentiveness to one's own
complicity in domination as well as a recognition of the ways
in which one's own fate is bound up with people whom one may
have very little 'in common' with.
In political life, solidarity comes into maturity as the
capacity to link the concrete political ends to a critigue of
the bad totality, and an openness to the unigue pleasure of
common work in the political sphere.
The very fact that no community is hermetically distinct,
that we are all prisms of a number of identities, is the
surest guarantor against a regress to 'mass politics.'
Indeed, I think much of the theoretical and practical energy
of a community is devoted, consciously or unconsciously, to
understanding and negotiating its relation to the array of
communities it overlaps.
The direst objection against all this will stand as the
last one: that it depends upon exactly the kind of conscious,
critical, 'robust' subjects that Adorno believes to be
(nearly) extinct. This is an objection that we cannot dodge
so easily.
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I suppose my first inclination is to argue that one
simply cannot assume that really existing subjects are beyond
recall. This leaves one the equally unpalatable political
options of a Zarathustran retreat to the mountains, or a kind
of hyper-Leninist attempt to compete with late capitalism in
the business of cultural and psychological manipulation.
If Adorno's critique is to mean anything to contemporary
radicalism, one is left with the rather mundane Gramscian
realization that the ultimate success of the project is not a
topic for theoretical or practical consideration; if you'll
excuse an extremely tiresome phrase (the kind Adorno loathed):
one does what one can.
Mostly because there really isn't any choice in the
matter; if Adorno's critique touches a person at all, then you
are left with an amended version of Martin Luther King's
ultimatum: one can be part of the problem and try to be part
of the solution, or one can simply be part of the problem.
The argument for solidarity suggests an avenue, moreover,
which will allow us to put aside these glum existential
musings which are so ill-suited to political science. It
seems to me that a renewal of the constitutive moment in
politics is the focus for whatever optimism-of-the-spirit we
might muster: political confrontation is educative like
nothing else.
One of the keenest examples of this in contemporary
American politics is middle class grass-roots conflicts with
209
polluters. No amount of political science is likely to push
the white middle class out of its radical anti-taxism, casual
racism, and 'social conservatism* in the way that a fight with
Monsanto or Dow chemical over what is going into the water
table. Where Michael Parenti and Noam Chomsky fail, an
initially modest political initiative can demonstrate to
people that the government is not their government, that
capitalism does not apologize for putting profits before
people, and that many things they always believed are simply
not true
.
But frustration and anger, even open hostility to the
political system, are hardly in short supply, and hardly
evince a very encouraging 'progressive' bent. If the left has
anything on its agenda in the West, it has to be the cathexis
of the legitimate anger and frustration of citizens across a
wide variety of 'identities' 49 with the felt understanding that
something entirely better is possible. How can the lust for
Adorno's Utopia compete with the lust for commodities? How
can solidarity compete with fear and the dialectic of enlight-
enment?
It seems to me that the answer to this guestion is
through politics, not over or "around.' If Adorno's Utopia
glimmers anywhere in the real world, aside from Beckett and
Schonberg, it flickers in the mundane solidarity people feel
who are engaged in more or less transformative projects right
now.
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And this is the gigantic contribution of the anarchist,
'infantile' wing of communism: that democracy and real
egalitarian community won't wait until after the revolution.
My insistence on the importance of solidarity is addressed in
no small part to radical theories that would privilege the
inculcation of class consciousness, or 'correct' theory over
what is sometimes dismissed as peripheral or ' superstructural
'
fixations. No social movement has any success unless it
engages (enough) people on the level of desire; revolution is
seductive, or it isn't a revolution. 50
What I intend by solidarity is not an abstract capacity
for identifying with others; it does not describe a diffuse
warm fuzzy feeling for 'humankind,' or for 'the oppressed.'
Rather, it is the felt and conscious attentiveness to frac-
tious and precarious particular communities—not just a shared
sense of responsibility for an organization's 'mental health,
'
but a collective thirst for utopia that is not cowed by the
mistakes and oversimplifications of past movements (or its
own) .
Nobody describes the unlikeliness of a living egalitari-
anism more thoroughly or trenchantly than Adorno; but it is
precisely here that one can experience, as in no other forum,
wrestling with the problems of autonomy and solidarity, theory
and praxis, negativity and Utopia, that widen the cracks in
21
1
the totally administered society and push back the shadow
the Spell.
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1. Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science, (New York:
Macmillan, 1978), p. 141.
2. This is certainly a critical issue in any attempt to
bring Adorno into contemporary 'critical theory'; a bit more
plainly: this is the point of attack for an Adornian
critique of Habermas
. I can hardly begin to deal with the
greatest living critical theorist within the confines of
this project.
3. V. I. Lenin, State and Revolution, (New York:
International Publishers, 1932), p. 84.
4. Negative Dialectics
,
p. 346.
5. Philosophy of Right, trans, by T.M. Knox, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1967), paragraph 203, p. 131. Note
that the inferior geistige status of farmers is literally
put down to their closeness to nature: in this respect they
are too much like women, in Hegel's view. One can't help
but wonder about the status of other economic agents not
really 'in the loop' of civil society, especially the
parasitic Junkers. It is hard to imagine how Hegel could
excuse the rentier classes from the criticisms he makes
here
.
6. The Philosophy of Right, paragraph 189, p. 126.
7. The Philosophy of Right, paragraph 187, pp. 124-125.
8. Negative Dialectics
,
pp. 261-262.
9. Negative Dialectics, p. 262 (translation altered).
10. Hegel: Three Studies, (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), pp. 28-
30.
11. Hegel: Three Studies, p. 29.
12. Philosophy of Right, paragraph 183, p. 123.
13. Philosophy of Right, paragraph 258, pp. 155-156.
14. Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, (New York:
International Publishers), p. 31.
15. Negative Dialectics, p. 344.
16. Marxism and Totality, (Berkeley: 1984), pp. 271-272.
17. See Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp. 174-176.
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18. Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 171.
19. Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 199. Actually, one
could make a similar argument about Gypsies, gays, and
communists: each seems to carry some reminder of the
prohibited Utopia.
20. See especially "On Popular Music," Studies in
Philosophy and Social Science, no. 9 (1944), pp. 44-48.
21. "On Popular Music," p. 47.
22. "On Popular Music," p. 47.
23. "On Popular Music," p. 47.
24. Negative Dialectics
, p. 95.
25. "On Popular Music," pp. 47-48.
26. Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 145.
27. And perhaps it is not simply coincidental that Achilles
is brought down by the 'effeminate' Paris, whose unruly
desire started the Trojan War.
28. Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 137.
29. Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 139.
30. Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp. 141-142.
31 . A selection from this important early book, along with
one from the equally fascinating Systeme de objets, has been
published in English in Jean Baudrillard : Selected Writings
,
edited by Mark Poster (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1988)
.
32. The Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V.
Miller, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), paragraph
167, p. 105.
33. The Phenomenology of Spirit, paragraph 175, p. 109.
34. On psycyhoanalysis and intersubjectivity , see Jessica
Benjamin's excellent book, The Bonds of Love:
Psychoanalysis , Feminism, and the Problem of Domination,
(New York: Pantheon, 1988).
35. See Connerton, The Tragedy of Enlightenment, pp. 75-77;
Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I, pp.
388ff.; J. Benjamin, "The End of Internalization," Telos,
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no. 32 (Summer 1977), pp. 48ff.
36. The Tragedy of Enlightenment, p. 75.
37. In fact, I would argue that Adorno
' s texts presume a
really intersubjective relationship with the reader, in a
way to which Habermas 1 textbook-like contributions are
evidently deaf.
38. Interestingly, solidarity appears in a handful of
Adornian sentences, usually in the context of an attack on
Communist-enforced conformity. See, e.g., Minima Moralia,
p. 51, and a lovely sentence evoking "a solidarity that is
transparent to itself and all the living" (Negative
Dialectics, p. 204), which—like most of Adorno' s close
brushes with concepts that border on practical politics
—
hangs suspended in the text, with no elaboration.
39. See, e.g.: pp. 3-6, pp. 141-144, and pp. 203-207.
40. Negative Dialectics
,
p. 142.
41. Negative Dialectics, 205.
42. Negative Dialectics, p. 191.
43. One might argue that the theoreticians and politicians
of Third World revolutions are a significant exception to
this: certainly a public enthusiasm for the continuing
project of revolution made Cuba much harder to dismiss as a
thoroughly authoritarian regime. In the West, the major
theoreticians with some affinity for the transformative
power of politics would seem to be Luxemburg and Sorel
.
44. My thinking about the constitutive power of political
life was sparked by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis' superb
book Democracy and Capitalism : Property
,
Community , and the
Contradictions of Modern Social Thought, (New York: Basic
Books, 1986).
45. This seems to be the intention, suffocated as it is by
their jargon, of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical
Democratic Strategy, (London: Verso, 1985). Even better
than this interesting book is the recent work of Shane
Phelan; see "Interpretation and Domination," Polity, (Fall
1993), and Identity Politics: Lesbian Feminism and the
Limits of Community, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1989), esp. ch. 4.
46. See, for instance, Phelan, Identity Politics, William
Connolly, Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of
21 5
Political Paradox, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991),
Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit, Mark C. Taylor,
Altarity, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), and
Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity: a Particular History
of the Senses, (New York: Routledge, 1993).
Adorno's contribution to the guestion of identity is
probably the point of his greatest influence on contemporary
social theory; in various ways, Phelan, Taussig, and Cornell
all acknowledge the relevance of Adorno's negative
dialectic
.
47. Civilization and Its Discontents
,
p. 69. Note again,
the friendliest alternative Freud cites is an instrumental,
purely external relationship.
48. In Freud, the only conceivable community is one bound
together in aggression against some 'outside.' This
argument is premised on the same intersub jective vacuum I
described above: there can be no positive internal cohesion
in a community since its members do not really relate to
each other as subjects.
49. Obviously, I am not suggesting that a radical political
strategy ought to (or could!) aspire to the allegiance of
everyone or almost everyone. But rather: even people in
the 'middle' might be convinced they have more to gain than
to lose from change.
50. The sympathy of Marcuse and Bookchin for the
libidinally-oriented moment of the 'counterculture' is worth
a critical revival. The most relevant texts here would be
Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, (Montreal: Black Rose
Books, 1986), and Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1969).
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